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Iv

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the
Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 4, and to Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), which provides that:
A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a
lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a
judge and would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided
that the misconduct was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary
proceeding as to which there has been a final determination by the
Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Screening Panel err in concluding that the Respondent, Ray
Harding did not violate Rules 8.4(a) or (d) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct? The standard of review is a correctness standard. See In re
Johnson. 2001 UT 110 (Utah 2001); see also In re Rav Harding. Jr..
Order of Reference, March 25, 2004.

2.

Did the Screening Panel err in finding no aggravating circumstances, and
according too much weight to those in mitigation? The standard of review
is a correctness standard. See In re Johnson. 2001 UT 110 (Utah 2001);
see also In re Rav Harding. Jr.. Order of Reference, March 25, 2004.

3.

Did the Screening Panel err in recommending that the Respondent, Ray
Harding, should be sanctioned with a five-year probation? The standard
of review of sanctions for professional misconduct in attorney discipline
actions is a correctness standard, and the Utah Supreme Court may make
an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if
the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997); see
also In re Rav Harding. Jr.. Order of Reference, March 25, 2004.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 8.4(a), Rules of Professional Conduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to
do so, or do so through the acts of another.
Rule 8.4(b), Rules of Professional Conduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer t o : . . . (b) Commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects.
Rule 8.4(d), Rules of Professional Conduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer t o : . . . (d) Engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Rule 4.2, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the
intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the
legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with
a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or
theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances;
or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
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Rule 4.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)

knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal
proceeding; or

(b)

engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements
listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline proceeding.
Course of the Proceedings: In accordance with an Order of Reference
from the Utah Supreme Court dated March 25, 2003, the Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC") was instructed "to proceed with a disciplinary review under its
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr.
Harding's license to practice law to be submitted directly to this Court for final
action."

Pursuant to this directive, the OPC presented the results of its

investigation to the Screening Panel on January 22, 2004, along with its
conclusions and recommendations for a specific sanction with respect to Mr.
Harding's law license in accordance with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions ("Standards"). Mr. Harding appeared for the Screening Panel hearing,
offered his own testimony and that of several witnesses, and made argument
concerning the sanction to be imposed.
Disposition By the Screening Panel: The Screening Panel concluded
that a six-month suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction, but

recommended that the suspension be stayed and that Mr. Harding be placed on
probation for a period of five years, with conditions including random drug testing,
and continued participation in a rehabilitation program.
Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review:
On July 13, 2002, after being called to Ray Harding Jr.'s home on a
domestic disturbance call, law enforcement officers found cocaine, heroin and
drug

paraphernalia.

Mr.

Harding's

person

also tested

positive for

benzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine.
Mr. Harding was arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts:
Count I - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree
felony; Title 58, Chapter 27, section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, section
202 of the Utah Code for knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a
controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance; Count
II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony;
Title 58, Chapter 37, section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, section 202 for
knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit:
Heroin, a Schedule I Controlled Substance.
Mr. Harding was a Fourth District Court Judge for the State of Utah at the
time the criminal charges were brought. Mr. Harding entered a plea of guilty to
two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances opiates in one count, cocaine in another, both of which are class A
misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was sentenced to 120 days in jail; fined; ordered to
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perform 500 hours of community service; and placed on probation for 24 months,
including participation in individual therapy and help from 12-step programs.
In the OPC's view, Mr. Harding also must have committed the illegal act of
soliciting the controlled substances that he used, inasmuch as cocaine and
heroin are controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally. Mr. Harding
may have solicited these controlled substances from an individual by the name of
Rick Connelly.
Mr. Harding conceded that no one could come into possession of illegal
controlled substances except by some illegal solicitation. He noted, however, that
he has never been and never will be charged with illegal solicitation, and it is
unlikely that the facts of this case would have supported such a criminal charge.
See Response to OPC Screening Panel Memo.
In addition to the July 13, 2002 incident, Ann Harding, who was Mr.
Harding's wife, told the police, and testified at the Screening Panel hearing, that
she had seen Mr. Harding smoking "crack" on a prior occasion, and he told her
that he had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding also
told her that he smoked "crack" in the bathroom while he was at work (as a
judge). Mrs. Harding also told police and testified at the hearing that Mr. Harding
had been on a drug "binge" for approximately three weeks prior to the July 13,
2002 incident.

This raises the question whether Mr. Harding was under the

influence of controlled substances while he was on the bench.
With respect to Mr. Harding's use of controlled substances and the effect
of these controlled substances on his judicial responsibilities, the Screening

Panel explored allegations that Mr. Harding at times used illegal drugs while he
was at work. Specifically, Mr. Harding allegedly was unable to attend a hearing
the Thursday before the July 13, 2002 incident as a result of his illegal controlled
substance use (even though the lawyers in the case settled the case so his
attendance was not necessary). Also, Mr. Harding may have been under the
influence of an illegal controlled substance at a hearing he presided over on
Friday July 12, 2002.

The lawyers at the hearing noticed that Mr. Harding

appeared drawn and ill. Moreover, Mr. Harding may have been under the
influence of illegal controlled substances at other times while on the bench and
specifically during the six-month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. Court
staff reported to the police that during this six-month period, Mr. Harding had
"mood" changes and often appeared bored and disinterested before brief
recesses, after which he returned refreshed.
Mr. Harding denied that he used illegal drugs while performing his duties
as a judge. His in-court clerk, Shauna Young Woodward, testified that she was
in daily close proximity to Mr. Harding, with an opportunity to observe his actions
and behavior, and never saw any evidence that he used illegal drugs at the
courthouse. Likewise, Judge Claudia Laycock and Judge Fred Howard, both of
whom had regular contact with Mr. Harding, testified that they never saw any
evidence of Mr. Harding using illegal drugs in the courthouse. Other attorneys Mike Petro (by proffer), Dave Sturgill, and John Allen - also testified that when
they appeared in front of Mr. Harding they never observed any behavior that
would lead them to conclude that Mr. Harding was under the influence of drugs,
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and they appeared in front of Mr. Harding on a fairly regular basis.

The

Screening Panel found that there was no proof that Mr. Harding used drugs in
chambers and that "The clear and convincing evidence is that Ray Harding did
not use drugs in the courthouse while acting as a judge." (Recommendation at
3.)
The Screening Panel also found that Mr. Harding's "decision to violate the
law and use illegal drugs was an intentional act," and that it violated Rule 8.4(b).
(Recommendation at 2.) It further found that "there was no violation of Rule
8.4(a), (c), or (d)." (Recommendation at 6.)
The Screening Panel also considered charges that Mr. Harding killed a
trophy moose and two cow elk on or about October 6, 2001 for which he could be
charged with several third-degree felony counts of wanton destruction of
protected wildlife. Mrs. Harding testified that Mr. Harding did not have the proper
licenses, and that she witnessed him killing the moose and elk outside of any
licensing limits.
Harding denied that he illegally killed any game animals. The Screening
Panel found that 'there is no evidence to support even a finding of probable
cause that Ray Harding committed the crime of poaching. The only statement to
that effect came from his ex-wife whom the Panel did not find credible."
(Recommendation at 6.)
Aggravating Circumstances
The Screening Panel found no aggravating circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances
The Screening Panel found the following mitigating circumstances:
Ray Harding sat as a District Court Judge when he engaged in the
misconduct of possessing and using illegal drugs. The evidence
before the Panel shows that he has paid a significant price for that
illegal conduct. He has been removed from his judgeship. He has
plead [sic] guilty to and been convicted of two misdemeanors. He
has spent 90 days in jail in circumstances which amounted to
solitary confinement. His confinement was in 'protective custody'
because the inmate population included those who had been sent
to the prison by his order as a judge, and protective custody was
necessary to provide safety to him during confinement. However,
that custody amounted to solitary confinement. He has also been
barred from holding any further judicial office in the State of Utah,
paid the maximum monetary fine imposed by the statute,
undergone treatment for drug dependency at the Betty Ford Clinic,
and become involved in 12-step programs on an on-going active
basis.
(Recommendation at 1.)
The Panel also found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harding
"has been completely drug free for a period lasting 18 months," and "is now over
95% likely to remain drug free." It further found that Mr. Harding's voluntary
withdrawal from practice, coupled with the testimony concerning his treatment
and recovery, "is reason to believe that he has sincerely and seriously pursued
the processes of rehabilitation, and that he has succeeded in putting his drug use
behind him for that time period." (Recommendation at 5.) It concluded that Mr.
Harding "has accomplished a 'meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation' and that he has otherwise qualified under Rule 6.3(i) for mitigation
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of

his

punishment

under

the

Rules

of

Professional

Discipline."1

(Recommendation at 5.)
A number of witnesses testified on Mr. Harding's behalf with respect to his
substance abuse and to his claim of a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation. The witnesses were as follows: Dr. Lynn Johnson, a
psychologist involved with Mr. Harding's aftercare through the Betty Ford Clinic;
Dr. Glen R. Hanson, Director of Utah Addiction Center; Francis Mackenzie, a
drug rehabilitation peer; Richard Uday, Director of Utah Lawyers Helping
Lawyers Program; Ed Brass, Mr. Harding's criminal defense attorney; Sheleigh
A. Chalkey-Harding (by proffer), an attorney and friend of Mr. Harding; Michelle
Monson (by proffer), Mr. Harding's daughter; James Heiting, an attorney and Mr.
Harding's current mentor and sponsor; and Nicole Farnsworth, Mr. Harding's
daughter. (Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.)
A number of witnesses testified on Mr. Harding's behalf with respect to his
good character and/or reputation.

These witnesses were Dr. Johnson; Mr.

Mackenzie; Mr. Uday; Thomas W. Seiler (by proffer), an attorney; Rick
Sutherland (by proffer), an attorney; Ms. Chalkey-Harding (by proffer); Paul
Belnap (by proffer), an attorney; John Allen, an attorney; Mike Petro (by proffer),
an attorney; Shauna Young Woodward, Mr. Harding's in-court clerk; Dave
Sturgill, an attorney; Ms. Monson (by proffer); Ms. Farnsworth; and Mr. Heiting.
(Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.)

1

The OPC believes that this is an erroneous reference to the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability, and that the reference intended is to the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Q

Mr. Harding had the following witnesses testify on his behalf as to his
personal and emotional problems: Dr. Johnson; Ms. Monson (proffer); and Ms.
Farnsworth. (Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.)
Witnesses who testified to Mr. Harding's remorse were Mr. Mackenzie; Mr.
Uday; Ms. Chalkey-Harding; Ms. Monson (by proffer); and Ms. Farnsworth.
(Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.)
The Screening Panel's Conclusions
The Screening Panel concluded that "Ray Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) in
that he committed the crime of possession of illegal drugs while an active judge
in the Fourth District Court." (Recommendation at 1.)
The Screening Panel's Recommendation of Sanctions
The Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Harding be suspended for
his violation of Rule 8.4(b), but that the suspension be stayed in favor of
probation in light of the mitigation. (Recommendation at 1.) Elsewhere, it stated,
in the totality of the circumstances, the Panel recommends that Ray
Harding be placed on Probation, and allowed to continue his
practice of law. The conditions for that probation should include
random drug testing, the costs of which should be borne by Ray
Harding, to be coordinated through the Office of Professional
Conduct. Further, Ray Harding should be required to participate in
a 12-step program on an on-going basis, at least monthly, for the
entire time of probation. That Panel recommends that the period of
probation last not less than five years.
(Recommendation at 5-6.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Screening Panel erred in concluding that Mr. Harding did not violate
Rule 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. His violation of Rule
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8.4(b) is necessarily a violation of Rule 8.4(a). Likewise, a conviction of serious
crimes committed by a sitting judge in and of itself constitutes conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
The Screening Panel also erred in its assessment of the aggravating
factors and in weighing these against the mitigating factors. The Panel identified
no aggravating factors, although the evidence supports the conclusion that a host
of these are present. By the same token, the Panel gave too much weight to the
factors it found in mitigation.
Finally, the Screening Panel erred in concluding that the appropriate
sanction would be a five-year probation with conditions to be monitored by the
OPC. Instead, a correct application of the Standards leads to disbarment as the
appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. Harding's misconduct. Although the
mitigation may be sufficient to warrant a downward departure from this
presumption, and a period of probation following a long-term suspension might
be appropriate as the ultimate sanction, a long-term probation by itself is
insufficient to protect the integrity of the profession.
ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Harding's Violation of Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) Necessarily
Constitutes the Violation of Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct
Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) provides that M[i]t is professional misconduct for a

lawyer to: . . . Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." The Panel
correctly concluded that Mr. Harding violated this rule through unlawful
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possession and use of cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia—crimes for
which he was charged and convicted.
Although the Panel did not address this, Mr. Harding also violated Rule
8.4(b) by soliciting the controlled substances he used: cocaine and heroin are
controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally and Mr. Harding
solicited them from another person. Violations of Rule 8.4(b) are not predicated
upon an attorney's conviction of a crime; the rule merely requires that the
attorney commit an act that constitutes a crime. See e.g. People v. Odom. 941
P.2d 919, 920-921 (Colo. 1997) (lawyer disciplined for crime of concealing
property to avoid seizure, for which he was never charged); In re Hassenstab.
934 P.2d 1110 (Or. 1997) (rule does not require criminal conviction). Moreover,
the criminal conduct for which a lawyer is subject to professional discipline need
not have been committed while the lawyer was acting in a professional capacity.
See In re Mullen 659 N.Y.S.2d 255 (App. Div. 1997) (lawyer made harassing
phone calls and posed as clerk to federal court judge to harass former girlfriend
at her law school); In re Capone. 689 A.2d 128 (N.J. 1997) (lawyer made false
statement on loan application); In re Peters. 428 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1988)
(formal adjudication that conduct is illegal is not necessary, nor are lawyer's
ethics obligations confined to conduct arising out of attorney-client relationship).
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) provides that it is professional misconduct for an
attorney to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. A
lawyer's first professional obligation is to obey the rules of professional ethics in
the jurisdiction in which he is licensed to practice. Thus, any violation of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct also constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(a). See
e.g. Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 662 So.2d 586, 591 (Miss. 1995) ("Rule 8.4 is the
'bread and butter* charge in attorney discipline cases; it accompanies almost any
other charge in a bar complaint"). Hence, Mr. Harding's violation of Rule 8.4(b)
is also necessarily a violation of Rule 8.4(a), and the Panel erred in concluding
that "there was no violation of Rule 8.4(a)...." (Recommendation at 6.)
II.

Mr. Harding's Possession and Use of Controlled Substances During
a Time When He Served as a District Court Judge Constitutes the
Violation of Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a

lawyer to: . . . Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice/' The Comment following the rule explains that "Lawyers holding public
office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A
lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional
role of attorney."
Even if there is no evidence that Mr. Harding's use of controlled
substances influenced the cases over which he presided, his position as a
District Court Judge, and particularly his responsibilities for the administration of
justice, subject him to the highest standard of conduct.

A judge is required to

show respect for and obey the law as an example to others. In the OPC's view,
Mr. Harding's illegal drug use while serving as a judge is sufficient to establish a
violation of 8.4(d), and the Screening Panel erred in concluding otherwise. Cf jn
re Inquiry Concerning a Judge. 403 S.E.2d 255, 257 (N.C. 1991) (during time
when respondent was judge, he possessed marijuana, cocaine, and

paraphernalia, and this constituted "willful misconduct in office and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute"); see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hambv. 589 A.2d 53 (Md.
1991) (court adopted trial court's finding that attorney violated Rules 8.4(b) and
8.4(d) by among other things possessing cocaine and resisting arrest); In re
Gooding, 917 P.2d 414 (1999 Kan.) (court found attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) by
violating criminal statutes which as a lawyer he had sworn to uphold.)
III.

The Screening Panel Incorrectly Applied the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, Thereby Reaching an Erroneous Result
Mr. Harding's solicitation, use, possession and conviction of attempted

possession of illegal controlled substances establishes that, at minimum, Mr.
Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, by committing
a criminal act that reflects on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects; Rule 8.4(d), by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice; and Rule 8.4(a), based on violations of these other
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Standards are used in determining the appropriate sanction or
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has
violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

See Rule 1.3,

Standards. The Standards ensure and maintain the high standard of professional
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional
responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are
unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their professional
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responsibilities.

See Rule 1.1, Standards.

The Standards are a system for

determining sanctions, and permit flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions
in a particular case of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: "(a)
consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction
in an individual case; (b) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors
in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; and (c) consistency in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and
among jurisdictions." Rule 1.3, Standards.
The following factors are to be considered in imposing sanctions: "(a) the
duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury
caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors." Rule 3.1, Standards.
A.

The Duty Violated

An attorney's license to practice is granted on the implied understanding
that the person receiving it will conduct himself in a manner that is proper, and
will abstain from conduct that brings discredit to himself, the profession, and the
courts.

Mr. Harding violated this duty by engaging in criminal activity.

Additionally, Mr. Harding had a higher duty because he was a judge, which he
breached by adjudicating cases involving drug offenders while he himself was a
drug offender, and presiding over criminal cases while committing criminal acts.
Harding violated this higher duty regardless of whether his drug use influenced
his decisions as a judge.
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B.

Mr. Harding's Mental State

There is a dearth of case law explicitly interpreting the lawyer's mental
state as a factor for the Court's consideration. It appears linked to motive, or
personal or emotional problems or mental disability, but each of these is
independently covered in the aggravating and mitigating factors listed elsewhere
in the Standards. See Rule 6, Standards. The OPC contends that this factor is
inextricably linked with these other factors, but concedes that the rule itself is
ambiguous as to its precise application.
As the Panel concluded, Mr. Harding intentionally committed the criminal
acts that led to his conviction plea. Ancillary to this, his conduct was also
knowing. An addiction is not something that comes about by accident; the
person taking illegal drugs knows that they are illegal and still elects to
participate. In a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of Ohio, one justice
discussed the situation of a judge with a substance abuse problem:
If the respondent was addicted to cocaine before he assumed the
bench, then he took office knowing he would adjudicate drugrelated cases and sentence drug-related felons while he too was
violating the law. If he began his cocaine use after he assumed the
bench, then he deliberately and voluntarily began using the drug
knowing it was illegal while, at the same time, he was sentencing
other drug abusers for the same behavior. This is hypocrisy.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher. 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Stratton, J.
concurring).
C.

The Injury Caused by Mr. Harding's Misconduct

Criminal misconduct causes havoc to the public, the legal system, and the
profession. Mr. Harding "injured" each of these groups by his criminal conduct.
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Furthermore, as a lawyer and judge, Mr. Harding placed at risk the very fiber of
judicial administration by presiding over cases while he himself was committing
crimes. This created a level of potential harm due to the possible necessity of reevaluating some of those cases and specifically any case where Mr. Harding
may have presided while under the influence of illegal drugs. Moreover, Mr.
Harding's misconduct had a devastating impact upon public respect for and
confidence in the judiciary.
D.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed."

Rule 6.2, Standards.

Conversely, mitigating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.3, Standards.
Possible mitigating and aggravating factors are identified in the Standards,
although, as this Court has noted, the lists are non-exclusive. See In re Tanner,
960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998).
This Court discussed the balancing process in which a court must
engage when it considers mitigation and aggravation:
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level of discipline,
it may apply rule 6 and consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in deciding what sanction should ultimately be
imposed. Because rule 6 does not provide any guidance as to how
these circumstances are to be weighed, the process of applying
them is necessarily somewhat subjective
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of discipline
set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors
must be significant.
In re Ince. 957 P.2d 1233,1238 (Utah 1998).
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In two attorney discipline decisions reviewed by this Court, the trial court
accorded too much weight to mitigating factors that were not compelling. See
Ince. 957 P.2d at 1238. Indeed, in light of the number of aggravating factors,
which "at least" balanced the "not particularly compelling" mitigating factors, "no
adjustment to the presumptively appropriate level of discipline is warranted." ]d.
Similarly, in In re Tanner, this Court found that the multiple aggravating factors
"would in fact justify an increase in the degree of discipline imposed." In re
Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998).
1.

The Aggravating Factors

The following are the appropriate aggravating circumstances for
consideration in this case:
(1)

A pattern of misconduct. Rule 6.2(c), Standards. By Mr. Harding's

own admission, he engaged in criminal conduct involving illegal drugs as early as
October 2001. This would necessarily entail a pattern of illegal activity of
obtaining and using illegal drugs for almost a year (at the least, until the July
2002 incident). This circumstance should be given significant weight.
(2)

Multiple offenses.

Rule 6.2(d), Standards.

Mr. Harding was

convicted by his plea of two criminal offenses of possession; moreover, he
necessarily engaged in multiple instances of solicitation.

This circumstance

should be given significant weight.
(3)
Standards.

Substantial experience in the practice of law.

Rule 6.2(i),

Mr. Harding has been a member of the Utah State Bar since
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September of 1978. Furthermore, he had been a member of the bench since
September of 1995. This circumstance should be given significant weight.
(4)

Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. Rule

6.2(k), Standards. Obviously, this circumstance applies in Mr. Harding's case.
2.

The Mitigating Factors

Mr. Harding asserted the following as mitigating circumstances:
(1)

Absence of a prior record of discipline. Rule 6.3(a), Standards.

Although Mr. Harding did not assert the absence of a prior record of discipline at
the Screening Panel, the OPC acknowledges that Mr. Harding does not have a
prior record of discipline. The question is how much weight to give this factor. In
the OPC's view, little if any weight is appropriate, given the seriousness of Mr.
Harding's misconduct. See e.g. Borre v. State Bar of California, 804 P.2d 50, 53
(Cal. 1991) ("Lack of a prior disciplinary record over many years of practice may
be considered in mitigation when coupled with present misconduct which is not
deemed serious. It does not, however, preclude substantial discipline for serious
misconduct."); see also Basbanes' Case, 676 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1996)
(respondent urged lack of disciplinary record as mitigation; the court stated, "We
believe that the respondent's twenty-eight years of experience as a litigator could
just as easily Justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed."')
(citation omitted).

Notably, the Panel does not appear to have considered this

as a mitigating factor.
(2)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Rule 6.3(b), Standards.

Mr. Harding claimed that his misconduct does not reflect a dishonest or selfish

motive. This is entitled to little or no weight in light of Mr. Harding's obvious
conflict of interest with the interests of the people who appeared before him while
he was on the bench.
(3)

Personal or emotional problems.

Rule 6.3(c), Standards.

Mr.

Harding claims that his emotional decline began with the death of his first wife in
October 1991, then was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a
subsequent divorce. Presumably, all of this led to his drug use beginning, by his
own admission, in October 2001. Although the OPC is sensitive to the effect that
these types of personal problems may have on a person, it questions whether
there is a causal connection between personal problems that began in 1991 and
the type of drug use Mr. Harding began in October 2001—a decade later.
Furthermore and also importantly, personal problems should not be compelling
mitigation for criminal possession of illegal drugs by a sitting judge.
(4)

Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct involved. Rule 6.3(d), Standards. This Court
has addressed the issue of restitution. See In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1238.
Restitution is not an issue in this case, however, there is an issue of rectifying the
consequences of Mr. Harding's illegal drug use. In Ince. this Court stated that
restitution should not be given much weight after an attorney's misconduct was
discovered because restitution at that time can be characterized simply as the
"honesty of compulsion." id. at 1238. Analogous to restitution, any showing of
attempts at rectifying or rehabilitation of his criminal conduct, although welcome,
should only be given weight in mitigation if it is shown to have happened before
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discovery of the problem. That is not the case here. The evidence indicates that
any attempts by Mr. Harding at rectifying the consequences of his misconduct
were not timely because they happened after his arrest in July of 2002.
(5)

Full and free disclosure to the client or the discipline authority prior

to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings.
Rule 6.3(e), Standards. As previously indicated, there is no evidence in the
record that Mr. Harding made any disclosures prior to discovery of his
misconduct in July 2002. With respect to a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings, the OPC concedes that Mr. Harding, through his counsel, has been
cooperative. Although this is entitled to some weight, it should not be compelling
mitigation as measured against Mr. Harding's serious misconduct.
(6)

Good character or reputation. Rule 6.3(g), Standards. In his Pre-

Sentencing Report and in his response to the OPC's Notice of Informal
Complaint, Mr. Harding offered letters attesting to his good character and
reputation.

Mr. Harding also provided testimonial evidence of this at the

Screening Panel hearing. Although the testimony of the witnesses supported Mr.
Harding's claim that he has good character or reputation, this mitigation is
entitled to little weight unless the witnesses are shown to have been aware of the
full extent of Mr. Harding's misconduct. See Jjnce, 957 P.2d at 1238-39; In re
Ford, 749 P.2d 1331,1335 (Cal. 1988) (letters of support that did not reflect their
authors' knowledge of the full extent of attorney's misconduct did not constitute
mitigation, and in any case, although attorney "may continue to enjoy the respect
and confidence of a number of his peers; it is our responsibility to determine if he

is fit to remain a member of the bar."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gary. 452
A.2d 1221, 1222-223 (Md. 1982) (attorney convicted of tax evasion disbarred,
notwithstanding excellent reputation); see also In re Petty. 627 P.2d 191, 194
(Cal. 1981) (character testimony, no matter how laudatory, does not establish
rehabilitation).
None of the character witnesses who testified on Mr. Harding's behalf
testified that they knew the full extent of his drug use. The Panel mentioned
character evidence in conjunction only with its conclusion that Mr. Harding's
rehabilitation is sincere and its conclusion that Mr. Harding's ability to practice
law is unimpaired by the violations he committed. The OPC acknowledges that
the character evidence was laudatory with respect to Mr. Harding's legal abilities.
This is not necessarily entitled to much weight, however, particularly since this is
only an asset if he remains drug free—a point that the Screening Panel
recognized.
(7) Mental disability or impairment including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental
disability; and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to
the misconduct: and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental
disability is demonstrated bv a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation; and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.
Rule 6.3 (i), Standards.
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If the evidence presented before and found by the Screening Panel
supports each and every element of Rule 6.3(i), this would constitute a significant
mitigating circumstance and, depending on the weight given to all the other
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, could justify a decrease in the degree
of discipline imposed.
The OPC concedes that the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr.
Harding was affected by substance abuse within the meaning of subsection (1),
and that it causally contributed to his misconduct consistent with the meaning of
subsection (2). It also concedes that Mr. Harding's recovery is demonstrated by
meaningful rehabilitation; what it questions is whether eighteen months of
rehabilitation constitutes a "sustained period of successful rehabilitation" within
the meaning of subsection (3). Case law from other jurisdictions differs widely in
what constitutes "meaningful and sustained successful rehabilitation." The OPC
offers the following examples:
•

Tenner v. State Bar of California. 617 P.2d 486 (1980 Cal.) (where
substantial period of time for rehabilitative efforts including
substance abuse was assessed over an approximate four-year
period).

•

Twohv v. State Bar. 769 P.2d 976 (1989 Cal.) (where court held
eighteen months of sobriety was insufficient to demonstrate control
of addiction and thus short-term effort at rehabilitation is not
sufficiently compelling to warrant
disciplinary sanctions).

reducing the severity of

•

In re Steiner, 817 A.2d 793 (2003 Del.) (where the court could not
conclude that four months in recovery from longstanding addiction
established "a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation.").

Finally, although the evidence favors the conclusion that Mr. Harding's
recovery has arrested his misconduct, and the forecast for its recurrence is
optimistic, all of the testimony included the caveat that Mr. Harding would not
have a recurrence provided that he refrains from using illegal substances. In the
OPC's view, this is a circular conclusion, and perhaps not entitled to significant
weight.
(8)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Rule 6.3(1), Standards.

Mr. Harding offered evidence that other penalties or sanctions have been
imposed upon him in the form of the criminal penalties and the loss of his
judgeship.

Again, this is entitled to little weight, inasmuch as the sanctions

imposed upon Mr. Harding in the criminal matter and the loss of his judgeship did
not encompass the totality of Mr. Harding's professional misconduct. The
Screening Panel recognized that these were simply the consequences in other
arenas of Mr. Harding's criminal acts. See People v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651
(Colo. 1995) (county judge charged with forgery was disbarred even though he
had to resign his judge position and was subject to criminal charges; determining
the appropriate level of attorney discipline is not retaliation but for the protection
of the public).
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(9)

Remorse. Rule 6.3(m), Standards. Mr. Harding offered evidence

that he is remorseful. The OPC does not doubt the genuineness of Mr. Harding's
present state of remorse. However, based on the evidence that the OPC has
reviewed, Mr. Harding's expressions of remorse were made only after he had
been caught and confronted in July of 2002. With all due respect, this suggests
that Mr. Harding's remorse is not for his misconduct, but for his apprehension,
and as such, is entitled to little weight. See e.g. I nee, 957 P.2d at 1238; Tanner,
960 P.2d at 403 ("Naturally anyone going through a trial for [Tanner's]
wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught.

Instead, the remorse

question closely relates to the acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did Tanner
feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and was he motivated by
remorse in making amends?").
Moreover, the OPC is constrained to observe that Mr. Harding continued
on the State payroll after he was criminally charged. The concurring opinion in
the Gallagher case addressed a similar situation:
[Although the law did not require the respondent to resign from
office upon his arrest, and he retained a presumption of innocence,
respondent knew he was using illegal substances. He had a moral
obligation to resign from his position. Yet he continued to draw his
judicial salary, funded by taxpayer monies, from August 3, 1995
until March 4, 1996. This created an appearance of impropriety
and seriously damaged the public image of the judiciary.
Respondent's actions certainly speak to his failure to accept
responsibility for his conduct and to his lack of character.
Gallagher. 693 N.E.2d at 1080.
E.

Disbarment Is the Appropriate Presumptive Sanction For Mr.
Harding's Misconduct

Rule 4.2 of the Standards provides that disbarment, absent aggravating

and mitigating circumstances, is the appropriate presumptive sanction when a
lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court,
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of
which includes intentional interference with the administration of
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of
controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an
attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Although Mr. Harding's misconduct falls within the first two of these
categories, the fact that it falls into one of them is sufficient to establish
disbarment as the appropriate presumptive discipline. See In re Babilis. 951
P.2d 207, 215 (a finding under any of the three subparagraphs of Rule 4.2 is
sufficient to establish disbarment as presumptive sanction); In re Jamis M.
Johnson. 2001 UT 110, H 13; In re Pendleton. 11 P.3d 284 (Utah 2000) where an
attorney

was

disbarred

for

possession,

use,

and

distribution

of

methamphetamines. Moreover, as this Court has explained, "Once an attorney's
conduct has been found to fall within Rule 4.2 of the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the presumptive sanction is disbarment.
additional

There is no

burden to show aggravating circumstances; the absence of

aggravating factors is not a mitigating factor." Johnson. 2001 UT 110, n.3.
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Even if disbarment were not the appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr.
Harding's misconduct, suspension would be, and the significant circumstances of
aggravation would raise the level of sanction to disbarment.

The Standards

provide:
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or
the legal system, or causes interference or potential
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements
listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 4.3, Standards. This Court has explained that "the difference between the
sanctions of disbarment and suspension under paragraphs (a) of rules 4.2 and
4.3 lies in the attorney's motive and in the relative severity of the conduct."
Babjlis, 951 P.2d at 216; see also jd. at 215 (presumptive discipline may be
increased from suspension to disbarment where there are "overwhelming
aggravating factors"); see also Ennenqa. 2001 UT 111, n.6 (significant
aggravating factors combined with lack of significant mitigating circumstances
provide additional reason to disbar attorney).
Thus, the appropriate level of discipline depends upon the existence and
relative weight given the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
analysis, Mr. Harding's status as a judge figures significantly.

In this

Again, the

Supreme Court of Ohio's analysis is useful. Although it usually "tempered] our
decision where substance abuse is involved and the respondent has
demonstrated a commitment to sobriety," it would not do so in this case, noting

that "[[Judges are subject to the highest standard of ethical conduct" Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1079 (Ohio 1998). The
court concluded that "When a judge's felonious conduct brings disrespect to the
judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed." Id. Accordingly, despite
evidence of rehabilitation, "Mitigating factors relevant to this individual attorney
pale when he is viewed in his institutional role as a judge. We, therefore, find
that respondent deserves the full measure of our disciplinary authority." id. The
court permanently disbarred the former judge.
If the Court is inclined to accord significant weight to Mr. Harding's
rehabilitation, the OPC urges it to consider reducing the presumptive sanction of
disbarment to a three-year suspension. Alternatively, if the Court concludes that
a presumptive sanction of suspension is warranted and that the mitigation is
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the OPC
urges the Court to reduce a three-year suspension to nothing less than a twoyear suspension. Imposing anything less suggests that a judge's use of illegal
drugs does not seriously offend the legal community, and it minimizes the effect
Mr. Harding's behavior has had upon public confidence.
The OPC's recommendation is supported to some extent by case law from
other states.
criminal

For example, long-term suspensions have been imposed for

conduct

of

prosecuting

attorneys

whose

mitigation

included

rehabilitation, remorse, and accepting responsibility for their actions. See e.g. in
re Penn. 548 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Wise. 1996) (district attorney convicted of
misdemeanor marijuana and cocaine possession suspended for two years);
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Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris. 666 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1996)
(prosecuting attorney who pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of cocaine
suspended for two years with one year of the suspension stayed).
As far as the OPC knows, there is no Utah case directly on point with Mr.
Harding's case, which must be determined based on its own facts in accordance
with Utah's Standards. Nevertheless, the OPC offers the following sample of
drug-related attorney discipline cases that could be used as a backdrop for the
Court's decision in this case. Note, however, that none of the cases is directly on
point with Mr. Harding's case or his status as a judge, nor necessarily with the
presumptive discipline Standards in this jurisdiction, or the applicable elements of
aggravation and mitigation.
•

In re Olson. 537 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1995) (misdemeanor conviction for
marijuana use resulted in three-year suspension).

•

In re Sawhill. 425 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1993) (attorney indicted for
possession of cocaine, obstruction of an officer, two counts of DUI;
pled guilty to possession of cocaine; sentenced to three years
probation conditioned on surrender of license for three years;
aggravation included fact that attorney entered rehabilitation only when
required to do so; continued practicing until ordered to stop; sought to
continue practicing after his conviction; failed to cooperate with Bar;
disbarred).

•

State v. Stauffer, 858 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1993) (attorney convicted of
felony cocaine possession; also failed to pay judgment against him for

expert witness bill; aggravation: prior discipline; failure to acknowledge
wrongful

conduct;

misrepresentations

substantial

experience;

indifference;

to clients; practicing law while suspended;

mitigation: personal and emotional problems; delay in proceedings;
disbarred).
•

In re Nelson. 874 P.2d 1201 (Kan. 1994) (attorney pled guilty to felony
attempted possession of cocaine; sentenced to one and one-half to
five years in prison; served three months, then probation; random
urinalysis negative; doctor testified to complete recovery from
addiction;

legal

prosecution,

competence

made

false

not in question; during

allegations

against

criminal

police; failed

to

communicate with two clients and abandoned another; mitigation: long
term practice with only one previous discipline; general good character;
therapy and clean urinalysis; no pattern of misconduct; aggravation:
failed to return retainer to client; indefinite suspension).
•

In re Rivkind, 791 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1990) (attorney convicted of felony
attempted possession of cocaine; placed on interim suspension, no
impact on work; aggravation: repeated violation of state law for
extended period; mitigation: remorse, rehabilitation, cooperation; twoyear suspension, followed by two-year probation).

•

In re Gooding. 917 P.2d 414 (Kan. 1996)

(attorney charged with

thirteen criminal counts; found guilty of felony possession of narcotic
drugs; sentenced to three to ten years in prison; actually served one
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yean eventually acquitted pursuant to habeas corpus petition; admitted
using cocaine for ten years; engaged in illegal conduct including
possession of illegal substances and paraphernalia; aggravation:
cocaine use for ten years; multiple offenses; illegal conduct;
mitigation: absence of prior disciplinary record; personal and emotional
problems; cooperation; good character and reputation; rehabilitation;
remorse; suspension presumptive discipline; compelling mitigation
warranted two-year probation).
•

In re Abelman. 744 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1987) (attorney pled guilty to using
cocaine; mitigation: rehabilitation, cooperation; six-month suspension).

IV.

Probation Alone Is Not an Adequate Sanction for Mr. Harding
Mr. Harding suggested that the appropriate sanction in this case would be

one that allows him to continue to practice law, for example, to complete his
community service obligation. This suggestion is essentially requesting that
probation be the appropriate sanction in this case, and that is what the Screening
Panel ultimately recommended.
Probation is a permissible sanction under the Standards. Specifically Rule
2.7 of the Standards states that "Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to
practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or non-public,
can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement."
The OPC does not consider probation appropriate as the ultimate sole
sanction in cases where disbarment is the presumptive sanction. Consistent with

the goals of lawyer discipline and the responsibilities the legal profession owes
the public to maintain high standards of professional conduct, the discipline
ultimately imposed must involve actual time out from the practice of law. Further,
given Mr. Harding's substance abuse problems and the probationary
requirements of his criminal case, Mr. Harding may need this time out to
evidence a "sustained period of successful rehabilitation" and to demonstrate
conclusively that "the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely." Rule 6.3(i),
Standards.
CONCLUSION
The presumptive sanction for Mr. Harding's misconduct is disbarment. In
light of the evidence concerning his continuing rehabilitation, a downward
departure to a three-year suspension may be warranted, perhaps to be followed
be a period of probation. Having said this, the OPC does not object to probation
added to a sanction consisting of actual time out from the practice of law.
Consistent with Rule 2.7 of the Standards, Mr. Harding's successful completion
of his probation in the criminal matter, as well as in this case if probation is
ordered, should be made before he is reinstated or readmitted to the practice of
law.
DATED: April

/

, 2004.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Billy 1 . Walker
Senior Counsel
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DETERMINATION OF DISCIPLINE

The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in pertinent part outline the following for
the Screening Panel's consideration of discipline:
Definitions.
"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a
lawyer's misconduct. The level of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury; a reference
to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater than "little or no" injury.
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result
"Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct
but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a
result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would
exercise in the situation.
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor
or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct

Rule 3. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.
3.1. Generally.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

Rule 4. Imposition of sanctions.
4.1. Generally.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in
Standard 3.1, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
4.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these
offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.3. Suspension.
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but
nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.4. Reprimand.
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

4.5. Admonition.
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Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or
interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury
or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this Standard 4 that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 6. Aggravation and mitigation.
6.1. Generally.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be
considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.
6.2. Aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the
degree of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a) prior record of discipline;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders
of the disciplinary authority;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the
disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or
to the disciplinary authority;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct
involved; and
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
6.3. Mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the
degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include:
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct
involved;
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any
misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) good character or reputation;
(h) physical disability;
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the misconduct; and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is demonstrated
by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
3
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(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely;
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did not
substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice
resulting from the delay;
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment;
(!) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(m) remorse; and
(n) remoteness of prior offenses.
6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following circumstances should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;

(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(d) complainants recommendation as to sanction; and
(e) failure of injured client to complain.
Furthermore, Rule 10(b)(6) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, as amended
January 1,2003 ("RLDD") provides as follows:
in determining an appropriate sanction and only after having found unethical
conduct, the screening panel may consider any admonitions or greater discipline
imposed upon the respondent within the five years immediately preceding the
alleged offense.
The Screening Panel will be provided with sealed information on
any prior discipline against the Respondent. The sealed
information should only be opened after the Panel has concluded
that the Rules of Professional Conduct have been violated.
After review of all the facts developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation
and hearing, and consideration of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and
Rule 10(b)(6) of the RLDD, as stated above, Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD requires the
Screening Panel to make one of the following determinations:
[

]

(A) That the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is probable
cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional conduct, in
which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel shall
promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant and
the respondent

[

]

(B) That a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed by OPC
counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the future
conduct of the respondent Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution.
Please identify the conduct to be cautioned against:
{Use extra attached page if necessary)
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(C) That a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Please identify the condition and the date by which it mustbe performed:

(Use extra page attached if necessary)

(D) That the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such
screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to
delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair
shall enter an order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed
within ten (10) days of notice of the recommendation being provided to the
respondent
List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision:

(Use extra page attached if necessary)

(E) That the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing
and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses
and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public
reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served
upon the respondent prior to the delivery of the recommendation to the
Committee chair.
The Committee chair shall enter an order publicly
reprimanding the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten (10) days
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent

List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision:
Screening Panel:

Date:
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(Use extra page attached if necessary)

[

]

(F) That [there is probable cause that] a formal complaint be filed against the
respondent
List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision:

(Use extra page attached if necessary)

Based upon any finding(s) that the Respondent violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Panel finds that the Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the
Rules, which provides, alt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another."
The Panel understands that after considering its findings, including aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, if it recommends that a formal complaint be filed, neither of the parties
is limited to presenting facts consistent with those findings inasmuch as further factual
development of the case through discovery and other means may result in additions to or
elimination of factors such as aggravating or mitigatiprg/circumstances.
Date: f*3g'pf

Signature: ^ Q ^ r J ^
^ - O h a i r O F p i a t J (If ertra attached page is used, do not sign here)
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From the evidence presented and the record in this case (Case No. 03-0417) the Screening Panel
makes the following findings, reaches the following conclusions and makes the following
recommendations:
Ray Harding violated Rule 8.4 (b) in that he committed the crime of possession of illegal
drugs while an active judge in the Fourth District Court For this violation the Panel
recommends that Ray Harding be subject to suspension from practice for six months pursuant to
Rule 4.3 (a) of the Standards for imposing Lawyer Sanctions; however, that the suspension be
stayed and Ray Harding be put on probation pursuant to the mitigating circumstances discussed
below, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 6.3 (i).
Ray Harding sat as a District Court Judge when he engaged in the misconduct of
possessing and using illegal drugs. The evidence before the Panel shows that he has paid a
significant price for that illegal conduct He has been removed from his judgeship. He has plead
guilty to and been convicted of two misdemeanors. He has spent 90 days in jail in circumstances
which amounted to solitary confinement His confinement was in "protective custody" because
the inmate population included those who had been sent to the prison by his order as a judge, and
protective custody was necessary to provide safety to him during confinement However, that
custody amounted to solitary confinement He has also been barred from holding any further
judicial office in the State of Utah, paid the maximum monetary fine imposed by the statute,
undergone treatment for drug dependency at the Betty Ford Clinic, and become involved in 12step programs on an on-going active basis.
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The sanctions imposed upon Ray Harding, however, relate to his violation of the criminal
law and the violation of the standards applicable to the judicial office he held at the time of
committing the offenses. The question of his license to practice law is another matter, not dealt
with in the other proceedings. Therefore, the question of his misconduct raising Professional
Responsibility violations are being considered for the first time in these proceedings. Nothing
that has preceded this hearing has dealt with Ray Harding's violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct
Ray Harding's decision to violate the law and use illegal drugs was an intentional act It
violated Rule 8.4 (b) in that it was a "criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's... fitness
as a lawyer." That violation subjects him to discipline.
The rules for imposing discipline make suspension the appropriate sanction when "a
lawyer (a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct... and causes injury or potential injury
to... the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal
proceeding." That presumption may be modified by mitigating circumstances such as we find
here, as provided by Rule 6.3 (i).
Therecordand testimony contained the allegation that Ray Harding's violation of the law
included abuse of drugs within his chambers. No proof of that exists, however. The alleged act
was not witnessed by anyone. Ray Harding denied that it ever occurred but insisted that his drug
use was confined to weekends or holidays when he was away from his work as a judge. Other
judges who had close contact with Ray Harding testified that they never saw any evidence of any
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drug use by him while in the courthouse. The in-court clerk testified that she never witnessed
any drug use or behavior indicating drug use in the court nor in his chambers. She testified that
the door to his chambers remained open nearly all the time, and when closed his wife or counsel
were present with him in the chambers. She detected nothing in his conduct which betrayed drug
use, and she never smelled anything which would indicate use of or smoking of any drugs within
his chambers. The clear and convincing evidence is that Ray Harding did not use drugs in the
courthouse while acting as a judge.
The rule governing aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to Ray Harding's
case provides the following:
"6.3 Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the
degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include:
...(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the misconduct; and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is demonstrated by a
meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely."
In the case of In Re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme Court makes it
clear that in circumstances in which a person is brought to the point of remorse by criminal
proceedings, their penitence for the wrongdoing is suspect. Therefore, the Panel was concerned
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with the question of Ray Harding's sincerity in accepting responsibility for his wrongdoing, and
the success of Ray Harding in accomplishing a "meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation."
Although there were allegations that Ray Harding's rehabilitation was insincere and that
he began violating the process beginning at the Betty Ford Clinic, and that it continued thereafter,
these allegations all originate with Ray Harding's ex-wife. She did not witness any of this
conduct She testified that she heard Ray Harding say things which led her to these conclusions.
This testimony was not credible, and the allegations were contradicted by proof in the record.
Ray Harding was tested for drugs while in the Betty Ford Clinic. His sponsor monitored
his recovery. The testimony of Ray Harding, of his sponsor, of his aftercare counselor, of his
defense attorney, of his daughters and of the head of Lawyers Helping Lawyers was all to the
effect that Ray Harding's recovery has been both sincere and successful. The clear and
convincing evidence in the matter is that Ray Harding has been completely drag free for a period
lasting 18 months. Given the length of time of his being drug free, the evidence is that he is now
over 95% likely to remain drug free. The Panel can find no credible evidence that Ray Harding's
efforts to recover from drug use are insincere.
During this period, Ray Harding has refrained voluntarily from the practice of law. The
Office of Professional Conduct contends that since this has been voluntary, Ray Harding should
receive no credit against a period of suspension. The Panel agrees with the Office of
Professional Conduct that a voluntary withdrawal from practice does not entitle a person to credit
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against a period of suspension. However, the voluntary withdrawal from practice by Ray
Harding does indicate to the Panel the seriousness with which Mr. Harding has taken his
violations, and a manifestation of his commitment to changing his life. Therefore, the Panel
finds that the voluntary withdrawal from practice by Ray Harding for the past eighteen months,
along with the testimony of all those involved in his treatment and recovery, is reason to believe
that he has sincerely and seriously pursued the processes of rehabilitation, and that he has
succeeded in putting his drug use behind him for that time period
The testimony established that Ray Harding will remain vulnerable, however, to a return
to drug abuse for the remainder of his life. His success is to be measured therefore by the
continuing commitment which he makes to the process of being "clean and sober.'9 To that end,
since the end of his court-ordered participating inrehabilitation,he has continued to be involved
in the processes of 12-step programs and in Lawyers Helping Lawyers. He has continued to
demonstrate an on-going determination to remain drug free. He has also acknowledged to the
Panel and to others that he is vulnerable to this addiction and needs to keep himself ever vigilant
to avoidreturningto abuse. The Panel is persuaded that the evidence in this case shows that Ray
Harding has accomplished a "meaningful and sustained period of successfulrehabilitation"and
that he has otherwise qualified under Rule 6.3 (i) for mitigation of his punishment under the
Rules of Professional Discipline.
Therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, the Panelrecommendsthat Ray Harding be
placed on Probation, and allowed to continue his practice of law. The conditions for that
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probation should include random drug testing, the costs of which should be borne by Ray
Harding, to be coordinated through the Office of Professional Conduct. Further, Ray Harding
should be required to participate in a 12-step program on an on-going basis, at least monthly, for
the entire time of probation. The Panel recommends that the period of Probation last not less
than five years.
Ray Harding's ability to practice law and render meaningful assistance to clients was
undisputed Even his harshest critic in the evidentiary proceedings, his ex-wife, commented on
the excellence of his legal abilities. His fellow judges, his defense counsel, his drug counselors,
the Prosecuting Attorneys and even his critics all hailed his legal abilities. There is no doubt,
therefore, in the Panel's mind that Ray Harding's ability to practice law and assist the public is
unimpaired by the violations he committed So long as he remains drug free, he is an asset to the
Bar and to the public. Only in the event of a relapse does he become a threat to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct and a liability to the Bar. Given the record in this case, however, the
Panel is satisfied that Ray Harding can practice law successfully, although the period of
probation and supervision is warranted in his case.
The Panel finds there was no violation of Rule 8.4 (a), ( c ) or (d). The Panel specifically
finds that there is no evidence to support even a finding of probable cause that Ray Harding
committed the crime of poaching. The only statement to that effect came from his ex-wife whom
the Panel did not find credible. There was no physical evidence of the crime. There was no
statement from Fish and Game officers. There was no testimony from prosecuting attorneys in
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the case. The charges were denied by Ray Harding. Mr. Harding's defense attorney claimed the
charges had no merit and that a plea bargain had been rejected The case involving those charges
has not had a preliminary hearing as yet Therefore, the Panel cannot conclude that any basis for
discipline lies in relation to the poaching allegations.
Finally, the Panel notes that it is the considered opinion of the members of the Panel after
hearing all of the evidence in this case that the best interests of all concerned, including the
public and the Bar, are served by the recommendations made in this decision.

/Wsf

Date: 1
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Utah State Bar
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077
E-mail: opcOuiahbar.org

August 5,2003

Ray Harding, Jr.
11165 North Yarrow Circle
Highland, UT 84603
NOTICE OF INFORMAL COMPLAINT
OPC File No. 03-0417
Dear Mr. Harding:
This letter is to notify you that pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January 1, 2003)
("RLDD"), the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC")
has initiated an .informal complaint of unprofessional conduct against you.
The OPC's informal complaint is based upon an investigation conducted
by the OPC pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2) of the RLDD. As a result of this
investigation, this Notice of Informal Complaint ("NOIC") is issued in
accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD.
On May 22,2003 I sent this NOIC to your counsel in your criminal
matter, Mr. Edward Brass. I specifically requested that Mr. Brass contact
me and let me know if he intended to represent you in this attorney
discipline matter. I also indicated to Mr. Brass that if I did not hear from
him, I would assume that he does not represent you and that I would
resend the NOIC to you for your response. I did not receive any response
from Mr. Brass so pursuant to the RLDD, I am serving the NOIC on you
for your response.
With specific respect to the allegations of unprofessional conduct
the information that the OPC has is represented by the documents that I
have enclosed with this NOIC. Those documents are identified as follows:
1)
2)

Copies of Judicial Conduct Commission proceeding
documents (including a copy of the index of those
documents);
Copy of Discovery Index in the case of State v. Rav Harding
Jr.. Case No. 021403545 (a copy of all the documents that
are part of that Discovery Index can be made available to
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3)

4)

5)

you, however, they are not provided as part of this NOIC
because the documents total in excess of one thousand
pages. In this respect, it is likely that you already have
copies of these documents as part of the criminal case.);
Copies of newspaper articles as follows:
a)
Embattled Judge Resigns from Bench. Deseret News
March 1,2003;
b)
Harding's Wife Hopes Case Won't aotoTrial. Deseret
News, March 3,2003;
c)
Harding Admits to Reduced Charges. Deseret News,
March 5,2003;
d)
Harding Gets 120 Days on Drug Counts. Deseret
News, April 28,2003; and
e)
Hard Time for Judge Harding. Deseret News, May 1,
2003.
Copy of the videotape for the protective order hearing on
October 23,2002 in the case of Harding v. Harding, case no.
024402310.
Additionally with respect to a matter distinct from the case of
State of Utah v. Rav Harding. Jr.. case no. 021403545,
enclosed are copies of the foliowing newspaper articles:
a)
Harding Charged with Poaching:
b)
Harding Faces Poaching Charges. Deseret News,
April 12,2003;
c)
Ex-Judoe's Poaching Case Delayed. Deseret New,
May 13,2003; and
d)
Judge Recuses Himself from Harding Case. Salt Lake
Tribune, May 14,2003.

Based upon the foregoing, it is the opinion of the OPC that you
have violated thefollowingRules of Professional ConductRule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) states Tj]t is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." in this
respect, you may have violated this rule when law enforcement officers
after being called to you home on a domestic disturbance call on July 13,
2002, found cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Your person also
tested positiveforbenzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine.
You were arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts: Count I -
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Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3 rt degree
felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(0 and Title 76, Chapter 2,
Section 202 of the U.CA for knowingly and intentionally possessing or
using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled
Substance; Count II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, a 3 rt degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(l)
and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly and intentionally
possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit Heroin, a Schedule I
Controlled Substance.
There is also evidence that you may have committed the illegal act
of soliciting the controlled substances that you used. Specifically, cocaine
and heroin are controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally
and there is evidence that you solicited these controlled substances from
an individual by name of Rick Connelly.
In addition to this, your wife indicated to the police that she had
previously seen you smoking "crack" and you admitted to your wife that
you had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. You stated to
your wife that you smoked "crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a
judge).
Regarding the felony charges, reportedly, you entered a plea of
guilty to two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled
substances - opiates in one count, cocaine in another, class A
misdemeanors. You were sentenced to 120 days of jail; fined, ordered to
do 500 hours of community service and probation for 24 months which
includes individual therapy and help from 12-step programs.
With respect to the criminal charges of poaching, You may have
violated Rule 8.4(b) when reportedly you allegedly killed a trophy moose
and two cow elk on October 6, 2001. You are facing three 3" degree
felony counts of wanton destruction of protected wildlife. Reportedly, you
did not have the proper licenses.
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to: Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." In this respect, you may have violated this rule by the
above outlined factual allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, your
reported actions of poaching may be a greater reflection of dishonesty if
your conduct was outside of any licensing limits.
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Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice." In this respect, you may have violated this rule by the above
outlined factual allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, Mrs. Harding
indicated that you had been on a drug "binge" about three weeks prior to
the July 13, 2002 incident This raises the question whether you were
under the influence of controlled substances while performing duties on
the judicial bench. Specifically it is probable that due to controlled
substance use that you were unable to attend a hearing on the Thursday
before the July 13, 2002 incident (even though the lawyers in the case
settled the case so your attendance was not necessary); it is probable that
you were under the influence of a controlled substance at a hearing you
presided over on Friday July 12,2002 (the lawyers at that hearing noticed
that you appeared drawn and ill); it is also probable that you were under
the influence of controlled substances at other times while on the bench
and specifically, during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002
incident This is evidenced by reports from court staff to the police that
during this six month period, you had "mood" changes and would often
appear bored and disinterested before brief recesses when you would
return refreshed. Finally, Mrs. Harding stated to the police that you
indicated to her that you had smoked "crack" in the bathroom of your
office.
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) by engaging in conduct that violates the
above-mentioned Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD provides that "[wjithin twenty days after
service of the Notice of Informal Complaint on the respondent the
respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed answer
setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal
complaint, together with ail defenses and responses to the claims of
possible misconduct" In addition, please provide any documents or other
materials that support your response or would otherwise assist us in
evaluating the informal complaint Do not submit original documents; the
OPC cannot make photocopies, and will not be responsible for your
originals. If at some point we need to review your original records, we will
ask for them.
One particular item that is not part of the OPC record that we need
you to provide is the Pre-sentencing report in the State of Utah v. Rav
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Harding. Jr.. case, case no. 021403545. I spoke to a Cathy Charlesworth
(who I understand prepared the report) and she said that she could not
provide me with a copy of the report without your consent. If you will
authorize the release of a copy of this report to this office, I will contact
Ms. Charlesworth to obtain a copy.
Please be advised that Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides that attorneys shall not "knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority." Further, the
Comment following the rule states that "it is a separate professional
offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in
connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct.
This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on
the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person
involved becomes aware." Failure to do so may constitute a separate
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
The OPC will notify you in writing of significant milestones in your
case. For example, if it determines that the matter must proceed to a
hearing before a Screening Panel, you will be notified of this fact in writing.
Likewise, if the matter is dismissed or if the OPC declines to prosecute the
complaint, you will be notified in writing. If you do not receive written
notification that the case is being closed, do not assume that it has been
closed.
If, under Rule 10(b)(1) of the RLDD, the OPC refers the matter to a
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court, you will'be notified of the date andtimeset for a hearing.
Please note that Rule 10(b) of the RLDD sets forth Screening Panel hearing
proceedings. If the matter is heard by a Screening Panel, pursuant to Rule
10(b)(1), the Panel has the authority to make its determination based on the
facts developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation, the OPC
recommendation and the Screening Panel hearing. In this respect, foots
developed at the hearing may give rise to a determination of Rules of
Professional Conduct violations not alleged in this Notice of Informal
Complaint
Further, Rule 32(a) of the RLDD provides that "p]f having received
actual notice of the charges filed, the Respondent fails to answer the
charges within twenty (20) days, the Respondent shall be deemed to have
admitted the factual allegations." If you do not provide a response to the
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charges in this NOIC within 20 days, the OPC may request that the
Screening Panel find that the allegations are admitted.
Also enclosed is a copy of the Utah Supreme Court's Order of
Reference vesting authority and responsibility with this office to review this
matter. Please note that after a Screening Panel review, pursuant to the
Supreme Court Order of Reference, the recommendation will go directly to
the Supreme Court
If you have any questions regarding this informal complaint and
investigation or. would like to suggest that an area be investigated or
documents be secured, please contact me.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

^

,

Billy L Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Acknowledged before me this i E _ day of -^4'

- 2003.

FUMe
645 South 200 Eaat

Owerntar4»jL.
__Stta£fU*h

No&ry Public
Residing in SaJbt IsJli

County,
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My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^
day of Al*Jty*M
, 20OJ? the
foregoing Notice of Informal Complaint was mailed via United States firstclass mail, postage pre-paid to Ray Harding, Jr., at 11165 North Yarrow
Circle, Highland, UT 84603, the address reflected in the records of the Utah
State Bar.
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SKORDAS

& CASTON, LLC4

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
9 E X C H A N G E PLACE
SUITE 1104 BOSTON B U I L D I N G
SALT LAKE C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 1 1
GREGORY G. SKORDAS
HARRY CASTON
JACK M. MORGAN, JR.

TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 > 53 1-7444
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 1 - 8 8 8 5

RECEIVED
September 5,2003
Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Utah State Bar
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-3834
Re:

$& 0 5 2001fK
CONDUCT

Response to Notice of Informal Complaint
OPC File No. 03-0417 Ray Harding, Jr.

Dear Mr. Walker
This letter and attached verification is a response to the Notice of Informal Complaint ("NOIC")
received by this office on or after August 5,2003. You and I spoke briefly sometime last week and it
was agreed that we could have additional time to prepare this response given that I was out-of-town for
a couple of days during Labor Day.
This response should not be taken in anyway as a waiver of Judge Harding's right to have his
case heard just as any other attorney would before a District Court Judge. I am troubled by the way this
case is intending to proceed. That is, that our only "due process" would be before a Screening Panel
without the availability of subpoenas, cross- examination, and adequate presentation of witnesses. My
experience with Screening Panels is that they are volunteer lawyers and citizens who devote time to
hear matters such as this and cannot and should not be required to the make same evidentiary rulings
that a judge would. Indeed, as you know, each Screening Panel session begins with the chair reading a
statement that clearly defines the limitations on the Panel's authority. Apparently, uniquely to Judge
Harding's case, the Screening Panel will serve the roles of prosecuting the case, judging the merits and
recommending thefinalsanction. We believe this constitutes afimdamental violation of due process.
One of the requests in the Notice of Informal Complaint is that we provide a copy of the PreSentencing Report in the case of State of Utah v. Ray M. Harding, Jr.. number 031900587. That
request is followed by a suggestionfromyour office thatfoilingto provide this Pre-Sentence Report
would constitute a separate professional offense. Because of that, and only because of that threat, the
Pre-Sentence Report is attached to this letter. A Pre-Sentence Report is confidential and is never made
a part of a public record. It contains information that typically would probably not be appropriate for a
Screening Panel to view or consider such as Mr. Harding's personal and family history. Nonetheless, it
is hereby provided It is our hope that you will honor the confidentiality that this report requires.
A judge in a criminal matter will typically request the Office of Adult Probation and Parole
("AP&P") to prepare a Pre-Sentence Report when a criminal defendant has entered a plea of guilty to
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Skordas & Caston, LLC
Billy Walker
Senior Counsel
Re: Judge Harding
September 5,2003
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any felony or some more serious misdemeanors. In this case, Judge Ray Harding entered
a plea of guilty to two misdemeanor drug charges. He was thereafter referred to Adult
Probation and Parole for the preparation of this report That referral was made by Judge
Tim Hansen of the Third District Court and is typical for this type of case. The Presentence Report is typically an investigatiye report prepared so that a judge, at the time of
sentencing, has sufficient informationfromwhich that judge can make a fair
determination as to an appropriate sentence. Often, judges have little or no information
about a defendant appearing before them and they rely on agencies such as AP&P to give
them as much information as possible.
A Pre-Sentence Report is, as such, an investigation and should not include
conclusion, opinions, and editorials. Unfortunately, the Pre-Sentence Report which is
attached to this letter is full ofjust such remarks. It is interesting to note that the cover
sheet for the Pre-Sentence Report starts with the line "Just the fax." That is a law
enforcement term which is intended to keep people, such as the person who prepared this
Pre-Sentence Report, on task and it reminds them that their rqrorts are to be factual and
not editorial. This Pre-Sentence Report, however, violates that rule on virtually every
page. Nonetheless, we believe the Pre-Sentence Report is helpfiil because it provides
your office and the Screening Panel with a very thorough understanding of the case and
includes numerous letters of recommendation and commendation which should help in a
fair determination of Judge Harding's future status as a member of the Utah State Bar.
Because the Pre-Sentence Report contains some fifty pages, we will not attempt to
address each issue in this response. However, it is our hope that you will take the time to
read or peruse all of the report including the attached letters.
With respect to the individual allegations in the NOIC, it is our intent to address
those briefly as follows:
L
You indicate in page two of the NOIC that Judge Harding tested positive
for "benzoylecyonine" and other controlled substances. Certainly the other controlled
substances listed in your complaint are illegal, but benzoylecyonine is achemical term for
Valium which was a prescribed drug and which was legally possessed by Judge Harding.
2.
Judge Harding has never been convicted of afelony.He was certainly
charged with two possession counts. However, they were reduced to two class A
misdemeanors. This is not uncommon in criminal cases especially forfirsttime
offenders. It also is not uncommon for people to practice their professions after having
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been convicted of similar class A misdemeanors, after rehabilitation. Indeed, our justice
system encourages and aids defendants in returning to their jobs, families, and other life
activities.
3.
The NOIC implies that Judge Harding illegally solicited the controlled
substances. Certainly no one could come into possession of these substances without
some illegal solicitation. However, Judge Harding has never been charged with such an
offense and it probably would not have been appropriate to charge him as such given the
facts of this case. He was found in possession of small quantities of controlled
substances and pled guilty to two counts of attempted possession of a controlled
substance. There is no chance that he will ever be prosecuted for any other crime arising
out of this conduct, including solicitation.
4.
The NOIC indicates that Judge Harding's now ex-wife stated that he
smoked "crack" while at work. There is no credible evidence eitherfromher or anyone
else that Judge Harding, possessed, used, or was under the influence any controlled
substance while he sat as a Fourth District Court Judge. To the contrary, while Judge
Harding was at times ill or looked tired the evidence indicates that he at all times acted
appropriately and handled his cases appropriately while on the bench. Certainly his
judgment could have been impaired while dealing with drug offenders with the
knowledge that he himself was a drug user but there has been no allegation or evidence
that he treated such defendants any differently than any other judge would have. Further,
there have been no successful challenges to any proceedings that were held before Judge
Harding based upon an allegation of abuse by him as a judge. The Pre-Sentence Report
at one point indicates that "tax payers may pay millions as appeals arefiledregarding
decisions Judge Harding made while on die bench." Our investigation has concluded that
there were several minor challenges to Judge Harding's rulings which were similarly
dismissed. It is unlikely that there was much of a taxpayer burden forthat
5.
Although this is addressed in the Pre-Sentence Report it is important to
know that Judge Harding successfully completed a ninety-day treatment program at the
Betty Ford Center in California and attended ninety aftercare meetings in ninety days
thereafter. He continues to participate in aftercare on an almost daily basis even after he
served substantial jail time and was ordered to completefivehundred hours of
community service.

Skordas & Caston, LLC
Billy Walker
Senior Counsel
Re: Judge Harding
September 5,2003
Page 4
6.
It is also important to note that since the date of his arrest, July 13,2002,
he has never tested positive for any illegal drug or alcohol and he reports that he has not
abused alcohol or drugs in the intervening months.
7.
As indicated, even now Judge Harding attends almost daily AA, CA, and
NA Twelve Step Meetings. He attended those meetings at all times after he successfully
completed treatment at the Betty Ford Clinic. The only time Judge Harding did not
attend those meetings was while he served his jail term.
8.
Judge Harding has taken special efforts to stay involved in the "recovery
community," chairing meetings at a local treatment center and sponsoring recovering
addicts to help them maintain sobriety.
9.
Judge Harding has worked with and continues to work with Lawyers
Helping Lawyers and he has become a liaison between that committee and treatment
centers throughout the state.
10.
Judge Harding continues to meet regularly with Dr. Lynn Johnson in
regular therapy sessions as suggested by the Betty Ford Clinic and Lawyers Helping
Lawyers.
11.
Judge Harding continues to maintain contact with other recovering addicts
and alcoholics who are lawyers and judges nationally and he has participated in
conferences on addiction issues involving lawyers and judges in recovery.
12.
a sponsor.

Judge Harding has successfully worked the Twelve Steps of Recovery with

13.
Judge Harding is fully compliant with all the terms and conditions of his
sentence and probation which were ordered by Judge Hansen.
14.
There appears to be no creditable evidence that Judge Harding ever
committed any poaching violations and it is anticipated that those charges will be
dismissed or resolved soon.
15.
Judge Harding never appeared in court under the influence of alcohol or
drugs and never failed to make any of his court appearances as a result of substance
abuse.
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16. - The illnesses that were observed by others during the second week of July,
2002, were unrelated to substance abuse. Mr. Harding sufferedfromsome flu symptoms
on the Thursday and Friday before his arrest, but again this was not the result of
substance abuse.
17. Any recesses or breaks Judge Harding took while on the bench were for
reasons other than substance abuse. It is not uncommon forjudges to take recesses and
breaks periodically especially during hearings where a judge may want to compose
himself or herself before pronouncing a ruling. Additionally, judges may take breaks for
staff and lawyers to refocus, or check a point of law.
18. Without reiterating too much of Judge Harding's life, it is clear that he
started an emotional decline after the death of hisfirstwife in October of 1991. That
problem was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a subsequent divorce.
The problem became much more serious in October 2001, when Judge Harding's drug
abuse problem began. This problem culminated with Judge Harding's arrest in July 2002.
After the arrest, he has conducted himself appropriately and has not used or abused any
alcohol or controlled substances whatsoever.
Allowing Ray Harding to continue to practice law while on probation with other
conditions will allow him to complete community service hours by volunteering time at a
legal aid or legal defender office. It will also allow him to continue to assist other
lawyers and judges both locally and nationally who suffer from addiction and who are in
desperate need of mentors, such as Ray, who have overcome their problems. He has
suffered the loss of his judgeship, his dignity, his liberty and has accepted full and
complete responsibility for his actions. It is unlikely that taking his ability to practice law
at this point would serve any legitimate purpose. Please let me know if there is
anything further we can provide.
Sincerely, /I
/ /

SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC.

CMgazyXj. Skordas

GGS/hy

J\

\
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CERTIFICATION
I Ray Harding, Jr., having beenfirstdully sworn depose and say that I have read
the foregoing Response to Notice of Infonnal Complaint and the contents therein are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Dated this
is

y of September, 2003.

Subscribed and sworn to before me

day of September, 2003.

STATE OF UTAH )
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
" N o S y Public— " 1
BRIGID CARNEY
,
9ExctMng*Placa.M10
SaKUteCBKUtollMiai
MyuoiHRNwincxpiflM
» r 1,2004

I
,
1

Notary Pijfclic
r
My Commission Expires:
Residing at: %^t/ CJJU
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SCREENING PANEL MEMO
Case No.: 03-0417

OPC Staff: Billy L Walker

Respondent: Ray Harding, Jr.

Complainant: Office of Professional Conduct

Membership No.: 01363

Disciplinary History:

Date of Birth: 11-23-53
Year Admitted: 1978
Address/Telephone: 11165 North Yarrow Circle
Highland, UT 84603
(801)756-6279
Respondent's Attorney: Gregory Skordas

A.

Alleged Violations:
Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)

B.

Summary of Investigation:

On March 25, 2003 the Utah Supreme Court ordered the Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC") "to proceed with a disciplinary review [of Ray Harding, Jr.] under its
ordinary rules
" (000001). On May 22, 2003 the OPC served a Notice of Informal
Complaint on Edward Brass, Mr. Harding's counsel during the criminal proceedings
(000152). On August 5, 2003 the OPC served the Notice of Informal Complaint
("NOIC") on Mr. Harding (000160). Gregory Skordas, Mr. Harding's counsel, filed a
response by letter of September 5, 2003 (000202). Sheleigh A. Harding submitted
information by letter of September 14,2003 (000297).
C.

Introduction:

In accordance with an Order of Reference from the Utah Supreme Court dated
March 25,2003, the OPC was requested "to proceed with a disciplinary review under its
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. Harding's
license to practice law to be submitted directly to this Court for final action." Therefore,
the OPC's charge in this case is to not only forward the results of its investigation to the
Screening Panel on alleged Rules of Professional Conduct violations but also its
conclusions and recommendations for a specific sanction with respect to Mr. Harding's

law license in accordance with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
("Standards").
Additionally, since, the Court has requested that "under its ordinary rules" the
conclusions and recommendation regarding Mr. Harding's license to practice law be
submitted directly to the Supreme Court (and not to the District Court if there is probable
cause for a formal complaint pursuant to Rule 10(b)(5)(F) of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") or to the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
if there is a preponderance of evidence for a recommendation of an admonition or
public reprimand pursuant to Rules 10(b)(5)(D) and (E) of the RLDD), the OPC will
forward the conclusions and recommendation for a specific sanction with respect to Mr.
Harding's law license to the Supreme Court. This means that unlike other matters
heard by the Screening Panel and determined pursuant to Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD,
the Screening Panel's determination in this case may recommend a specific sanction
beyond those outlined in Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD and should do so if the evidence
supports a sanction in accordance with the Standards for this case. This expands the
Screening Panel recommendation authority to those sanctions that ordinarily would be
determined by a District Court (i.e. suspension, probation, disbarment). The
recommendation and conclusion by the Screening Panel in this case will be considered
by the Utah Supreme Court based on the record established at the Screening Panel for
the determination of the ultimate sanction, if any, to be imposed on Mr. Harding's law
license.
D.

Complainant's Statement:
OPC's statement is summarized as follows:
1. Controlled Substances

On or about July 13,2002, after being called to Mr. Ray Harding Jr.'s home on a
domestic disturbance call, law enforcement officers found cocaine, heroin and drug
paraphernalia. Mr. Harding's person also tested positive for benzoylecyonine and
opiates in addition to the cocaine. Mr. Harding was arrested and charged with two
felony criminal counts: Count I - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 27, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76,
Chapter 2, Section 202 of the U. C. A. for knowingly and intentionally possessing or
using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance; Count
II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title
58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly
and intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit: Heroin, a Schedule
I Controlled Substance. Mr. Harding was a Fourth District Court Judge for the State of
Utah at the time of the criminal charges.
Mr. Harding may have committed the illegal act of soliciting the controlled
substances that he used. In this respect, cocaine and heroin are controlled substances
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that can only be obtained illegally. Mr. Harding may have solicited these controlled
substances from an individual by the name of Rick Connelly.
In addition to the July 13,2002 incident, Mr. Harding's wife indicated to the police
that she had previously seen Mr. Harding smoking "crack" and Mr. Harding admitted to
his wife that he had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding
stated to his wife that he smoked "crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a judge).
Mrs. Harding indicated that Mr. Harding had been on a drug "binge" about three
weeks prior to the July 13,2002 incident At minimum, this raises the question whether
Mr. Harding was under the influence of controlled substances while on the bench.
More specifically, with respect to Mr. Harding's use of controlled substances and
the effect of these controlled substances on his judicial responsibilities, it is at the least
probable that Mr. Harding was unable to attend a hearing the Thursday before the July
13,2002 incident due to his illegal controlled substance use (even though the lawyers in
the case settled the case so his attendance was not necessary); it is at the least
probable that Mr. Harding was under the influence of an illegal controlled substance at a
hearing he presided over on Friday 12,2002 (the lawyers at the hearing noticed that Mr.
Harding appeared drawn and ill); and it is at the least probable that Mr. Harding was
under the influence of illegal controlled substances at other times while on the bench
and specifically during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident (in this
respect, there were reports from court staff to the police during this six month period
that Mr. Harding had "mood" changes "and would often appear bored and disinterested
before brief recesses when he would return refreshed.).
Regarding the felony controlled substance charges, Mr. Harding entered a plea
of guilty to two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances opiates in one count, cocaine in another, class A misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was
sentenced to 120 days of jail; fined, ordered to 500 hours of community service and
probation for 24 months which included individual therapy and help from 12-step
programs.
2. Poaching
Mr. Ray Harding Jr. allegedly killed a trophy moose and two cow elk on or about
October 6, 2001. Mr. Harding faces three 3rd degree felony counts of wanton
destruction of protective wildlife. Reportedly, Mr. Harding did not have the proper
licenses and additionally this conduct may have been outside of any licensing limits.

E.

Respondent's Statement:

Name:
Address:
Telephone:

Ray Harding, Jr.
11165 North Yarrow Circle
Highland, UT 84603
(801) 756-3279

Mr. Harding's responsive statement is summarized as follows:
Mr. Harding's response should not be taken as a waiver of Mr. Harding's right to
have his case heard by a District Court Judge. In this respect, Mr. Harding objects to
Mr. Harding's case being treated differently than any other attorney discipline case. Mr.
Harding states that a Screening Panel cannot and should not be required to make the
evidentiary rulings that a judge would. Besides exceeding the Screening Panel
authority, having the Screening Panel prosecute the case, judge the merits and
recommend the final sanction violates the due process of Mr. Harding.
Mr. Harding provided his Pre-Sentencing Report but only because of threat by
the OPC that the failure to provide this report would be the basis for a separate
professional offense. A Pre-Sentence Report is confidential and should never be part of
a public record. It contains information that typically is probably not appropriate for a
Screening Panel to view or consider (i.e. Mr. Harding's personal and family history).
The Report is an investigative report for the judge for sentencing in a criminal matter. In
this case it was prepared by the Office of Adult Probation and Parole for Judge Timothy
Hansen to have sufficient information to make a fair determination of an appropriate
sentence in Mr. Harding's criminal case. The confidentiality of the report should be
honored.
Furthermore, since a Pre-Sentence Report is investigative, it should not include
conclusions, opinions and editorials. However, Mr. Harding's report does. Having said
that, Mr. Harding believes the Pre-Sentence Report is helpful because it provides to the
OPC and the Screening Panel information for a complete understanding of the case.
With specific reference to the NOIC, in summary Mr. Harding responds as
follows:
1.

"Benzolyecyonine" is a chemical term for Valium which was a prescribed
drug and which was legally possessed by Mr. Harding. The other
controlled substances listed in the NOIC are illegal.

2.

Mr. Harding was not convicted of a felony. He was charged with two
possession counts that were reduced to two class A misdemeanors. This
is not uncommon for first time offenders in criminal cases and it is not
uncommon for people to practice their professions after having been
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convicted of similar class A misdemeanors after rehabilitation. The justice
system encourages this.
3.

Even though no one could come into the possession of illegal controlled
substances except by some illegal solicitation, Mr. Harding has never
been and never will be charged with illegal solicitation and it is unlikely
that the facts of this case would have supported such a criminal charge.
Mr. Harding was found in possession of small quantities of controlled
substances and pled guilty to two counts of attempted possession of a
controlled substance, not illegal solicitation of a controlled substance.

4.

There is no credible evidence that Mr. Harding used or was under the
influence of any controlled substance while he served on the bench as a
judge. Even if there is evidence that at times Mr. Harding was ill or looked
tired, the evidence indicates that at all times he handled his cases
appropriately from the bench. Admittedly his judgment could have been
impaired while as a judge he was dealing with drug offenders with the
knowledge that he was drug user himself but there is no evidence that Mr.
Harding as a judge treated such defendants differently than any other
judge would have. In this respect, there have been no successful
challenges to Mr. Harding's rulings on the bench based on allegations of
the judge's drug abuse.

5.

Mr. Harding has successfully completed a ninety-day treatment program
and attended ninety aftercare meetings in ninety days thereafter. Mr.
Harding continues to participate in aftercare on almost a daily basis even
after service of substantial jail time and the order of completion of five
hundred hours of community service.

6.

Since Mr. Harding's arrest on July 13, 2002, he has never tested positive
for any illegal drug or alcohol and Mr. Harding reports that he has not
abused alcohol or drugs since.

7.

Mr. Harding attends almost daily AA, CA and NA twelve step meetings.

8.

Mr. Harding has taken special efforts to stay involved in the "recovery
community". He chairs meetings at a local treatment center.

9.

Mr. Harding has worked and continues to work with Lawyers Helping
Lawyers and has become a liaison.

10.

Mr. Harding continues to meet with a doctor in regular therapy sessions.

11.

Mr. Harding continues to maintain contact with recovering addicts and
alcoholics who are judges and lawyers and he has participated in national
conferences regarding "recovering" lawyers and judges.

12.

Mr. Harding has successfully worked the Twelve Steps of Recovery with a
sponsor.

13.

Mr. Harding is in full compliance with the terms and conditions of his
sentence and probation resulting from his criminal substance abuse case.

14.

There is no evidence that Mr. Harding committed any poaching violation
and it is expected that those charges will be dismissed or resolved soon.

15.

Mr. Harding never appeared in court under the influence of alcohol or
drugs and never failed to make any of his court appearances as a result of
substance abuse.

16.

The illnesses observed by people during the second week of July 2002
were related to flu symptoms and not substance abuse.

17.

Any recesses taken by Mr. Harding while on the bench were not related to
substance abuse.

18.

Mr. Harding started an emotional decline since the death of his first wife in
October 1991. The problems became worse with a motorcycle accident in
1997 and a divorce. Mr. Harding's drug abuse began in October 2001 and
his problems culminated with his arrest in July 2002. After this arrest he
has conducted himself appropriately and has not used or abused any
alcohol or controlled substance whatsoever.

Mr. Harding's response specifically states the following:
"Allowing Ray Harding to continue to practice law while on
probation with other conditions will allow him to complete community
service hours by volunteering time at a legal aid or legal defender office. It
will also allow him to continue to assist other lawyers and judges both
locally and nationally who suffer from addiction and who are in desperate
need of mentors, such as Ray, who have overcome their problems. He
has suffered the loss of his judgeship, his dignity, his liberty and has
accepted full and complete responsibility for his actions. It is unlikely that
taking his ability to practice law at this point would serve any legitimate
purpose
"
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Witnesses: (to support OPC's statement)
• Ann E. Harding
(Possibly)
• Mariane O'Bryant and Sherry Ragan
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street #2100
Provo, UT 84606
Financial Records:
•

None

Court Records:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Information, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545, 09-09-02
(000049)
Discovery Index, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545,01 -17-03
(000144)
Order of Reference, In Re: Rav Harding. Jr.. Supreme Court No. 20020535,
03-25-03 (000001)
Final Order, In Re: Rav Harding. Jr.. Supreme Court No. 20030173, 03-25-03
(000003)
Docket, Harding. Jr. v. Judicial Conduct Commission. District Court No.
030901394, 08-18-03 (000173)
Docket, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 031900587, 08-18-03
(000175)
Docket, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 031800042, 08-18-03
(000182)
Docket, Harding v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 024402310, 08-18-03
(000186)
Docket, Brown v. Friel et al.. District Court No. 030400499, 08-18-03
(000190)
Docket, Harding. Jr. v. Harding. District Court No. 024402632, 08-18-02
(000192)
Docket, Attorney General v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545, 0818-03(000194)

Other Documentation:
•
•

Geoffrey Fattah, Judge Arrested in Utah County, Deseret News, 07-14-02
(000032)
Matt Canham, Judge Jailed Over Drugs, Salt Lake Tribune, 07-15-02
(000034)

Geoffrey Fattah, $10,000 Bail Set for 4th District Judge, Deseret News, 07-15-

02 (000036)
Jesse Coleman, Local Judge Behind Bars; Law Enforcement Shocked Over
Harding's Drug Charges, Hark the Herald.com, 07-15-02 (000044)
Stephen Hunt, Judge on Leave After Arrest, Salt Lake Tribune, 07-16-02
(000038)
Debra Jandreau, Harding Posts $10,000, Hark the Herald.com, 07-16-02
(000042)
Rebecca Kellog and Liesel Enke, Utah Judge Faces Drug Charges, NewsNet,
07-17-02(000040)
Stephen Hunt, Officer says Judges was 'Staggering', Salt Lake Tribune, 0718-02 (printed) (000046)
Letter to Mr. Harding from Colin R. Winchester, 08-21-02 (000119)
Letter to Collin R. Winchester from Sharon A. Donovan, 09-06-02 (000121)
Letter to Sharon A. Donovan from Colin R. Winchester, 09-12-02 (000122)
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 09-18-02
(000123)
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 09-20-02 (000125)
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 10-10-02 (000126)
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 11-13-02 (000127)
Notice of Formal Proceedings, 11-19-02 (000052)
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 12-02-02
(000128)
Letter to Brian R. Rorence from Colin R. Winchester, 12-12-02 (000129)
Notice of Confidential Hearing and Pre-hearing Order, 01-03-03 (000056)
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, 01-07-03 (000063)
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 01-07-03
(000130)
Examiner's Position Paper, 01-17-03 (000059)
Letter (with attachments) to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 0117-03(000131)
Appearance of Counsel, 01-24-03 (000064)
Motion to Stay Proceedings, 01-24-03 (000065)
Letter to Edward K. Brass and Colin R. Winchester from Ruth Lybbert, 02-0103 (000134)
Stipulation, 02-01-03 (000070)
Transcript of hearing before Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, 02-01-03
(000076)
Memorandum Decision, 02-01-03 (000100)
Letter to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-06-03 (000135)
Letter to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-11-03 (000136)
Order Denying Motion to Stay Proceedings, 02-12-03 (000067)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 02-12-03 (000108)
Order of Removal from Office, 02-12-03 (000115)
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Letter (with attachment) to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-1303 (000137)
Stephen Speckman and Linda Thomson, Embattled Judge Resigns from
Bench, Deseret News, 03-01-03 (000016)
Geoffrey Fattah and Linda Thomson, Harding's Wife Hopes Case Wont go to
Trial, Deseret News, 03-03-03 (000019)
Linda Thomson, Harding Admits to Reduced Charges, Deseret News, 03-0503 (000022)
Jesse Coleman, Harding to Face New Criminal Charges, Hark the
Herald.com, 03-22-03 (000004)
Leziee E. Whiting, Harding Faces Poaching Charges, Deseret News, 04-12-

03 (000009)
Fax to Edward Brass from Utah Department of Corrections Adult Probation
and Parole, 04-22-03 (000208)
Presentence Investigation Report, 04-23-03 (000211)
Linda Thomson, Harding Gets 120 Days on Drug Counts, Deseret News, 0428-03 (000025)
Hard Time forjudge Harding, Deseret News, 05-01-03 (000028)
Leziee E. Whiting, Ex-judge's Poaching Case Delayed, Deseret News, 05-1303(000011)
For the Record Judge Recuses Himself from Harding Case, Salt Lake
Tribune, 05-14-03 (000013)
Linda Thomson, Sentence by Harding Upheld, Deseret News, 07-04-03
(000200)
Former Judge is Released from Jail, Deseret News, 08-03-03 (000199)
For the Record Former Judge is Arraigned on Poaching Charges, Salt Lake
Tribune, 08-12-03 (000170)
Matt Canham, Harding Charged with Poaching (000015)
Previous JCC Complaints against Judge Ray M. Harding Jr., Complied by
Susan Hunt and Colin Winchester (000142)
J.

NOIC Summary & Recommendation:

Our investigation suggests that Mr. Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct)
states [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: Commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects." In this respect, Mr. Harding may have violated this rule when law
enforcement officers after being called to his home on a domestic disturbance call on
July 13, 2002, found cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Mr. Harding also tested
positive for benzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine. Mr. Harding was
arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts: Count I - Unlawful Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section
8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 of the U.C.A. for knowingly and
intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II
Controlled Substance; Count II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
u

Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76,
Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a controlled
substance, to wit: Heroin, a Schedule I Controlled Substance.
There is also evidence that Mr. Harding may have committed the illegal act of
soliciting the controlled substances that he used. Specifically, cocaine and heroin are
controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally and there is evidence that Mr.
Harding solicited these controlled substances from an individual by name of Rick
Connelly.
In addition to this, Mr. Harding's wife indicated to the police that she had
previously seen him smoking "crack" and he admitted to his wife that he had been using
"crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding stated to his wife that he smoked
"crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a judge).
Regarding the felony charges, reportedly, Mr. Harding entered a plea of guilty to
two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances - opiates in
one count, cocaine in another, class A misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was sentenced to
120 days of jail; fined, ordered to do 500 hours of community service and probation for
24 months which includes individual therapy and help from 12-step programs.
With respect to the criminal charges of poaching, Mr. Harding may have violated
Rule 8.4(b) when reportedly he allegedly killed a trophy moose and two cow elk on
October 6, 2001. Mr. Harding is facing three 3rd degree felony counts of wanton
destruction of protected wildlife. Reportedly, he did not have the proper licenses.
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." In this
respect, Mr. Harding may have violated this rule by the above outlined factual
allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, Mr. Harding reported actions of poaching
may be a greater reflection of dishonesty if his conduct was outside of any licensing
limits.
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." In this respect,
Mr. Harding may have violated this rule by the above outlined factual allegations of
criminal conduct. Additionally, Mrs. Harding indicated that he had been on a drug
"binge" about three weeks prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. This raises the question
whether Mr. Harding was under the influence of controlled substances while performing
duties on the judicial bench. Specifically it is probable that due to controlled substance
use that Mr. Harding was unable to attend a hearing on the Thursday before the July
13, 2002 incident (even though the lawyers in the case settled the case so his
attendance was not necessary); it is probable that Mr. Harding was under the influence
of a controlled substance at a hearing he presided over on Friday July 12, 2002 (the
lawyers at that hearing noticed that he appeared drawn and ill); it is also probable that
he was under the influence of controlled substances at other times while on the bench
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and specifically during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. This is
evidenced by reports from court staff to the police that during this six month period, he
had "mood" changes and would often appear bored and disinterested before brief
recesses when he would return refreshed. Finally, Mrs. Harding stated to the police that
he indicated to her that he had smoked "crack" in the bathroom of his office.
It should also be noted that given the nature of public trust of the position held by
Mr. Harding, a state District Court Judge, and specifically the administration of justice
that he was responsible for in this position, even if there is no evidence to support that
his controlled substance abuse influenced his cases, it is OPC's contention that the
illegal drug use, in and of itself, while serving in this position is sufficient evidence for a
violation of 8.4(d). The OPC feels that the same analysis is true, if there is sufficient
evidence to show that Mr. Harding committed the crime of poaching and the Panel finds
that this crime is related to a lawyer's fitness.
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) by engaging in conduct that violates the abovementioned Rules of Professional Conduct.
OPC'S RECOMMENDATION
The purpose of the Standards is for the use in imposing a sanction or sanctions
following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a provision
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.3, Standards. Even considering the
response submitted by Mr. Harding, the undisputed fact of Mr. Harding's use,
possession and conviction for attempted possession of illegal controlled substances
establishes that, at minimum, Mr. Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, i.e., a criminal act that reflects on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness . . .; Rule 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice; and Rule 8.4(a), based on violations of these other Rules of Professional
Conduct . If the Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Harding used
illegal controlled substances while at work on the bench, these additional facts only
supplement the above-mentioned rule violations. Furthermore, if the Panel finds
sufficient evidence of the allegations of the criminal conduct of poaching and finds that
this criminal conduct reflects upon Mr. Harding's fitness as a lawyer, this also
supplements the above-outlined rule violations.
The Standards are to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities
as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who
have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to
discharge properly their professional responsibilities. Rule 1.1, Standards. The
Standards are a system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in
assigning sanctions in a particular case of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to
promote: (a) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of
sanction in an individual case; (b) consideration of the appropriate weight of such
factors in light of the stated goals of. lawyer discipline; and (c) consistency in the
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imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among
jurisdictions. Rule 1.3, Standards.
The following factors are to be considered in imposing sanctions: (a) the duty
violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Rule
3.1, Standards.
A.

The Duty Violated

An attorney's license to practice is granted on the implied understanding that the
person receiving it will conduct himself in a manner that is proper, and will abstain form
conduct that will bring discredit to himself, the profession, and the courts. Mr. Harding
violated this duty by engaging in criminal activity. Additionally, Mr. Harding had a higher
duty as a lawyer placed on him due to his judicial capacity and, at the minimum, he
breached this duty by adjudicating cases involving drug offenders while he himself was
a drug offender. At the maximum, Mr. Harding violated this higher duty by presiding
over any cases while committing criminal acts. The OPC's view is that this higher duty
was violated whether or not Mr. Harding's decisions as a judge were influenced by his
drug use.
B.

Mr. Harding's Mental State

Mr. Harding knowingly and intentionally committed the criminal acts, which led to
his conviction plea.
C.

The Injury Caused bv Mr. Harding's Misconduct

Criminal misconduct causes havoc to the public, the legal system and the
profession. Mr. Harding "injured" each of these groups by his criminal conduct.
Furthermore, as a lawyer and judge, Mr. Harding placed at risk the very fiber of judicial
administration by presiding over cases while he himself was committing crimes. This
created a level of potential harm due to the possible re-evaluation needed for those
cases and specifically any case where Mr. Harding may have presided while under the
influence of illegal drugs.
D.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.2, Standards. Conversely,
mitigating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the
degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.3, Standards.
Possible mitigating and aggravating factors are identified in the Standards,
although, as the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the lists are non-exclusive. See In re
Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998).
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The Supreme Court recently discussed the balancing process in which a court
must engage when it considers mitigation and aggravation:
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level of discipline, it may
apply rule 6 and consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
deciding what sanction should ultimately be imposed. Because rule 6
does not provide any guidance as to how these circumstances are to be
weighed, the process of applying them is necessarily somewhat
subjective
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of discipline set forth
in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be
significant
In re Ince. 957 P.2d 1233,1238 (Utah 1998).
In two fairly recent attorney discipline decisions issued by the Utah Supreme
Court, the trial court has been found to have accorded too much weight to mitigating
factors that were not compelling. In Ince. the Supreme Court found that the District
Court accorded too much weight to mitigation that was "not particularly compelling." Jd.
at 1238. Indeed, in light of the number of aggravating factors, which "at least" balanced
the "not particularly compelling" mitigating factors, "no adjustment to the presumptively
appropriate level of discipline is warranted." Jd. at 1238. Similarly, in In re Tanner, the
Supreme Court found that the multiple aggravating factors "would in fact justify an
increase in the degree of discipline imposed." In re Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah
1998).
It is the OPC's viewpoint that the following are appropriate aggravating
circumstances for consideration in this case:
(1)

A pattern of misconduct. Rule 6.2(c), Standards. In this respect, by Mr.
Harding's own admission, he engaged in criminal conduct involving illegal
drugs as early as October 2001. This would necessarily entail a pattern of
illegal activity of obtaining and using illegal drugs for almost a year (at the
least, until the July 2002 incident).

(2)

Multiple offenses. Rule 6.2(d), Standards. At minimum, Mr. Harding was
convicted by his plea of two criminal offenses of possession.

(6)

Substantial experience in the practice of law. Rule 6.2(i), Standards. Mr.
Harding has been a member of the Utah Bar since September of 1978.
Furthermore, he had been a member of the bench since September of
1995.

(6)

Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. Rule 6.2(k),
Standards.

Based on what Mr. Harding has provided to the OPC, in his response and in his
Pre-Sentencing Report, the OPC expects that Mr. Harding will, at the minimum, assert
the following as mitigating circumstances:
(1)

Absence of a prior record of discipline. Rule 6.3(a), Standards. The OPC
does not contest this fact, however, the question is how much weight to
give it. The OPC feels little if any should be given because of the
seriousness of this misconduct. See e.g. Borre v. State Bar of California.
804 P.2d 60,53 (Cal. 1991) ("Lack of a prior disciplinary record over many
years of practice may be considered in mitigation when coupled with
present misconduct which is not deemed serious. It does not, however,
preclude substantial discipline for serious misconduct."); see also
Basbanes' Case. 676 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1996) (respondent urged lack of
disciplinary record as mitigation; the court stated, "We believe that the
respondent's twenty-eight years of experience as a litigator could just as
easily 'justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.'")
(citation omitted).

(2)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Rule 6.3(b), Standards. Mr.
Harding may claim that his misconduct does not reflect a dishonest or
selfish motive. This is entitled to little or no weight in light of Mr. Harding's
obvious conflict of interest with the interests of the people who appeared
in front of him while he was on the bench. Mr. Harding's desire to obtain
and use illegal controlled substances placed his interests before those of
the plaintiffs and defendants, appearing in front of him thereby evidencing
a selfish motive underlying his misconduct

(3)

Personal or emotional problems. Rule 6.3(c), Standards. Mr. Harding
claims that his emotional decline began with the death of his first wife in
October 1991, was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a
subsequent divorce. Presumably, all of this led to his drug use beginning
by his admission in October 2001. Even though the OPC is sensitive to
the effect that these types of personal problems may have on person, with
all due respect, it is questionable whether there is a causal connection to
problems of this type which began in 1991 to the type of drug use that Mr.
Harding began in October 2001. Furthermore and also importantly, it is as
questionable whether personal problems should be compelling mitigation
for criminal possession of illegal drugs by a sitting judge.

(4)

Good character or reputation. Rule 6.3(g), Standards. As part of his PreSentencing Report and response, Mr. Harding has offered evidence
through letters of good character and reputation and Mr. Harding may
provide testimonial evidence of this at the Panel hearing. Although the
testimony of witnesses might be offered in support of a claim that Mr.
Harding has good character or reputation, this mitigation evidence is
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entitled to little weight unless the witnesses are shown to have been
aware of the full extent of Mr. Harding's misconduct. See Ince, 957 P.2d
at 1238-39; In re Ford. 749 P.2d 1331,1335 (Cal.-1988) (letters of support
that did not reflect their authors' knowledge of the full extent of attorney's
misconduct did not constitute mitigation, and in any case, attorney "may
continue to enjoy the respect and confidence of a number of his peers; it is
our responsibility to determine if he is fit to remain a member of the bar.");
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gary. 452 A.2d 1221, 1222-223 (Md.
1982) (attorney convicted of tax evasion disbarred, notwithstanding
excellent reputation): see also In re Petty. 627 P.2d 191,194 (Cal. 1981)
(character testimony, no matter how laudatory, does not establish
rehabilitation).
Mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected bv a substance abuse or mental disability:
and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct: and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental
disability is demonstrated bv a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation: and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.
Rule 6.3 (i), Standards.
This alleged mitigating circumstance is the focus of Mr. Harding's claim for
mitigation (i.e. a substance abuse problem which caused the misconduct
and is being rehabilitated). The OPC concedes that if each and every
element of Rule 6.3(i) is met, this would be a significant mitigating
circumstance and depending on the weight given to all mitigation and any
aggravating circumstances this could justify a decrease in the degree of
any discipline imposed.
Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Rule 6.3(1), Standards. The
OPC anticipates that Mr. Harding will attempt to offer evidence that other
penalties or sanctions have been imposed upon him (i.e. his criminal
penalties and the loss of judgeship). Again, this is entitled to little weight,
inasmuch as the sanctions imposed upon Mr. Harding in his criminal
matter and the loss of his judgeship did not encompass the totality of Mr.
Harding's.professional misconduct.

(7)

Remorse. Rule 6.3(m), Standards. Finally, the OPC anticipates that Mr.
Harding will offer evidence that he is remorseful. In order for remorse to
constitute a significant mitigating factor, something more than an isolated
eleventh-hour expression is required. See e.g. Hipolito v. State Bar of
California. 770 P.2d 743, 746 (Cal. 1989) (remorse may be significant
factor in mitigation if an attorney Mdisplay[s] candor, cooperation and
remorse throughout the disciplinary proceedings, and a willingness to
rehabilitate himself."*) (emphasis added). The OPC does not doubt the
genuine nature of Mr. Harding's present state of remorse. However,
based on the evidence that the OPC has reviewed, Mr. Harding's
expressions of remorse were made only after he had been caught and
confronted on July of 2002. With all due respect, this suggests that Mr.
Harding's remorse is not for his misconduct, but for his apprehension, and
as such, is entitled to little weight. See e.g. Ince. 957 P.2d at 1238;
Tanner. 960 P.2d at 403 ("Naturally anyone going through a trial for
[Tanner's] wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead,
the remorse question closely relates to the acknowledgement of wrongful
conduct: did Tanner feel remorse about his behavior before getting
caught, and was he motivated by remorse in making amends?"); In re
Lamb. 776 P.2d 765, 768-70 (Cal. 1989) (seriousness of misconduct
outweighed repeated expressions of "genuine remorse").

Rule 4.2 of the Standards outline that disbarment, absent aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, is the appropriate presumptive sanction when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d),
(e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the
lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale,
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
It is the OPC's viewpoint that Mr. Harding engaged in serious criminal conduct. If the
Panel determines under 4.2(b) of the Standards that Mr. Harding's serious criminal
conduct includes any of the elements listed under that Standard, such as solicitation of
someone (i.e., Mr. Rick Connally) to sell Mr. Harding the illegal controlled substances
then the presumptive discipline in this case is disbarment. See In the Matter of the
Discipline of Pendleton. 11 P.3d 284 (Utah 2000) where an attorney was disbarred for
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possession, use, and distribution of methamphetamines (a copy of this case is attached
as Exhibit A). Thereafter, the issue is whether Mr. Harding's rehabilitation evidence
sufficiently meets the standards of mitigation and outweighs any aggravation to reduce
the degree of discipline (i.e., to a suspension).
Rule 4.3 of the Standards outlines the presumptive discipline of suspension as
follows:
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d),
(e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in
Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
Due to violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and 8.4(b) as outlined by the
OPC, either Standards, 4.3(a) or 4.3(b) would be an appropriate guideline for
suspension as the presumptive sanction in this case (if the Panel determines that the
elements of the crime do not exist to support a presumptive disbarment sanction).
Pursuant to Rule 2.3 of the Standards, the maximum period of suspension is
three years. From the OPC's perspective, the best case scenario for Mr. Harding is that
all of the elements of aggravation or significant mitigation appears to balance toward the
presumptive discipline in this case with the exception of Mr. Harding's claim of
rehabilitation. The worst case scenario for Mr. Harding, is that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigation in this case and the presumptive discipline
should be increased in degree, notwithstanding his rehabilitation claim. An argument
certainly can be made for the worst case scenario since most of the mitigation asserted
by Mr. Harding could be determined to have little or no weight as outlined above by the
OPC and the added aggravating circumstance in this case is the fact of a sitting judge
committing this type of misconduct However, the OPC's recommendation is based on
the best case scenario for Mr. Harding.
The OPC's recommendation is that if the evidence supports Mr. Harding's
rehabilitation claim, consistent with the elements of the Standards, the OPC feels that
this claim should at most reduce a presumptive sanction of disbarment to a three-year
suspension or a presumptive sanction of suspension from a three-year suspension to a
two-year suspension. Therefore the OPC's recommendation is that at minimum, Mr.
Harding's law license should be suspended for a period of two years for his misconduct
The OPC's recommendation is also somewhat supported by case law from other
states. At least two cases are similar to Mr. Harding's case from the standpoint that the
criminal conduct involving the lawyer occurred while the attomey was in a public service
capacity. See In re Penn. 548 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Wise. 1996) (involving conviction of

district attorney for misdemeanor marijuana and cocaine possession. The district
attorney was suspended from practice for two years.) See also Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Norris. 666 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1996) (respondent attorney was a
prosecuting attorney who pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of cocaine. The court
suspended the attorney for two years with one year of the suspension stayed) (a copy
of these cases are attached as Exhibit B). In these cases, there were mitigating
elements of rehabilitation, remorse and accepting responsibility for actions.
A sampling of other drug misconduct related attorney discipline cases is as
follows:
In re Olson, 537 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1995)
Misdemeanor conviction for marijuana use resulting in a three-year
suspension.
In re Sawhill. 425 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1993)
Indicted for possession of cocaine, obstruction of an officer, two counts
of DUI; pled guilty to possession of cocaine; sentenced to three years
probation conditioned on surrender of license for 3 years.
Aggravation: entered rehabilitation only when required to do so;
continued practicing until ordered to stop; sought to continue practicing after
his conviction; failed to cooperate with Bar.
Disbarment.
State of Colorado v. Stauffer. 858 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1993)
Convicted of possession cocaine (felony); failed to pay judgment
against him for expert witness bill.
Aggravation: prior discipline; failure to acknowledge wrongful conduct;
substantial experience; indifference.
Mitigation: personal and emotional problems; delay in proceedings.
Aggravation:
misrepresentations to clients; practicing law while
suspended.
Disbarment.
In re Nelson. 874 P.2d 1201 (Kan. 1994)
Pled guilty to attempted possession of cocaine (felony); sentenced to
one and one-half to five years in prison; served 3 months, then probation;
random urinalysis negative; doctor testified to complete recovery from
addiction; legal competence not in question.
During criminal prosecution, made false allegations against police.
Failed to communicate with client (2 counts). Abandoned client
Mitigation: long term practice with only one previous discipline;
general good character; therapy and clean urinalysis; no pattern of
misconduct.
Aggravation: failed to return retainer to client.
Indefinite Suspension.
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In re Rivkind. 791 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1990)
Convicted of attempted possession of cocaine (felony); placed on
interim suspension, no impact on work
Aggravation: repeated violation of state law for extended period.
Mitigation: remorse, rehabilitation, cooperation.
Suspension (2 years, followed by 2 year probation).
In re Gooding. 917 P.2d 414 (Kan. 1996)
Charged with 13 criminal counts; found guilty of possession of narcotic
drugs (felony); sentenced to 3 to 10 years in prison; actually served one year;
eventually acquitted pursuant to habeas corpus petition; admitted using
cocaine for ten years; engaged in illegal conduct including possession of
illegal substances and paraphernalia.
Aggravation: use of cocaine for 10 years; multiple offenses; illegal
conduct.
Mitigation:
absence of prior disciplinary record; personal and
emotional problems; cooperation; good character and reputation;
rehabilitation; remorse.
Suspension presumptive discipline; because of compelling mitigation,
2 year probation.
In re Abelman. 744 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1987)
Pled guilty to using cocaine
Mitigation: rehabilitation, cooperation
Suspension (6 months).
It should be noted that none of the cases are right on point with Mr. Harding's
case with respect to all aspects of the facts, presumptive sanction standards in this
jurisdiction, and the elements of aggravation and mitigation. And, as far as the OPC
knows, there is no case directly on point in our jurisdiction. Therefore, Mr. Harding's
case should be determined based on its facts in accordance with Utah's Standards.
The various elements of the cases from other jurisdictions can be used as a
backdrop for Utah's determination.
One final note, Mr. Harding in his response has suggested that the
appropriate sanction in this case should be one that allows him to continue to
practice law (i.e. to complete community service etc.). This suggestion is essentially
requesting that probation be the appropriate sanction in this case.
Probation is an allowable sanction under the Standards. Specifically Rule 2.7
of the Standards states:
Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under
specified conditions. Probation can be public or non-public, can be
imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement.

It is the position of the OPC that in Utah, probation is not appropriate as a
sole sanction for cases where due to the misconduct, disbarment is potentially the
presumptive sanction. As outlined by this memo disbarment is certainly a possibility
in Mr. Harding's case. In cases like Mr. Harding's, it is the OPC's viewpoint that
consistent with the goals of lawyer discipline and the responsibilities that the legal
profession has to the public to maintain the high standards of professional conduct
that the discipline sanction imposed involve actual time out from the practice of law.
This time out is a lawyer's license price that Mr. Harding should pay for his
misconduct. Furthermore, due to the nature of the substance abuse problem that
Mr. Harding is claiming and the probationary requirements of his criminal case, Mr.
Harding may need this time out to evidence a "meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation" and to show that "the recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely." Rule 6.3(i), Standards.
Having said the foregoing, the OPC does not object to probation added to a
sanction consisting of time out from the practice of law (i.e. at the minimum the two
years consistent with the OPC's recommendation). And certainly consistent with
Rule 2.7 of the Standards, completion of all probations (including his criminal case)
should be made before he is reinstated or readmitted to the practice of law.

Dated: _ H ^ 4 - N a m e : "R, JUL A ^/JUy
Dated:

Name:
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LEXSEE 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
In the Matter of the Discipline of Gary W. Pendleton, No. 2564.
No. 990317
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2000 UT77; llP.3d284;

405 Utah Adv. Rqp. 3; 2000 Utah LEXIS 119

September 26,2000, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
[**1] Released for Publication October 18,2000.
PRIOR HISTORY:
Fifth District, St George. The Honorable Boyd Bunnell.
DISPOSITION:
Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant challenged a
trial court's judgment disbarring him from the practice of
law in Utah, entered by the Fifth District, St George
(Utah), in a case where disbarment was sought after die
trial court made factual findings that appellant possessed,
used, procured, and distributed methamphetamine.
OVERVIEW: Appellant was disbarred by die trial court
after the court made factual findings that he possessed,
used, procured, and distributed methamphetamine. A
disciplinary investigation was begun after criminal
charges had been filed against him, but before any
conviction occurred. Appellee's second petition for
interim suspension was pursuant to a disciplinary rule
thai allowed interim suspension where lawyer had been
convicted of a crime that reflected on his honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. By the time the
second petition was filed, appellant had been convicted
of die possession charge. Appellant challenged the trial
court's judgment disbarring him. The court affirmed The
court held appellee did not have to take appellant's case
to a screening panel, his request to change die judge was
untimely, appellants requests for a protective order and
relief from default admissions were properly denied,
appellee's protective order was properly granted,
disbarment was proper, and appellant was not denied due
process.

OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed because trial court did
not err in not requiring appellant's action first be brought
before a screening panel, appellant's notice of change of
judge was untimely, appellant's protective order motion
and relief from default admissions request were properly
denied while appellee state administrative agency's
protective order motion was properly granted,
disbarment was appropriate, and appellant was not
denied due process.

COUNSEL:
Gary W. Pendleton, Ivins, pro se.
Billy L. Walker, Charles A. Gruber, Kate A. Toomey,
Salt Lake City, Office of Professional Conduct of die
Utah State Bar.
JUDGES:
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice. Chief Justice Howe,
Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, and Justice Wilkins
concur in Associate Chief Justice Russon's opinion.
OPINIONBY:
RUSSON
OPINION:
[*287] RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:
Gary Pendleton appeals from die district court's
judgment disbarring him for misconduct involving his
possession, use, procurement, and distribution of
methamphetamine. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
Pendleton was licensed to practice law in the state
of Utah and was engaged full time in the practice of law
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in Washington County, Utah, when criminal charges
were filed against him. On April 28, 1997, he was
charged in Fifth District Court with criminal solicitation
to deliver a controlled substance, distribution of a
controlled substance (two counts), and possession or use
of a controlled substance. In December 1997, a jury trial,
[**2] presided over by District Judge David E. Roth,
was held in die criminal court nl at which the State
presented evidence of Pendleton's alleged involvement
with methamphetamine, a controlled substance. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of possession
or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2XaXi)> n2 and
on March 16, 1998, the criminal court entered its
judgment of conviction of this offense. The criminal
court sentenced Pendleton to a five-year prison term but
stayed the sentence and placed Pendleton on thirty-six
months' probation.

nl To avoid confusion, the district court in
which Pendleton's criminal trial took place shall
be referred to in this opinion as the "criminal
court" and the district court in which die
disciplinary proceeding took place shall be
referred to as the "disciplinary court"
n2 The other three charges were dismissed
before die matter was submitted to the jury for
determination.

On July 2, 1997, after [**3] die criminal charges
had been filed against Pendleton but before he was
ultimately convicted, the Utah State Bar's Office of
Professional Conduct (die "OPC") commenced a separate
disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton by filing a
petition for die interim suspension of Pendleton in the
Fiflh District Court The OPC filed its petition pursuant
to rule 18 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability ("RLDD"), which permits die OPC to seek
interim suspension of a lawyer who poses a substantial
threat of irreparable harm to the public, pending a final
determination of whether permanent discipline is
necessary. The OPC alleged in its petition that Pendleton
(1) possessed and used methamphetamine, (2) solicited
one of his clients, Donald Mills, to distribute
methamphetamine to him, (3) purchased large amounts
of methamphetamine from Mills, (4) requested
methamphetamine from Mills's wife, Shannon Mills, in
exchange for legal services, and (5) accepted
methamphetamine in exchange for legal services
provided to another client, Robert Hernandez. The OPC
contended that in light of these acts, Pendleton's
continued practice of law posed a substantial threat of
irreparable harm to die public. [**4] The presiding

judge of die Fifth District Court assigned Senior Judge
Boyd Bunnell to preside over the [*288] OPCs
disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton.
On January 10, 1998, a hearing was held before
Judge Bunnell on die OPCs petition for interim
suspension. In an order entered January 20, 1998, the
disciplinary court granted the OPCs petition and ordered
that Pendleton be suspended from the practice of law
pending final disposition of die disciplinary proceeding
against him. On February 19, 1998, Pendleton filed a
notice of appeal of the interim suspension order.
On March 3, 1998, die OPC filed a formal
complaint in the disciplinary court pursuant to rule 18 of
die RLDD, which provides that once an interim
suspension order is entered, die OPC is entitled to file a
formal complaint seeking permanent discipline. In
addition to listing the allegations set forth in die OPCs
rule 18 petition for interim suspension, the formal
complaint listed additional allegations of misconduct that
had arisen since the petition was filed, including
allegations
that
Pendleton
(1)
distributed
methamphetamine to Marlene Meyers, a client, and
smoked methamphetamine with her in his [**5] office,
(2) failed to wind up his law practice, as required by rule
26 of the RLDD and die disciplinary court's interim
suspension order, (3) engaged in die unauthorized
practice of law while on an administrative suspension for
failure to pay his annual licensing fee, (4) improperly
used his client trust account, and (5) was convicted of
possession or use of methamphetamine. The OPC
requested in its formal complaint that Pendleton be
disbarred for his alleged misconduct
On April 1,1998, Pendleton filed a notice of change
of judge as a matter of right pursuant to rule 11 of the
RLDD, which entities a lawyer subject to discipline to a
change ofjudge as ofrightwhen die lawyer files a notice
within thirty days after the action is commenced against
the lawyer. The OPC opposed Pendleton's notice,
contending that die notice was untimely. Senior Judge
Douglas L. Cornaby was assigned to rule on the notice of
change of judge, since die judges of die Fifth District
recused themselves.
On June 2, 1998, a hearing was held before Judge
Cornaby on Pendleton's notice of change of judge. The
OPC contended that Pendleton's notice was untimely
because it was not filed within [**6] thirty days after die
action had commenced, as required by rule 11 and this
action "commenced" when die motion for interim
suspension was filed on July 2, 1997—several months
before Pendleton requested a change of judge. Pendleton
argued, however, that the notice was timely because the
action against him did not "commence" for purposes of
rule 11 until the OPC filed its formal complaint on
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March 3, 1998, and thus, die notice of change of judge
was timely filed on April 1, 1998. Judge Comaby ruled
that Pendleton's notice of change of judge was untimely
and thus denied the notice. Judge Bunnell then continued
to preside over die ongoing disciplinary proceeding
against Pendleton.
During this time, we granted Pendleton's
interlocutory appeal of the rule 18 interim suspension
order and concluded on April 20, 1998, that while
Pendleton's conduct constituted grounds for discipline,
his conduct was insufficient to justify interim suspension
under rule 18. We therefore stayed die rule 18 interim
suspension order pending final resolution of die
proceeding against Pendleton in die disciplinary court
We added, however, that die OPC was entitled to move
for interim suspension under [**7] rule 19 of the RLDD.
On April 24, 1998, after we decided Pendleton's
appeal from the rule 18 interim suspension order, die
OPC filed with the disciplinary court a second motion for
interim suspension. This time die OPC sought the interim
suspension of Pendleton under rule 19 of the RLDD,
which enables the OPC to seek interim suspension "upon
being advised that a lawyer has been convicted of a
crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
At this point, Pendleton's conviction had been entered for
possession or use of a controlled substance. Pendleton
opposed the rule 19 motion for interim suspension,
arguing, in part, that a conviction of possession or use of
a controlled substance does not warrant interim
suspension. [*289] On July 6, 1998, the disciplinary
court ultimately granted die OPCs rule 19 motion for
interim suspension, again suspending Pendleton from the
practice of law pending die final outcome of die
disciplinary proceeding.
On May 1,1998, die OPC served upon Pendleton a
set of interrogatories, a request for admissions, and a
request for production of documents. On June 5, 1998,
Pendleton [**8] moved for a protective order seeking
relief from die OPCs requested discovery. Pendleton
contended that the OPCs requests were not reasonably
calculated to lead to die discovery of admissible
evidence and that die requested discovery involved
"impermissible inquisition." The OPC objected to
Pendleton's motion for a protective order by filing both a
motion to strike Pendleton's motion and a memorandum
in opposition to Pendleton's motion. The OPC argued
that Pendleton's motion was untimely, unsigned, and
lacking an accompanying memorandum of points and
authorities, and should therefore be stricken. Moreover,
die OPC contended that its discovery requests were
reasonable and sought relevant evidence. Chi June 22,
1998, Pendleton filed an amended motion for a
protective order, accompanied by a forty-five-page

memorandum of points and authorities. In his
memorandum, Pendleton argued that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over this case during the pendency of
Pendleton's earlier appeal and, thus, Pendleton had no
duty to respond to the OPCs discovery requests, which
were filed during the pendency of the appeal. The
disciplinary court denied Pendleton's motion, stating:
Respondent's [**9] motion is so general that it in effect
is asking the Court to deny the Bar its rights of discovery
in preparing for die disbarment proceeding. For the Court
to enter such a general and all-inclusive protective order
would thus deny die Bar its discovery rights as set forth
in die Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court did not address the jurisdictional issue raised
by Pendleton.
After die disciplinary court denied Pendleton's
motion for a protective order, Pendleton still did not
respond to the OPCs interrogatories, request for
production of documents, or request for admissions.
Therefore, on September 4,1998, die OPC filed a motion
to compel responses to the interrogatories and request for
production of documents. As for the request for
admissions, die OPC alleged that die matters therein
were deemed admitted because Pendleton failed to
respond thereto within thirty days as required by rule 36
of die Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. n3

n3 This rule provides in pertinent part:
Each matter of which an admission is requested
shall be separately set forth. The matter is
admitted unless, within thirty days after service
of the request,... die party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection
addressed to die matter
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2).
[**10]
On September 15,1998, die disciplinary court ruled
tinat die matters set forth in die OPCs request for
admissions were, indeed, deemed admitted by default In
addition, die court ordered Pendleton to respond to the
OPCs interrogatories and request for production of
documents before September 18,1998.
On September 18, 1998, Pendleton finally filed a
response to die OPCs interrogatories and request for
production of documents, but included admissions and
denials of die matters set forth in die OPCs request for
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admissions. The OPC filed a motion objecting to
Pendleton's late responses to the request for admissions
and requested that his responses be stricken because the
matters had already been deemed admitted. In response,
Pendleton moved for relief from his default admissions.
The disciplinary court ultimately ruled that Pendleton
was not entitled to relief from his default admissions, and
die same were deemed admitted.
Meanwhile, the OPC sought partial summary
judgment as to Pendleton's alleged violations of rule
8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct In a motion
filed on September 4, 1998, the OPC argued that
undisputed facts as to [**11] Pendleton's admitted use,
possession,
solicitation,
and
distribution
of
methamphetamine established that Pendleton committed
criminal acts reflecting adversely [*290] on his honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in violation of rule
8.4(d). The disciplinary court granted die motion for
partial summary judgment on September 18,1998. In its
order granting die motion for partial summary judgment,
the disciplinary court made numerous findings of fact,
including (1) Pendleton's default admissions, (2)
Pendleton's admission at an earlier hearing that he
possessed and used methamphetamine over an extended
period of time, and (3) the feet of Pendleton's conviction
for his possession or use of methamphetamine. The court
concluded in its order that Pendleton had violated rule
'8.4(d) and ordered that a sanctions hearing be held to
determine die appropriate sanctions for Pendleton's
misconduct
On November 5, 1998, Pendleton served a number
of interrogatories upon the OPC. The OPC thereafter
moved for a protective order on the grounds that die
discovery requests were irrelevant and not reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. On December
24, 1998, the disciplinary [**12] court granted die
OPCs motion and entered a protective order.
The disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton
culminated in a sanctions hearing commenced on
January 27, 1999, to determine the appropriate
permanent sanction to be imposed upon Pendleton. At
the hearing, Pendleton testified that he had been
convicted for possessing methamphetamine, that he had
obtained methamphetamine from a client, that he had
repeatedly used metiiamphetamine, that he had violated
his probation agreement and had been sent to jail, that he
had refused to submit to urinalysis while in jail, and that
he knew possessing metiiamphetamine and asking
another to procure itforhim were criminal acts.
Other witnesses, including clients of Pendleton,
testified at the hearing. Marlene Meyers testified that
while a client of Pendleton, she smoked
metiiamphetamine with Pendleton at his office. Donald

Mills testified that while a client of Pendleton, he
received
legal
services
in
exchange
for
metiiamphetamine, Pendleton paid him to purchase
methamphetamine
for
Pendleton,
he
used
metiiamphetamine with Pendleton several times, and
Pendleton supplied him with methamphetamine. Other
witnesses testified [** 13] that when Pendleton presented
himself to the jail to serve his sixty-day sentence for
violating his probation agreement, he was under the
influence of methamphetamine.
On March 5, 1999, the disciplinary court ordered
that disbarment was the appropriate presumptive
sanction for Pendleton's misconduct and, in the
alternative, that even if suspension was the presumptive
sanction, disbarment was still proper due to several
aggravating factors. The court based its ruling upon its
findings of feet regarding evidence presented at the
sanctions hearing as to Pendleton's use, distribution, and
procurement of metiiamphetamine. The court also
incorporated those findings of feet set forth in its earlier
order granting partial summary judgment against
Pendleton, which were based on Pendleton's admissions
and his conviction.
Pendleton now appeals the disciplinary court's
ruling and raises the following claims of error (1) the
disciplinary court erred in allowing the OPC to pursue
this action in the Fifth District Court without "first
proceeding through a "screening" panel; (2) Pendleton's
notice of change ofjudge was timely; (3) the disciplinary
court erred in denying his [** 14] motion for a protective
order and denying relief from his default admissions; (4)
the disciplinary court erred in granting die OPCs motion
for a protective order; (5) die disciplinary court erred in
concluding that disbarment was proper, and (6) the
disciplinary court denied Pendleton due process. We will
address each argument in turn.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Given the unique nature of attorney discipline
proceedings, we may draw our own inferences from the
trial court's factual determinations, which we review
under a clearly erroneous standard." In re Stubbs, 1999
UT15, P19, 974 P.2d296 (citing In re Tanner, 960 P.2d
399, 401 (Utah 1998)). While we give serious
consideration to the rulings and factual findings of die
disciplinary court, "we may make an independent [*291]
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline" if
the evidence warrants. In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806,
809 (Utah 1990). Our review of this disciplinary
proceeding is guided by the stated purpose and scope of
theRLDD:
(c) ... These rules shall be construed so as to achieve
substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters
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with [**15] dispatch and at the least expense to all
concerned parties.
(d) The interests of die public, the courts, and the legal
profession all require that disciplinary proceedings at all
levels be undertaken and construed to secure die just and
speedy resolution of every complaint
RLDD l(c)-(d).
ANALYSIS
I. THE SCREENING PANEL
Pendleton argues that the disciplinary court erred in
allowing the OPC to pursue this action in die district
court without first proceeding through a "screening"
panel. In addition, he alleges that the OPC was not
entitled to raise additional allegations in its formal
complaint outside the scope of those allegations raised in
the motion for interim suspension.
In the typical case, a disciplinary proceeding is
initiated by die filing of an informal complaint with die
OPC. See RLDD 10(a)(1). After the informal complaint
is filed, the OPC has die opportunity to conduct a
preliminary investigation into die allegations of
misconduct, see RLDD 10(a)(3), and the respondent
attorney may respond to the allegations raised in die
informal complaint, see RLDD 10(aX5). Unless OPC
counsel determines that the informal complamt [** 16] is
nonmeritorious, the OPC then refers the case to a
screening panel, see RLDD 10(a)(5)-(6), whose purpose
is to determine whether there is "probable cause to
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and
that a formal complaint is merited," RLDD 11(a). If the
screening panel concludes that probable cause exists,
then the OPC can file with the district court Na formal
complaint setting forth in plain and concise language die
facts upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is
based and die applicable provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct*9 Id.
However, it is not always necessary for die OPC to
have a screening panel's recommendation before filing a
formal complaint When applicable, rules 18 and 19
enable the OPC to file a petition for interim suspension
directly with the district court without going through a
screening panel First, rule 18 applies when the lawyer
"poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the
public" and has violated the Rules. of Professional
Conduct RLDD 18(a). When die district court orders
interim suspension under rule 18, die OPC is entitled to
file a formal complaint in die district court See RLDD
[**17] 18(b)(2).
Second, rule 19 applies when die lawyer "has been
convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on die

lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer."
RLDD 19(b). If a lawyer is convicted of a crime that
fells within die purview of rule 19, the OPC may file
concurrently a motion for interim suspension and a
formal complaint See RLDD 19(b). In sum, both rule 18
and rule 19 obviate the need for the OPC to proceed
tiirough a screening panel for a determination of
probable cause before filing a formal complaint
Rules 18 and 19 do not, however, alter the
requisites of the formal complaint These requirementswhich apply to proceedings that are screened by a panel
or are commenced directly in the district court—are listed
in rule 11(a). This rule states that die formal complaint
shall "setQ forth in plain and concise language the facts
upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is
based and the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct" RLDD 11(a). These broad
requirements thus permit die OPC to include in its
complaint any facts on which its disciplinary proceeding
will be based. The formal complaint need not [**18] be
limited to die specific allegations that supported die
petition for interim suspension.
In the instant case, four separate counts of drugrelated offenses were filed against Pendleton in the
criminal court. After [*292] discovering die pending
criminal charges against Pendleton, the OPC filed a
petition for interim suspension in the disciplinary court
under rule 18. The allegations on which die rule 18
petition was based were Pendleton's pending criminal
charges and the alleged conduct that prompted those
charges. The disciplinary court granted die petition and
suspended Pendleton. Subsequently, the criminal court
convicted Pendleton for use or possession of
methamphetamine. After Pendleton was convicted, the
OPC filed a formal complaint in the disciplinary court
The formal complaint included not only the allegations
stated in the earlier petition for interim suspension, but
also die feet that Pendleton's conviction had been
entered, along with evidence of additional purported
misconduct that was discovered after die rule 18 petition
was filed.
As rule 18 makes clear, it was proper for die OPC
to file a formal complaint after die disciplinary court
ordered interim [**19] suspension under rule 18. Under
this rule, it was unnecessary for die OPC to proceed first
through a screening panel. Moreover, nothing precluded
die OPC from including in its formal complaint
additional allegations of purported misconduct that arose
or were discovered after die petition for interim
suspension was filed. Our review of the formal complaint
indicates tiiat it satisfied the basic requirements outlined
in rule 11(a). Furthermore, although we stated in our
previous order that it was error for the disciplinary court
to order interim suspension under rule 18, we stayed the
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interim suspension of Pendleton "pending final
disposition of the disciplinary proceeding" against him.
We did not stay the ongoing final disciplinary
proceeding or in any way limit the scope of the formal
complaint that had been filed in Hie disciplinary court
Rather, our order made clear that Pendleton's conduct
was "certainly reprehensible and constituted grounds for
disciplinary proceedings."
In addition, even after we stayed the interim
suspension under rule 18, the OPC was still entitled to
file a motion for interim suspension under rule 19. We
made this clear in our earlier order, recognizing [**20]
that by that time, Pendleton had been convicted of a
crime that "reflected adversely on [Pendleton]'s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.19 RLDD 19(b).
However, when the OPC filed the rule 19 motion for
interim suspension, there was no needforthe OPC to file
another formal complaint The rule 19 motion simply
requested the interim suspension of Pendleton pending
the final discipline that the OPC already sought by
having filed the formal complaint Finally, because the
OPC satisfied die requirements of rule 19, there was no
need for the OPC to proceed through a screening panel at
this stage of the disciplinary proceeding. Pendleton's first
claim of error thus fails.
IL PENDLETON'S NOTICE OF CHANGE OF
JUDGE
Pendleton claims on appeal that the disciplinary
court erred when it ruled that Pendleton's notice of
change of judge was untimely. Pendleton contends that
the requirement that die notice be filed within thirty days
after the commencement of die action was satisfied since
the action commenced when the formal complaint was
filed. Thus, he alleges, die notice was timely. The OPC
alleges that die action commenced when the OPC filed
its petition for interim [**21] suspension and therefore
Pendleton's notice was untimely.
Rule 11 of the RLDD states that a lawyer is entitled
to a change of judge as of right if die lawyer files a
notice of change of judge within thirty days "after
commencement of die action." RLDD 11(d)(2). We thus
must determine when an action commences in the
context of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. Rule 11
outlines the procedure by which a typical case proceeds
from a screening panel to die district court
(a) Commencement of action. In the event die screening
panel finds probable cause to believe that there are
grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint
is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the
district court a formal complaint....

RLDD 11(a). Thus, when proceeding through a
screening panel, an action is not commenced until a
formal complaint is filed [*293] widi die district court
The formal complaint is die first pleading filed with the
district court, and it is at that stage of die proceedings
that a district judge is assigned to the case.
However, a disciplinary proceeding that is brought
under rule 18 is different As discussed above, rule 18
permits [**22] die OPC to bypass die screening panel
by petitioning for interim suspension directly to the
district court when die lawyer poses a substantial threat
of irreparable harm to die public. In such a case, die
petition for interim suspension is the first pleading filed
with the court, and it is at that stage of die proceeding
that a district judge is assigned to the case. The
subsequent filing of a formal complaint under rule 18 is
simply another step in die disciplinary proceeding that
was already initiated by filing a petition for interim
suspension. Thus, die "action" is "commenced" under
rule 18 when the petition for interim suspension is filed.
n4

n4 In contrast, an action commences under
rule 19 when both die petition for interim
suspension and die formal complaint are filed
because both must be filed concurrently under
rule 19.

In the instant case, die OPC filed a rule 18 petition
for interim suspension against Pendleton on July 2,1997,
and a formal complaint on March 3,1998. Judge Bunnell
was [**23] assigned to this case when die petition for
interim suspension was filed and was still presiding over
die disciplinary proceeding when Pendleton filed a notice
of change of judge on April 1, 1998, more than thirty
days after die petition was filed and the action was
commenced. Thus, Pendleton's notice was untimely and
was properly denied by Judge Cornaby.
HI. THE OPCS REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
Pendleton argues that the court erred in denying his
motion for a protective order, which sought relief from
die OPC's request for admissions, in ruling tiiat the
matters were deemed admitted against him, and in
denying his motion for relief from the default
admissions.
A. Pendleton's Motion for a Protective Order
We first address the disciplinary court's denial of
Pendleton's motion for a protective order. Pendleton
objected to die OPC's request for admissions because the
request was filed during die pendency of his appeal of
die rule 18 interim suspension to this court Pendleton
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claims that the disciplinary court lacked jurisdiction over
the disciplinary proceeding during that time. He
specifically claims that die disciplinary court incorrectly
ruled that his [**24] motion was untimely.
We disagree with Pendleton's characterization of
die disciplinary court's ruling. The disciplinary court
specifically stated that its denial of Pendleton's motion
was not based on die timeliness of the motion. Rather,
the court explained in its order denying die motion:
The Respondent's motion is so general that it in effect is
asking the Court to deny die Bar its rights of discovery in
preparing for the disbarment proceeding. For die Court to
enter such a general and all-inclusive protective order
would deny the Bar its discovery rights as set forth in the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court did not address die timeliness of Pendleton's
motion or the jurisdictional issue raised by Pendleton.
Nonetheless, before we can address whether the
disciplinary court set forth a proper basis for denying die
motion, it is necessary for us to address the jurisdictional
issue raised by Pendleton.
Under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, when a litigant appeals from a nonfinal,
interlocutory order, die appellate couifsrevjew of the
appeal is discretionary. See Utah R. App. P. 5(a).
Moreover, it is generally recognized that [**25] die
granting of an interlocutory appeal does not normally
divest the district court of jurisdiction over the
underlying matter. See 16 Charles A. Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §
39212, at 53-64 (1996); see also, e.g., Ex Parte Nat'l
Enameling <& Stamping Co., 201 US. 156, 162, SOL Ed
707, 26 S. Ct 404 (1906) ("It was not intended diat die
cause as a whole [*294] should be transferred to the
appellate court prior to die final decree. The case, except
for the hearing on the appeal from die interlocutory
order, is to proceed in the lower court as diough no such
appeal had been taken, unless odierwise specially
ordered.'1); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Norris, 2000 US App. LEXIS 14680, *3-4 (10th Cir.
2000). When the scope of die interlocutory appeal is not
affected by litigation of die underlying action, the
interest in expediting litigation requires that die district
court proceed with die action. See 16 Wright, supra, at
54, 56. An interim suspension order, by definition, is a
nonfinal order because it is entered "pending final
disposition of a disciplinary [**26]
proceeding
predicated upon the conduct causing the harm." RLDD
18(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the appeal of an interim
suspension order is interlocutory and does not normally
divest die district court of jurisdiction over die pending
disciplinary proceeding.

In the instant case, Pendleton's earlier appeal to this
court from the disciplinary court's interim suspension
order was an appeal from a nonfinal, interlocutory order.
Moreover, die pending proceeding to determine whether
permanent disciplinary sanctions should be imposed
against Pendleton was in no way dependent upon our
disposition of Pendleton's interlocutory appeal. Thus,
even though the disciplinary court foiled to address this
issue, die disciplinary court retained jurisdiction over die
ongoing disciplinary proceeding, and the OPC was
entitled to proceed widi discovery.
We now examine whether die disciplinary court
properly denied Pendleton's motion for a protective
order. Rule 26(c) of die Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion of a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, die court
... may make any order which justice [**27] requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of die following:
(1) that discovery not be had;

(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that die
scope of die discovery be limited to certain matters....
Moreover, we have stated that die district court is
entrusted with broad discretion in dealing with discovery
matters, namely, protective orders. See R.&H Energies
v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah
1997). This court will "*not find abuse of discretion
absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is
no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings.'" Id.
(quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah
1996)).
In die instant case, Pendleton's motion sought a
protective order "relieving him from responding to all of
die Bar's requests for admissions, interrogatories, and
requests for production of documents." Pendleton set
forth two grounds for die relief he requested in his
motion:
1. The requested discovery is not reasonably calculated
to lead to die discovery of admissible [**28] evidence.
2. The requested discovery seeks information which has
no relationship to die professional misconduct which is
properly alleged and is die subject matter of these
proceedings: information which would establish that of
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which respondent has never been accused. It is
impermissible inquisition.
The disciplinary court correctly ruled that
Pendleton's motion would have denied the OPC any
further meaningful discovery in this case. The court
correctly determined that the OPCs specific
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for
production of documents were reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The OPCs
complaint involved allegations of criminal activity, into
which the OPCs requested discovery properly inquired.
Moreover, die OPCs requested discovery sought to find
evidence establishing certain aggravating factors,
including Pendleton's addiction to methamphetamine and
his failure to seek treatment, and his failure to comply
with die disciplinary court's rule 18 [*295] order of
interim suspension. Discovering this evidence was
essential to die OPCs duty to determine whether
Pendleton had violated die Rules of Professional [**29]
Conduct and what sanction should be imposed.
Furthermore, Pendleton's motion for a protective
order was untimely under rule 36 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure because it was not filed within thirty
days of service of the request for admissions. As
discussed above, Pendleton's interlocutory appeal did not
prevent the OPC from requesting discovery, nor did it
relieve Pendleton of his duty to respond within thirty
days. Thus, the disciplinary court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Pendleton's motion for a
protective order.
B. Pendleton's Default Admissions
We next address whether the matters set forth in the
OPCs request for admissions were properly deemed
admitted. The disciplinary court deemed die matters
admitted because Pendleton failed to file a timely
response to the OPCs request for admissions: Rule 36
makes clear that "each matter of which an admission is
requested... is admitted" if not responded to within thirty
days. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2); see also Triple I Supply,
Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc. 652 P.2d 1298. 1299-1300
(Utah 1982). In the instant case, Pendleton foiled to
timely respond to die OPCs request [**30] for
admissions. Thus, die trial court correctly concluded that
the matters set forth in the OPCs request were deemed
admitted.
C. Pendleton's Motion
Admissions

for Relief from His

In Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., we
addressed die effect of a party's failure to timely respond
to a request for admissions. See, 952 P.2d 1058,1060-64
(Utah 1998). In that case, we explained:

Requests for admission must be taken seriously, and
answers or objections must be served promptly. The
penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and
parties who foil to comply with the procedural
requirements of rule 36 should not lightly escape the
consequences of the rule.
Id at 1061. Rule 36 provides that die court may permit
withdrawal or amendment [of the admission] when the
presentation of die merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and die party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the
merits.
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b). We explained in Langeland that in
order to show that withdrawal or amendment promotes
die presentation [**31] of the merits of the action,
die party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1)
show that the matters deemed admitted against it are
relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of action,
and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or
otherwise of specific facts indicating that die matters
deemed admitted against it are in feet untrue.
952 P.2d at 1062. If die moving party M s to satisfy this
two-part test, the nonmoving party is relieved of its
burden under rule 36(b) to show that it would suffer
prejudice as a result of die withdrawal or amendment,
and the trial court has no discretion to grant die motion
for relieffromthe admissions. See id at 1063-64.
We thus turn to the instant case to determine
whether Pendleton has met his burden of proving that
relief from the admissions promotes die presentation of
the merits of the action. First, under Langeland,
Pendleton must show die relevance of die admissions to
die merits of the disciplinary proceeding. See id at 1062.
The admissions are clearly relevant to die disciplinary
proceeding against Pendleton because they involve
Pendleton's possession, use, [**32] procurement, and
distribution of methamphetamine, the allegations upon
which the disciplinary proceeding was premised. Second,
under Langeland, Pendleton must introduce evidence that
the matters deemed admitted are untrue, and "something
more than a bare denial is required." Id. Pendleton has
felled to meet this burden. His belated response to die
OPCs request for admissions included denials of several
of the requests, but he [*296] M e d to support his
denials with any supporting evidence or affidavit
Moreover, his motion for relief from die admissions
merely contends that the default admissions have a
prejudicial effect upon him. Again, he failed to present
any evidence supporting his contention of prejudice or
the falsity of die admissions. Thus, Pendleton has M e d
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to meet his burden under rule 36(b) of establishing that
relief from the admissions would promote the
presentation of the merits of the action against him. As a
result, as we explained in Langeland, 952 P.2d at 106364, because Pendleton failed to meet his burden under
rule 36(b), the disciplinary court had no discretion to
grant Pendleton's motion for relief from his admissions.
Thus, the disciplinary [**33] court properly denied
Pendleton's motion.
IV. THE OPCS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE
ORDER
Pendleton next claims that the disciplinary court
erred in granting the OPCs motion for a protective order
and thus providing relief from any obligation to respond
to Pendleton's interrogatories. As discussed above, die
district court is granted broad discretion in whether to
enter a protective order. See FL&R Energies v. Mother
Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1079 (Utah 1997). We
will mnot find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous
conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis
for the trial courts rulings.'" Id. (quoting Askew v.
Hardman, 918P.2d469,472 (Utah 1996)).
The disciplinary court granted the OPCs motion for
a protective order on two bases. First, the disciplinary
court held that at the time Pendleton's interrogatories
were filed and served, the only aspect of this case to be
concluded was the sanctions hearing, and thus, any
proper discovery request "would have to be limited to
matters covered by rule 4 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and matters in aggravation or mitigation of the
sanctions to [**34] be imposed." Examining Pendleton's
interrogatories, however, the court concluded:
None of the interrogatories, except for die request to
identify contemplated witnesses, would lead to
admissible evidence on this final issue or they cover
privileged or confidential information; [Pendleton's
requests] are cumulative since much of the information
requested is already in the record by way of deposition or
transcript; [and the requests] callQ for mental
impressions, conclusions or legal theories of the Utah
State Bar or [its] attorneys.
Second, the court noted that the interrogatories were
signed by Pendleton, not by his attorney of record, as
required by rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
n5
n5 This rule provides in relevant part:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record

in the attorney's individual name, or if the party is
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by
the party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(a).
[**35] We conclude that both bases on which the
disciplinary court entered a protective order were proper.
First, as the court correctly noted, the interrogatories
would not lead to die discovery of admissible evidence,
were cumulative, and called for OPC work product
Pendleton's interrogatories included, for example, such
requests as "identify your ultimate objective in the
instant case and identify die criteria by which it was
established"; "state whether or not disciplinary counsel is
subject to any professional discipline under die Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability or under any other
established regimen [sic]"; and "identify the factors
which have lead [sic] you to conclude that allegations of
professional misconduct which you advanced in your
petition can be appropriately asserted as grounds for
permanent discipline in your formal complaint whether
or not Judge Bunnell found merit in diem." As die
disciplinary court correctly concluded, these requests
would not lead to die discovery of admissible evidence,
and they lack any other justifiable legal basis for
discovery. It was therefore proper for the disciplinary
court to grant relieffromPendleton's interrogatories.
[**36] Second, die disciplinary court property
concluded that it was necessary under rule 11 for
Pendleton's discovery request to be [*297] signed by his
attorney of record. At die time die requested discovery
was served, Pendleton was not acting pro se; rather, his
attorney of record was Jim R. Scarth. Thus, it was
necessary under rule 11 for Mr. Scarth to sign
Pendleton's discovery request Because Mr. Scarth did
not sign the request, die disciplinary court properly ruled
that Pendleton had failed to meet die requirements of rule
11. In sum, the disciplinary court did not abuse its
discretion by entering a protective order to relieve the
OPC from Pendleton's substantively and procedurally
improper discovery request
V. DISBARMENT
Pendleton claims diat the disciplinary court erred in
concluding that disbarment was an appropriate sanction
for his misconduct Pendleton argues that suspension was
appropriate, and he takes issue with die disciplinary
court's reliance upon aggravating factors. The OPC
contends that disbarment was the appropriate
presumptive sanction and that even if suspension were
die correct presumptive sanction, disbarment was still
appropriate due to die aggravating [**37]
factors
established by die OPC.
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Rule 4 2 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions ("SILS") states that disbarment is appropriate
when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct
involving "the sale, distribution, or importation of
controlled substances;... or ... solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses." SILS Rule 42(b). Rule
4 3 of the SILS explains that suspension is an appropriate
sanction when the lawyer engages in criminal conduct
that "seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law." SILS Rule 43(b). Rule 6.1 of the SILS
provides, "After misconduct has been established,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may. be
considered and weighed in deciding what sanctions to
impose." Possible aggravating factors pertinent to this
case include:
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;

(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or
other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the
disciplinary authority;
(h) vulnerability [**38] of victim;
(0 substantial experience in the practice of law ....
SILS Rule 62. Potential factors in mitigation include, for
example, the absence of a prior record of discipline. See
SILS Rule 63. Factors in aggravation or mitigation are
not limited to those specifically enumerated in the rules.
See SILS Rules 6 2 , 6 3 .
In the instant case, the disciplinary court concluded
that the appropriate presumptive sanction was
disbarment and, in the alternative, suspension aggravated
to disbarment
The disciplinary court premised its conclusion that
disbarment was the appropriate presumptive sanction not
upon the fact of Pendleton's criminal conviction for
methamphetamine possession, but upon the courts
factual findings regarding Pendleton's possession, use,
procurement, and distribution of methamphetamine. On
the basis of evidence presented at die sanctions hearing,
the disciplinary court found that Pendleton testified to
using methamphetamine fifty or sixty times within a
three-year period. The court also found that Pendleton
accepted methamphetamine from Mills in exchange for

legal services. On two or three occasions, Mills received
money [**39]
from
Pendleton to purchase
methamphetamine for Pendleton, and Mills supplied
methamphetamine to Pendleton twelve to fifteen times
from June 1995 to October 1996. The disciplinary court
also found that Pendleton supplied methamphetamine to
Meyers and smoked methamphetamine with her in his
office while she was a client and within the setting of die
attorney-client relationship. The court found that
Pendleton violated his probation agreement by receiving
traffic citations and Ming to report diem to his
probation officer and then being arrested for failing to
appear. The court found that Pendleton had been
sentenced to sixty days in jail for his probation [*298]
violation and that he was under die influence of
methamphetamine when he reported to jail to serve his
sentence.
Furthermore,
the disciplinary
court
incorporated in its final order of disbarment die findings
of fact from its order of partial summary judgment,
which included Pendleton's admissions regarding his
possession, use, procurement, and distribution of
methamphetamine, and also his criminal conviction.
Pendleton argues that these findings are
unsupported by the evidence in the record. Pendleton
fails, however, to [**40] marshal die evidence in
support of the disciplinary court's findings, and
regardless, the court's findings are amply supported by
die record. n6

n6 T o successfully challenge a trial court's
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the
evidence that supports the trial court's findings.
After marshaling the supportive evidence, die
appellant then must show that, even when
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling, die evidence is insufficient
to support die trial court's findings." State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT44, PJ7n29 1 P.3dll08.

In view of these findings, the disciplinary court
concluded that Pendleton had violated rule 8.4(b) of die
Rules of Professional Conduct, n7 and die court held that
Pendleton had engaged in serious criminal conduct
involving "die sale, distribution, or importation of
controlled substances;... or ... solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses," justifying the
presumptive discipline of disbarment under [**41] rule
4 2 of die SOLS.

n7 "It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to ... commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely
on
the
lawyer's
honesty,
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trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects...." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b).

Pendleton argues that disbarment was not die
appropriate presumptive sanction for his misconduct
because his only criminal conviction, on which the
interim suspension order was premised, was for simple
possession of methamphetamine. However, nothing in
the SILS or die RLDD limits the scope of a disciplinary
proceeding and die ultimate sanction imposed to the
conduct for which die court enters an interim suspension.
Moreover, nothing prevents the court in a disciplinary
proceeding from making findings of fact regarding a
lawyer's criminal misconduct, even if that misconduct
has not yet resulted in a criminal conviction.
As discussed above, an interim suspension order is
a temporary sanction that is entered pending the final
disposition of a disciplinary [**42] proceeding against
the lawyer. The interim suspension order enables the
disciplinary court to take swift action against the lawyer
to protect die public while preserving die opportunity to
then conduct a full-scale disciplinary proceeding to
determine the scope and extent of die lawyer's
misconduct The OPCs investigation may invariably
reveal, after the interim suspension order is entered,
additional instances of misconduct, and there is no
justifiable basis" for' preventing die disciplinary court
from making findings in regard to such misconduct and
using these findings to determine an appropriate
sanction. Indeed, to enable the court to adequately weigh
and appreciate the gravity of the lawyer's misconduct, it
is necessary that die OPC bring all instances of
misconduct to die court!s attention. This serves "the
interests of the public, die courts, and die legal
profession," as required under rule 1(d) of die RLDD.
Thus, tiiere is no reason to limit the scope of a final
disciplinary proceeding to the misconduct that
precipitated the interim suspension order.
Moreover, in determining an appropriate sanction
for lawyer misconduct, die SILS do not prevent the
disciplinary [**43] court from examining criminal
conduct that has not yet resulted in a criminal conviction.
While an interim suspension order is proper under rule
19 of the RLDD only if the lawyer has been convicted of
a crime, disbarment is proper anytime a lawyer engages
in "serious criminal conduct," as set forth in rule 42(b)
of the SILS, regardless of whether die lawyer was
ultimately convicted of the misconduct Enabling the
disciplinary court to examine all of die lawyer's criminal
acts that are revealed during die discovery process
promotes "consideration of all factors relevant to
imposing the appropriate level of sanction in an

individual case." SILS Rule 13(a). Thus, it was proper
for the disciplinary [*299] court to conclude, from its
factual findings, that Pendleton sold and distributed
controlled substances and solicited the distribution of
controlled substances, even tiiough he was not convicted
of such offenses. Furthermore, in light of Pendleton's
serious criminal misconduct, die disciplinary court
correctly concluded that disbarment was die appropriate
presumptive sanction. Having thus concluded that
disbarment was die correct presumptive sanction for
Pendleton's misconduct, we need not [**44] address die
disciplinary court's alternative conclusion that if
suspension was the appropriate presumptive sanction,
disbarment was still appropriate due to numerous
aggravating factors.
VI. DUE PROCESS
Pendleton's final claim of error is that he was denied
due process "as a result of disciplinary counsel's
overreaching and die district court's bias." Pendleton's
due process claim involves a series of allegations. First,
he claims that OPC counsel used hearsay to persuade die
disciplinary court to issue its interim suspension order
under rule 18. This claim is moot because this court has
previously vacated the rule 18 order. Second, Pendleton
contends that the court's findings in support of the
disbarment order were unsupported by die record.
However, he fails to indicate which findings are
unsupported and fails to marshal the evidence. Third,
Pendleton argues that the disciplinary court improperly
limited his cross-examination of Mills. Again, Pendleton
fails to show dial the disciplinary court abused its
discretion, and he presents no evidence of the
disciplinary court's alleged bias. Finally, he claims that
the disciplinary court willfully distorted the record. This
[**45] allegation also lacks any support or explanation.
In sum, Pendleton fails to cite any authority for die
proposition that any of these events constituted a
deprivation of due process, and our review indicates that
he received all of die process that was due under the
applicable rules.
CONCLUSION
The disciplinary court did not err in ruling that the
appropriate sanction for Pendleton's misconduct was
disbarment We dierefore affirm the disciplinary court's
ruling.

Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice
Dun-ant, and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief
Justice Russon's opinion.
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Disciplinary Counsel v. Noiris.
No. 95-2525
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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April 15,1996, Submitted
July 24,1996, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [****1] As Amended.
Application for Reinstatement Granted March 8,1999,
Reported at 1999 Ohio LEXIS 808.
PRIOR HISTORY: ON. CERTIFIED REPORT by
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-34.
On November 18, 1994, based on his plea of guilty, a
federal court convicted respondent, David William
Noiris, die Prosecuting Attorney of Portage County,
Attorney Registration No. 0021394, of the
misdemeanor of possession of cocaine. The court
placed respondent on a two-year probation and fined
him $ 250. Pursuant to his agreed guilty plea,
respondent resigned as prosecutor and sought drug
counseling and rehabilitation.
On April 10, 1995, relator, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, filed a complaint charging respondent with
violating DR1-102 (A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude) and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging
in conduct adverse to his fitness to practice law).
At a hearing before a panel of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court ("board"), die parties stipulated to the
above facts and violation of die Disciplinary Rules as
charged. Respondent and other witnesses testified in
mitigation that while respondent [****2] had used
cocaine in the past, he did not use or possess it on the
day charged in the indictment, but that respondent had
entered his guilty plea to avoid a trial Respondent and
others testified that since his resignation as prosecutor,
respondent regularly attended rehabilitation meetings.
Respondent and others further testified that respondent
has become involved with the Ohio Lawyers
Assistance Program and a similar program in Florida,
where he temporarily resided, and that he has tested
drug-free on numerous random occasions during die
six-month period prior to the panel's hearing. Several
lawyers, a judge, a physician, the chief executive
officer of a comity hospital who is also an attorney,
and a representative of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance
Program testified as to respondent's being a highly

qualified attorney and being committed to his
rehabilitation.
The panel found that mitigating circumstances existed
and recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years, but that the
suspension be stayed, provided that the respondent
continues his rehabilitation and fulfills his contract
with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, submits to
periodic and random [****3] drug testing, and
continues to attend AA meetings. The board adopted
the panel's findings and recommendation.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court considered a
report by die board of commissioners on grievances
and discipline of die supreme court, which adopted a
panel's findings and recommendation that respondent
attorney be suspended from die practice of law for two
years, but that die suspension be stayed. Relator office
of disciplinary counsel had filed a complaint charging
die attorney with violating Ohio Code Prof. Resp. DR
1-102(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(6).
OVERVIEW: The attorney had pleaded guilty to and
was convicted in federal court of the misdemeanor of
possession of cocaine. The court concurred with the
board's findings, but found that a more severe penalty
was warranted. The court took as feet that the attorney
was guilty of die misdemeanor of possessing cocaine,
despite his testimony, and that of others, that there
were no facts to support his conviction and that he pled
guilty to avoid a trial. The court noted that the attorney
had committed the misdemeanor while serving as an
elected public official whose sworn duty was to
prosecute the very crime he was committing. The court
determined that it should temper any penalty due to its
belief that in a case involving substance abuse, die
disciplinary process of the court could and should be
viewed as a potential for recovery, as well as a
procedure for the imposition of sanctions. The court
concluded that it was clear from the testimony that the
attorney had already committed himself to a
rehabilitation program in which he had made
significant progress.
Pagel
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OUTCOME: The court suspended the attorney from
the practice of law for two years with one year of fee
suspension stayed. The court required the attorney to
comply with the drug and alcohol treatment of the state
lawyers assistance program throughout the two-year
period, to have mandatory, periodic random drug
testing, and to continue to attend AA meetings. The
court taxed costs taxed to the attorney.
CORE TERMS: canon, misdemeanor, suspension,
disciplinary, character witness, one year, two-year,
testifying, separately, prestige
LexisNexis(TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings
> Hearings
(EN1]A guilty plea is not a ceremony of innocence,
nor can it be rationalized in a subsequent disciplinary
proceeding.
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Substance
Abuse
[HN2]In a case involving substance abuse, the
disciplinary process of the court can and should be
viewed as a potential for recovery, as well as a
procedure for the imposition of sanctions.
HEADNOTES: Attorneys at law - Misconduct Two-year suspension with one year of stayed on
conditions — Conviction of possession of cocaine.
COUNSEL: Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel,
and Stacy M. Solochek, Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel, for relator.
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Second, we recognize that respondent committed this
misdemeanor [****4] while serving as an elected
public official whose sworn duty was to prosecute the
very crime he was committing. Our previous decisions
involving public officials should have provided a
warning to respondent
Disciplinary Counsel v.
Smakula (1988V 39 Ohio St 3d 143. 529 NJE.2d 1376
(assistant prosecutor received one-year suspension for
misdemeanor of ticket fixing); Disciplinary Counsel v.
Gross f1983V 11 Ohio St 3d 48.11 Ohio B. Rep. 195.
463 N.E.2d 382 (misdemeanor convictions of
Industrial Commission attorney for drug abuse and
driving under the influence warranted indefinite
suspension).
Third, we are disposed to temper any penalty due to
our belief that [HN2]in a case involving substance
abuse, "the disciplinary process of this court can and
should be viewed as a potential for recovery as well as
a procedure for the imposition of sanctions."
Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels (1988^ 38 Ohio St
3d 248. 251. 527 N.E.2d 299. 302. la this case it is
clear from the testimony that die respondent has
already committed himself to a rehabilitation program
in which he has made significant progress.
In view of the foregoing, die respondent is hereby
suspended from the practice of law [****51 for two
years with one year of the suspension stayed, provided
that throughout the two-year period he complies with
the" drug and alcohol treatment of die Ohio Lawyers
Assistance Program, and otherwise complies in full
with his contract under that program, has mandatory
periodic random drug testing, and continues to attend
AA meetings. Costs taxed to the respondent

Antonios C. Scavdis,forrespondent

Judgment accordingly. (*95]

JUDGES: MOYER, CJ., DOUGLAS, RESNICK,
FJE. SWEENEY, PFEDFER and STRATTON, JJ.,
concur. COOK, J., concurs separately.

MOYER, CJ., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, FJS.
SWEENEY, PFEIFER and STRATTON, JJ., concur.

OPINION: 1*94]
1***1088]
Per Curiam. We concur with Ac board's findings, but
believe that a more severe penalty [***1089] is
warranted. First, we take as feet that the respondent is
guilty of the misdemeanor of possessing cocaine.
Despite his testimony, and that of others, that Acre
were no facts to support his conviction and that he pled
guilty to avoid a trial, we decline to go behind the
federal court's judgment As we pointed out in
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi (1995). 72 Ohio St 3d
45. 49. 647 N.E.2d 473. 476. [HNl]wa guilty plea is
not a ceremony of innocence, nor can it be rationalized
in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding."

COOK, J., concurs separately.
CONCURSY: COOK
CONCUR: Cook, J., concurring. I write separately on
the subject of judges testifying as character witnesses
in disciplinary proceedings. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibits a judge from lending the
prestige of die office to advance the private interests of
others. It states that "[a judge] should not testify
voluntarily as a character witness.19 Canon 2(B). As
explained in die commentary to Canon 2, the
"testimony of a judge as a character witness injects die
prestige of his [her] office into the proceeding *** and
may be misunderstood to be an official testimonial."
Although the canon does not afford a judge the
privilege against testifying in response to an official
[****6]
summons, such practice should be

Parr* 0
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discouraged'when employed as a means to circumvent
the very principle espoused by Canon 2.
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In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against DAVID V. PENN, Attorney at Law.
No. 95-0536-D
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
201 Wis. 2d 405; 548 N.W.2d 526; 1996 Wise. LEXIS 64

June 4,1996, Filed
DISPOSITION:
suspended.

1***1]

Attorney's

license

CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL
POSTURE:
The
referee
recommended that the license of an attorney, who was
die county district attorney, be suspended for two years
as discipline for professional misconduct
OVERVIEW: The attorney's state bar membership
was suspended for failure to pay membership dues. He
was later convicted of six drug-related misdemeanors.
His sentence was withheld and he was placed on
probation for three years, with six months in the
county jaiL He was also ordered to perform community
service. The referee concluded that the attorney had
violated the conflict of interest rule, Wis. Sup. Ct R.
20:1.7, by representing the State when that
representation was materially limited by his own
interests. The referee found that the attorney discussed
a defendant's case with him out of the presence and
without the consent of the defendant's attorney, in
violation of Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:4.2. Moreover, the
attorney committed criminal actions reflecting
adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, in violation of
Wis. Sup. Ct R 20:8.4. The referee recommended a
two-year suspension. The court adopted the referee's
findings of feet and conclusions of law concerning the
attorney's professional misconduct and imposed the
recommended two-year suspension. The court also
ordered die attorney to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
OUTCOME: The court ordered the suspension of the
attorney's license to practice law in Wisconsin for a
period of two years. The court also ordered the
attorney to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.
CORE
TERMS: referee,
district
attorney,
professional misconduct, suspended, cocaine, license
suspension, illegal drug, recommended, practice law,
marijuana, deferred, two-year, license, disciplinary
proceeding, appropriate discipline, license to practice,
personal knowledge, trustworthiness, consultation,
metabolite, materially, discipline, membership,

misconduct, adversely, convicted, referral, honesty,
fitness, felony
LezisNexis(TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Conflicts of Interest
[HNl]Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:1.7 provides in part
Conflict of interest general rule, (b) A lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by die lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2) the client consents in
writing after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall- include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing
Counsel & Parties
[HN2]Wis. Sup. Ct R.
20:42
provides:
Communication with person represented by counsel In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Moral
Accountability
PBN3]Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:8.4 provides in part
Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects.
OPINION:
proceeding.

[**526J

ATTORNEY disciplinary

1*405]
PER CURIAM We review the
recommendation of the referee that fee license of
David V. Pexm to practice law in Wisconsin be
suspended for two years as discipline for the following
professional misconduct [*406] While serving as
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Vilas county district attorney from 1987 through 1992,
Attorney Perm used marijuana and cocaine, for which
he was subsequently convicted, and acted as district
attorney in respect to referral and prosecution of nine
persons who had used an illegal drug with him or had
personal knowledge of his illegal drug use. In late
1993 and early 1994, Attorney Penn's use of marijuana
and cocaine resulted in a deferred prosecution
arrangement On one occasion, Attorney Perm
discussed a pending criminal matter with a defendant
whose felony drug charge he was prosecuting out of
the presence of the defendant's attorney and without
his consent
We determine that the recommended two-year license
suspension is appropriate discipline to impose for
Attorney Penn's professional misconduct The
seriousness of his criminal conduct in using illegal
drugs is exacerbated by [***2] thefeetthat it occurred
in the context of Ids official position as district
attorney, a position of public trust in the legal system
to which the people of his county elected him. His
repeated contravention of die criminal law, which was
widely known in die community, caused significant
and unjustified damage to the public's perception of the
integrity of law enforcement personnel throughout die
county.
Attorney Penn was admitted to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1986 and practiced and served as district
attorney in Eagle River. He has not previously been the
subject of a disciplinary proceeding. He was suspended
from membership in die State Bar in October, 1993 for
failure to pay membership dues, and that suspension
continues. The referee in this proceeding, Attorney
Janet A. Jenkins, made findings of feet pursuant to die
stipulation of the parties.
[*4071 In January, 1993, on his.guilty plea to five
counts of possession of marijuana containing THC and
an Alford plea to one count of cocaine possession,
Attorney Penn was found guilty and convicted of six
misdemeanors..Sentence was withheld and Attorney
Perm was placed on probation for three years, with six
months in the county jail with [***3] Huber
privileges, and ordered to perform 200 hours of
community service.
[**527] While acting as district attorney, Attorney
Penn was involved in referral and prosecution in
criminal proceedings of nine persons who previously
had used an illegal drug with him or had personal
knowledge of his illegal drug use. The referee
concluded that Attorney Penn thereby represented his
client, die State, when that representation might have
been or was materially limited by his own interests, in
violation of die conflict of interest rule, SCR 20:1.7(b).
nl
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•Footnotes-

nl [HN1]SCR 20:1.7 provides, in pertinent
part: Conflict of interest: general rule

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(1) die lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents in writing after
consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the
common representation and die advantages
and risks involved.
- End Footnotes- •

1***4]
In February, 1990, while at a tavern, District Attorney
Penn encountered the defendant in a pending felony
drug case and discussed the case out of the presence
and without the consent of the defendant's [*408]
attorney. The referee concluded that his doing so
violated SCR 20:4 J2.n2
- Footnotes «
n2
[HN2]SCR
20:42
Communication
with
represented by counsel

provides:
person

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer
in die matter, unless die lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to do so.
•EndFootnotesIh February, 1994, after he had left office as district
attorney, Attorney Perm's blood and urine samples
Page 2
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taken following-a trafBc^stop disclosed the presence of
cocaine metabolite and marijuana metabolite. He then
was charged with having possessed cocaine and he
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement

profession, the courts and die public as a person fit to
be consulted by others and to represent them and
otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence. SCR
22.28(4).

In respect to the drug possession conviction and the
subsequent charge resulting [***51 in Ac deferred
prosecution agreement, the referee concluded that
Attorney Perm committed criminal acts reflecting
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness orfitnessas a
lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).
n3

IT IS ORDERED feat die license of Attorney David V.
Penn to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a
period of two years, commencing the date of this order.

Footnotes
n3 [HN3]SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent
part: Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that wifliin 60 days of
the date of this order David V. Penn pay to the Board
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility the costs of
this proceeding, [***7] [**528] provided that if the
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent
a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs
within that time, the license of David V. Perm to
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until
further order of the court
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David V. Perm
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning
the duties [*410] of a person whose license to practice
law in Wisconsin has been suspended.

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;
End Footnotes
As discipline for Attorney Pcnn's professional
misconduct, the referee recommended a two-year
license suspension. The referee took into account the
aggravating factor of Attorney Peon's position of chief
law enforcement official in the county and the feet that
his use of illegal drugs frequently occurred in the
company of persons subject to prosecution by his
office for non-drug criminal offenses. The referee also
acknowledged [*409] as mitigating circumstances
Attorney Penn's voluntarily having ceased practicing
law in 1992 and his acceptance 1***6]
of
responsibility for his misconduct and genuine remorse

for it
We adopt die referee's findings of fact and conclusions
of law concerning Attorney Penn's professional
misconduct and determine that the recommended two*
year license suspension is appropriate discipline to
impose for i t We emphasize that in order to have his
license to practice law reinstated, Attorney Penn will
have to establish, among other things, that his conduct
since the license suspension has been exemplary and
above reproach, that he has a proper understanding of
and attitude toward the standards imposed on lawyers
and that he will act in conformity with those standards,
and- that he safely can be recommended to the legal
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Billy L.Walker
Senior Counsel
Office o f Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
Re:

R a y Harding, Jr.

Dear Mr. Walker
Thank you for speaking with me yesterday. A s I indicated, I was surprised to read the
"Screening Panel Memo" w e received from your office on January 16, 2004, after w e had faxed
you our witness list. I was surprised because of my previous conversations with you wherein I
thought that your office was not seeking disbarment in this case. Additionally, I have not
practiced regularly before Screening Panels but my experience has almost always been that the
Screening Panel Memo is an objective report to the Screening Panel. The Screening Panel
M e m o in this matter is argumentative and takes issue with every one of our anticipated defenses
and mitigation. Finally, I believe I have been told by your office on several occasions that the
poaching charge did not relate to the practice of law and therefore would not be a material part of
the hearing. H i e Screening Panel Memo indicates otherwise.
W e are caught slightly off guard by the Screening Panel Memo and its rather harsh
treatment of Ray. In that respect I wish to address certain matters as follows:
THE POACHING CHARGE
Y o u have indicated on page 3 of the Screening Panel M e m o that Ray Harding, Jr.
allegedly killed a trophy moose and two (2) c o w elk on October 6 , 2 0 0 1 . You have indicated on
page 10 o f the Screening Panel Memo that Ray may have violated Rule 8.4(c) (misconduct) by
committing that crime. Ray is innocent of that crime, and there has never been even a probable
cause determination before any adjudicative body that he committed that crime. We believe he
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will ultimately be vindicated of that crime and also that at this point it is inappropriate for the
Screening Panel to consider those allegations. They are unsubstantiated allegations raised by his
ex-wife who arguably and perhaps understandably, is bitter and has every reason to try to hurt
Ray as much as possible.
MISDEMEANOR POSSESSION CHARGES
You have correctly pointed out in the Screening Panel Memo that disbarment is generally
appropriate under Rule 4.2(b) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyers Sanctions, when a person
"engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration ofjustice, false Swearing, misrepresentation, fraud,
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled
substances; or the intentional killing of another, or attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit any of these offenses.11 Mr Harding has never been charged with nor is there
any chance that he will ever be convicted of such a crime. Utah Law recognizes a substantial
difference between a person who possesses drugs and one who distributes them. It is obvious
that one cannot possess drugs without procuring them illegally. However, the indication in your
Screening Panel Memo that he may have committed the illegal act of soliciting controlled
substances has already been taken into account by everyone involved in this case. He was never
charged, nor will he ever be charged with solicitation or distribution of a controlled substance.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
You have chosen to argue aggravating circumstances in the Screening Panel Memo.
While it is certainly true that Ray was convicted of two (2) misdemeanor offenses, I believe that
does not constitute a "pattern of misconduct.11 Certainly any drug abuse, especially one as severe
as Ray suffered in 2002, took some period of time to develop. He was convicted of two (2)
misdemeanor drug possession offenses. Given all that the government knew and the law
enforcement discovered; that is essence of the criminal charges. Ray is currently on probation
and it is my understanding that he has never violated even a single provision of that probatioa
MITIGATION
The Screening Panel Memo argues against the mitigation you believe we will be
presenting. Specifically, you indicate that most of these mitigating factors "deserve little or no
weight." The mitigating factors are listed in our rules so that they will be given weight We
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intend that they be weighed appropriately by the Screening Panel and that evidence with respect
to each of them is entirely appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Disbarment is not the appropriate remedy in this case. It appears more likely that
suspension is the presumptive discipline.
In light of the mitigation we intend to present, a lesser period of time for suspension or in
the alternative, a stayed suspension given that Ray has not practiced at all in the last eighteen
(18) months is probably more appropriate. I have provided with this letter a summary of
American Law Reports and Law Reviews regarding attorney discipline as it may be effected by
substance abuse, including alcoholism and drug abuse. Additionally, there are attached cases
how narcotic convictions have been treated. That is, whether they are serious crimes or crimes
involving "moral turpitude11 justifying disbarment.
I apologize for the lateness of this, but again, I was caught a little off guard by the
aggressive stance your office took in its Screening Panel Memo.
Sincerely,
SKORDAS& CASTON, LLC.

GGS/hy
End.

GragoryHj. Skordas
\
\
^-^

American Law Reports and Law Reviews
7 Anu Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 28
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated May 2003
Attorneys at Law
Anne E. MeHey, JJD., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
C Judicial Supervision of Legal Profession [§§13-135]
A. Admission to Practice [§§13-29]
2. Moral Character [§§24-29]
§ 28. REHABELITATION OF MORAL CHARACTER
Past misconduct sufficient to deny applicationforadmission to the bar may be offset by a
showing of rehabilitation of the applicant and of his or her current moral qualification for
admission. [FN65] In some cases, however, an applicant is deemed to havefoiledto show
that his or her rehabilitation was sufficient to offset past misconduct. [FN66]
When an applicant has previously committed acts of moral turpitude, the applicant bears
the burden of demonstrating that he or she is rehabilitated and currently possesses the
moral qualifications to be a member of the bar. [FN67]
AMJURATTNYS§28
END OF DOCUMENT
39AJUEL4th567(1985)
American Law Reports ALR4th
BAR ADMISSION OR REINSTATEMENT OF ATTORNEY AS AFFECTED BY
ALCOHOLISM^
Volume 39 (1985)
8 3. Control of alcohol use as factor considered in granting reinstatement
The courts in thefollowingcases held that thefeetthat an attorney had gained control of
his use of alcohol was a factortobe considered in granting him reinstatement to the bar.
Where an attorney who had been disbarred because of his addiction to alcohol had
appliedforreinstatement and had presented persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, the
court in Application of Lanahan (196T> 102 Ariz 19L 427 P2d 142 held that the
application should be granted. The courtfoundit significant that an administrative
committee ofthe state bar had conducted an investigation of the applicant's personal and
business activitiesfromthe time of his disbarment, and had reached a conclusion,
supported by substantial evidence, that the attorney had been rehabilitated and was
morallyfitto practice law.

Retroactive suspension for 4-year period ending just before date of court's opinion, with
right to apply for reinstatement pursuant to applicable rules, was appropriate sanction for
attorney whose inadequate representation of two clients was result of alcohol abuse
where attorney had joined Alcoholics Anonymous and reinstatement was conditioned on
attorney's abstaining completelyfromuse of alcohol and drags for 2 years and his
continuing his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous and state bar membership
assistance program. In re Arrick (1994, Ariz^ 882 P2d 943. 176 Ariz Adv Rep 9.
Attorney who had been suspendedfrompractice for various violations stemming from
alcohol abuse was entitled to reinstatement after demonstrating that problem was under
control, and 2-year probationary period with some conditions related to alcohol was
recommended by state bar as "safety net" rather than contingency of reinstatement. Inre
Reinstatement of Blasnig (1995, Ariz) 890 P2d 1141.
Reinstatement of attorney transferred to disability inactive status based on attorney's
problems with alcohol would only be permitted upon showing of clear and convincing
evidence that attorney's alcohol-related disability had been removed, and that attorney
was once again competent to practice law. Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 241.23(a). People v.
Coulter. 950 R2d 176 fColo. 1998V
In The Florida Bar v Stewart (198L Flal 396 So 2d 170. the court approved the
reinstatement of an attorney on the condition that he actively participate in Alcoholics
Anonymous. The evidence established that the individual had been a successful and
highly respected trial attorney, but for several years had been unable to control his use of
alcohol The court pointed out that the attorney had admitted that he was an alcoholic,
that he had voluntarily sought help for his addiction to alcohol by entering a drug abuse
program, and that, according to his testimony, he had not had any alcohol for more than 2
years. In addition, noted the court, numerous witnesses testified that the petitioner's
previous inability to function as a lawyer had been the result of gross alcohol abuse, and
that after being suspended and seeking treatment, he had rehabilitated himself and was
now capable of assuming the responsibilities and trust of an attorney. Therefore, the court
approved the referee's recommendation that the attorney, who had been suspended for 6
months or until he proved his rehabilitation from alcoholism, be reinstated on the
condition that he continue treatment for his alcoholism during a 2-year probationary
period.
Former attorney disbarred in 1984 did not establish his rehabilitation sufficient to warrant
readmission, where attorney had been arrested for DUI in 1986 but did not join
alcoholics' recovery program until 1994, after board of bar examiners raised question of
attorneys drinking. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: L.BLH.. 660 So. 2d 1046 fffa.
1995).
Where an attorney had been suspended from the practice of law because of his neglect of
legal matters entrusted to him, which neglect was found to have been caused principally
by his excessive use of intoxicating beverages, the court in Re Johnson (1979. Km) 608
P2d 101L ordered that the attorney be reinstated to the practice of law where the
evidence showed that he had been cured of his drinking problem and had totally
abstained from the use of intoxicating beverages for several months, and the attorney
testified that he would continue to totally abstain in the future. In addition, the court
ordered that the newly reinstated attorney should continue to completely refrain from the
use of all intoxicating liquor and beverages, and that if it should in thefixturecome to the
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attention of the court that he had resumed the consumption of alcoholic beverages,
disciplinary action, including disbarment, could result without further formal proceedings
of any kind.
Attorney who had been indefinitely suspendedfrompractice of law for excessive use of
alcohol that had resulted in neglect of his law practice would be reinstated where
disciplinary board was convinced that attorney had rehabilitated himself from his
alcoholism and had maintained sobriety for four and one-half years. Re Johnson (1989^
244Kan59L770P2d842.
Attorney who was placed on disability inactive status as result of professional misconduct
arising from alcoholism would be reinstated to practice of law subject to being on
probation for two years in compliance with recommended conditions of reinstatement,
where respondent had undergone treatment for alcohol abuse and had succeeded for over
period of one year to remain free of alcohol. Re Keil (199n 248 Kan 629. 809 P2d 531.
Issuing bad checks, which were not honored by bank and were returned due to nonsufficient funds on several occasions, warranted transfer to disability inactive status,
where attorney's misconduct was directly related to and caused by his alcoholism and
drag addiction, and attorney voluntarily sought treatment for his substance abuse
problems and had completed successfiil recovery period. In re Dixon. 744 So, 2d 618 (La.
1999).
Petition for reinstatement of attorney who had been indefinitely suspended for at least 18
months was denied, and any new petition would be subject to conditions requiring
successful completion of his criminal probation following his conviction of aggravated
driving while under influence of alcohol, continued proof of abstinence from all moodaltering chemicals to date of any new petition for reinstatement, and minimum of one
year sustained and successfiil full-time employment. In re Lilja. 557 N.W.2d 209 (Minn.
1997V
The recommendation of the state's Commission on Practice that an attorney be reinstated
to the practice of law was accepted by the court in Re Herriott 0972^ 159 Mont 540,499
P2d 807. where the attorney was shown to have been successfully treated for his
alcoholism. The attorney had been disbarred primarily because of a larceny conviction
which the court stated was for the most part caused by habitual intemperance. The
individual had thereafter committed himself to a state hospital for treatment of his
problem, and had completed the prescribed course at that institutioa The evidence also
showed that he had maintained continuous sobriety for 2 years, had been steadily
employed as a laborer, and had become an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous.
After considering the many supporting letters and petitionsfromfollowpractitioners, the
court concluded that under the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to warrant the
reinstatement of the attorney.
State bar applicant would be admitted to practice law, subject to conditions designed to
ensure applicant's continued sobriety, notwithstanding applicant's history of alcohol and
narcotic abuse and criminal misconduct, where applicant completed substance abuse
treatment program, continued to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and other support
programs, and remained soberforthree-year period prior to bar application, and where
applicant produced medical and psychological evidence to establish that his chances for
remaining sober were excellent Re Application of Strait H99(ft 120 NJ 477. 577 A2d
149.

Attorney suspended for one year for neglect of client matters and failure to cooperate
with committee on professional standards, who applied for reinstatement on grounds that
his alcoholism had caused problems and that he completed rehabilitation program and
was participating in 15-week aftercare program but had application denied as premature
in view of recent completion of rehabilitation program and continued involvement in
aftercare, and who renewed request for reinstatement after completing aftercare,
maintaining sobriety, and submitting evidence of progress and doctor's report that
alcoholism did not result in impairment that would preclude him from practicing law,
would be reinstated and suspension would be terminated, where attorney satisfied
conditions setforthin decision denying previous application for reinstatement, where
attorney demonstrated physical and mental fitness to resume practice of law, where
misconduct which resulted in suspension occurred several years ago and did not involve
moral turpitude or misappropriation of funds, and where attorney served nine months of
his one-year suspension and committee on professional standards did not oppose
tennination of suspension. Re Woods (1989. 3d Depfl ISO App Div 2d 987,542NYS2d
797.
Attorney indefinitely suspended from practice of law for numerous instances of
misconduct would not be readmitted to practice, where attorney had not regularly
received alcohol counseling. Toledo Bar ASSIL v DeMars H99(ft 56 Ohio St 3d 90.564
NE2d43L
In concluding that a disbarred attorney should be reinstated as a member of the bar of the
state, the court in State ex rel Dabnev v Ledbetter (1933^ 162 Okla 20.18 P2d 1085.
gave consideration to the feet that the attorney had made a complete reform with
reference to his use of intoxicating liquor, the abuse of which had played an important
part in his original disbarment, which was due to his disrespectful attack on and conduct
toward the court
Where an attorney, who had been disbarred because of several serious breaches of his
duty as a member of the bar, presented evidence that he had lived a life of sobriety and
industry since his disbarment, the court in Re Greenwood (1945) 22 Wash 2d 684.157
P2d 591. ordered that he be reinstated to the practice of law. The evidence showed that
the attorney had had a reputation as a lawyer of great learning and ability until he had
become addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor which had resulted in the acts
of misconduct for which he was disbarred. In his petition for reinstatement, the attorney
alleged that he had completely controlled his former desire for intoxicating liquor, and
had been steadily employed in responsible positions, and earnestly desired an opportunity
to rehabilitate himself as a lawyer. The court indicated that the petitioner's character, both
before and after his disbarment, and his conduct subsequent to the disbarment were
important factors, particularly as it was not denied that the petitioner had been recognized
as a man of high character and a lawyer of integrity before he became an alcoholic, and
therefore, his subsequent rehabilitation, which was not controverted, was entitled to
consideration. In addition, the court noted that the court which had ordered the
petitionees disbarment had expressed the hope that in the future he would demonstrate
through right living and by abstaining from the use of intoxicating liquor that he was
worthy of reinstatement to the bar. [FN3]
Therecommendationof the state's Board of Governors to reinstate an attorney was
accepted by the court in Re Johnson (1979^ 92 Wash 2d 349, 597 P2d 113. where the
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attorney was shown to have been rehabilitated and to no longer suffer from an addiction
to alcohol The evidence showed that alcoholism had been a primary factor contributing
to the attorney's loss ofjudgment which had caused him to commit the crime of grand
larceny which had resulted in his being disbarred Explaining that the major consideration
in reinstatement proceedings is whether the petitioner has affirmatively shown that he has
overcome those weaknesses which produced his earlier misconduct, the court noted that
after making several attempts to conquer his alcohol problem, the attorney had
successfully undergone treatment approximately 5 years earlier and had since that time
totally abstained from alcohol, which the court saw as proof of the success of the
treatment. The court also considered the fact that the petitioner had at all times been
sincere,frank,and truthful in discussing his alcoholism and the other factors relating to
his disbarment and reinstatement.
Reinstatement of a suspended attorney was ordered by the court in Re Livesev (198(fl 94
Wash 2d 251.615 P2d 1294 on the basis of a showing by the petitioning attorney that he
had sought treatment and no longer suffered from the alcoholism which had been the
primary cause of the misconduct for which he was suspended. The petitioner had been
suspended for foiling to process several cases and then, upon inquiry by a client
concerning the status of a particular matter, falsely responding that it was proceeding
satisfactorily. Following his suspension, the petitioner had sought psychiatric treatment,
and the evidence showed that he had apparently made a remarkable recovery. The
petitioner's doctors testified that he had completely abstainedfromthe use of alcohol for
more than 2 years and showed no signs of returning to hisformerdrinking habits, and
that alcohol was no longer a problem for him. In addition, the court noted that it had been
furnished with numerous lettersfromBoth professional and nonprofessional persons in
the community, all attesting to the petitioner's dramatic physical and mental improvement
and to the feet that he had overcome the weaknesses that had produced his earlier
difficulties.
Attorney was reinstated to practice where evidence, inter alia, included favorable
testimony regarding attorney's integrity, legal competence, and rehabilitation from
alcoholism, and attorney had 5-year certificate of sobrietyfromAlcoholics Anonymous;
attorney would be subject to conditions and continue rehabilitation program with
Alcoholics Anonymous. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd v Vieweg (1995. W Va) 461 SE2d 60.
§ 4. Control of alcohol use as condition imposed uponfixturereinstatement attimeof
suspension or disbarment
In the following cases, the courts conditioned the future reinstatement of an attorney who
was suspended or disbarred upon his ability to get his use of alcohol under control.
Attorney would be disbarred and would be required to undergo evaluation process of
reinstatement proceeding before being allowed to practice law again, where he engaged
in repeated misconduct, including abandonment of clients, practicing law while under
suspension, and drunk driving, notwithstanding that attorney had been in alcohol
rehabilitation program for approximately eight months at time of his hearing; such
rehabilitation, while sustained, was not meaningful in light of attorney's repeated
misconduct over years. In re Billings (1990) 50Cal3d 358.267 CalRptr319. 787 P2d
617.

Suspending an attorney indefinitely from the practice of law, the court in The Florida Bar
v Blalock (1976. Fla) 325 So 2d 401. stipulated that he would be eligible for
reinstatement only after he had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that he had
been cured of his drinking problem. The record clearly demonstrated that the respondent
attorney's professional misconduct was directly connected with his disease of alcoholism
which had also led to financial, marital, and professional problems, said the court, while
prior to the development of his dependency upon alcohol, his personal and professional
conduct was ethical, competent, and responsible. If and when the suspended attorney is
able to bring his dependency upon alcohol under his complete control, continued the
court, he should be seriously considered for reinstatement to the practice of law.
However, the court disregarded the referee's more specific recommendations that the
attorney be required to actively participate in a continuing personal program controlling
his disease of alcoholism, including the total abstinence from all forms of alcohol, as a
condition to his reinstatement to the practice of law, and merely concluded that he must
be able to prove that he had been rehabilitated as to his alcoholism in order to be eligible
for reinstatement.
In suspending an attorney for professional misconduct resultingfromthe effects of
alcohol abuse, the court in The Florida Bar v Larkin T1982. Fla) 420 So 2d 1080. ruled
that the attorney would be eligible for reinstatement after 91 days if he could at that time
show that he had established full control ova: his problem with alcohol abuse. The court
noted that it was clearfromthe facts of the case that the attorney's professional
misconduct had stemmed totallyfromhis drinking problem, and indicated its belief that if
he could control his use of alcohol, he would be able to be restored as a fully contributing
member of the legal profession. The court explained that it had a duty to protect the
public from attorney misconduct, but stated that in those case where alcoholism was the
underlying cause of the improper behavior and the individual attorney is willing to cooperate in seeking alcoholism rehabilitation, these circumstances should be taken into
account in determining the appropriate discipline. In conclusion, the court stated that a
suspension for 91 days and until such time as the attorney establishes his rehabilitation
should be sufficient to protect society while at the same time encouraging the individual
to seek treatment.
Attorney who received suspension for neglecting legal matter, failing to cany out
employment contract, and intentionally prejudicing or damaging his client would not be
reinstated unless he established alcoholic rehabilitatioa The Florida Bar v Alford (1983,
Fla) 441 So 2d 615,
After suspending an attorney's license to practice law for an indefinite period of time, the
cnnit in rnmmittee on Professional Ethics & Conduct etc. v Sloan (1978, Iowa) 262
NW2d 262, stated that if and when the attorney believed that he had his alcoholism under
control and that he would continue to have it under control in the future, he might apply
to the court for reinstatement, although reinstatement could not be guaranteed. The
attorney had conceded that he had been an alcoholic for a number of years, and that at
times he had suffered from acute alcoholism which had rendered him incompetent to
practice law. The court also explained that if the attorney could prove that his alcoholism
was under control, his reinstatement would include a probationary period of 2 years
during which he must totally abstainfromthe consumption of intoxicating beverages, and
if any such beverage were consumed by him, his license would be revoked.
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In suspending an attorney's license to practice law for an indefinite period of time, the
court in Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Asso. v
Rabe (1979. Iowa^ 284 NW2d 234. also provided that he could apply to the court for
reinstatement after 6 months if he could prove that his alcoholism had been cured. After
having consumed a quantity of alcoholic beverages, the attorney had attempted to steal
several items from a department storey and was subsequently convicted of fourth-degree
theft of property, which resulted in his suspensionfromthe practice of law. The evidence
showed that the attorney had had a severe problem with alcohol and was apparently under
its influence at the time he committed the misconduct in question. The attorney testified,
however, that since that time he had joined Alcoholics Anonymous and attended the
meetingsfrequentlyand worked with other professionals who were combating alcohol
problems. Because of the attorney's efforts to cope with his alcohol problem and
rehabilitate himself the court decided not to disbar him, but to merely suspend him, and
specifically provided that if after 6 months he could establish that he had his alcoholism
under control and that the control would extend into the future, and if his conduct during
the period of suspension had been good, the court might reinstate his license.
In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Asso. v Bergren
(1980. Iowa> 300 NW2d 85. the court suspended an attorney as a result of his alcoholism
and related misconduct, but stated that if and when he believes he has his alcoholism
under control, and if upon application he establishes that the control of his alcoholism
will extend into the future, the court may then reinstate his license. The court apparently
considered it significant that although the attorney had not as yet been able to control his
drinking, he had at least made sincere attempts to do so.
Although the respondent attorney was suspended indefinitely, the court in Attorney
Grievance Com, v Finlavson (1982^ 293 Md 156.442 A2d 565. 39 ALR4th 562. stated
that the suspension was without prejudice to the attorney's right to apply immediately for
reinstatement if he could meet certain conditions pertaining to his alcoholism. The
evidence showed that the attorney had seriously neglected several matters which clients
had brought to him, and the court ruled that his numerous violations of various
disciplinary rules made it necessary to suspend him. However, the court stated that the
attorney had at one time been a very active and able member of the bar whose problems
were primarily due to the fact that he had become an alcoholic, and expressed a desire to
assist him in his rehabilitation as an individual and as an attorney. The court pointed out
that although the attorneyfreelyadmitted that he was an alcoholic, the evidence showed
that he had consumed no alcoholic beverages in nearly a year, and that he had sought
professional treatmentfromseveral organizations, including Alcoholics Anonymous and
a counseling program established by the state bar association. The disease of alcoholism
is such that those who say and believe that they are cured do not always remain so,
reasoned the court, and it would be necessary to monitor the respondent's progress
carefully should he in the future be reinstated. Thus, the court concluded that the
respondent attorney would be eligible for reinstatement in the future only if he continued
to participate in the counseling program sponsored by the state's bar association,
maintained an active membership in and participation with Alcoholics Anonymous, and
became associated with another member of the bar who would monitor his activities as a
practicing lawyer and report any failure by the respondent to act promptly on behalf of
his clients.

Attorney's future reinstatement after indefinite suspension would be conditioned on his
abstaining from consumption of alcoholic beverages, participating in such rehabilitative
activities as might be prescribed by bar association, operating with association to work
out program for having his practice monitored with submission of periodic reports to
association, and paying all costs incurred in original disciplinary proceeding. Attorney
Grievance Com, v Shaffer (19861305 Md 19(X 502 A2d 502.
Attorney who had been indefinitely suspended and whose misconduct was substantially
related to his dependence on alcohol would be reinstated subject to certain conditions,
including counseling, participating in Alcoholics Anonymous, and monitoring of his
practice by a member of the bar. In re Reinstatement of Grier. 356 Md, 142.737 A.2d
1076 (1999Y
Where an attorney was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law due to misconduct
which resulted from the fact that he was an alcoholic who had been unable to control his
drinking problem, the court in Re Application of Satterlee (1973) 296 Minn 515.207
NW2d 362. gave the attorney permission to apply for reinstatement when he is able to
show that he has his drinking problem under control. When charged with failure to attend
to matters entrusted to him as an attorney and deliquencies in payment of his state and
federal taxes, the court related, the attorney admitted that he was an alcoholic and that as
long as he continued to be such, he would be incompetent to practice law. The court
noted, however, that the administrative director who had commenced the disciplinary
proceeding had stated that the individual in question was a competent lawyer when he
was not drinking, and therefore the court concluded that at such time as the attorney is
able to present testimony from an expert in the treatment of alcoholics that he has had his
drinking problem under control for such time as to make it probable that he would
continue to be able to refrainfromthe use of alcohol, reinstatement would be appropriate.
The court in Re Stearns f 1976) 309 Minn 548.243 NW2d 312. held that an attorney who
was to be suspended from practice for misappropriating the funds of two clients could
petition for reinstatement to the bar after one year, provided the petition included a
showing that he had undergone appropriate medical treatment and abstained from the use
of alcohol during that period, and that there was a substantial likelihood, supported by
competent medical evidence, that his alcoholism was and would remain arrested. It was
undisputed that the attorney's derelictions stemmed from alcoholism, said the court, and
that prior to the incidents in question, the attorney had been a person of ability, integrity,
and good moral character. The court also noted that the attorney himself had disclosed Ids
improprieties to the state's Board of Professional Responsibility before any complaint had
been filed against him, and had made restitution of the sums which he had appropriated,
and that he recognized his need for medical treatment and rehabilitation. Under the
circumstances, the court concluded that the attorney should be suspended from the
practice of law, but expressed its opinion that he would be an appropriate candidate for
reinstatement once he was cured of his alcoholism.
Noting that attorney's trouble stemmed from chronic alcoholism, that he was not evil or
dishonest man, that, if his alcoholism could be arrested, he could be restored as
contributing and worthy member of Minnesota bar, but that, while he continued to drink,
he was not fit to practice law and public must be protected, court ordered indefinite
suspension from practice of law with provision that attorney might petition for
reinstatement, but only upon meeting following conditions, among others: (1) that he
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submit to physical and psychological examinations requested by referee, (2) that he
undertake long-term treatment and rehabilitation for alcoholism, (3) that no petition for
reinstatement be made before attorney could show total abstinance from use of alcohol
for at least one year following treatment, and (4) that, if no petition for reinstatement be
made by January 1,1985, director might petition court to make indefinite suspension
permanent in form of permanent disbarment Re Disciplinary Action against OfHara
(1983. Minn) 330 NW2d 863.
Attorney who was on probation and failed, inter alia, to abstain from alcohol or to verify
attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, would be indefinitely suspended from
practice for period of at least six months, and, as condition for reinstatement, would be
required to provide evidence that he had abstained from alcohol and other mood-altering
chemicals for at least one year, had attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly,
and had continued regular chemical dependency counseling. Re Application for
Discipline of Kroening (1986. Minn) 397 NW2d 335.
Attorney's misconduct in refusing to return clients' telephone calls, misrepresenting to
client that child custody modification hearing had been continued, agreeing to temporary
change of custody and suspension of child support obligations to obtain continuance
without client's consent, neglecting another client's case, and trust account violations
warranted indefinite suspensionfrompractice of law, with no possibility of reinstatement
for 18 months, and with reinstatement conditioned upon factors including abstinence
from use of alcohol during period of suspensioa Code of Prof Resp., DR1- 102(A)(1,4,
5), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 9-102(A)(l, 2), (BX3,4). State ex rel Nebraska State Bar Ass'n
v. PulleiL 260 Neb. 125.615 N.W.2d 474 f2000V
An attorney who was suspended as a result of various acts of misconduct which were said
to have been caused by his drinking problem was held by the court in Jubicv New York
State Bar Asso. (1974^ 46 App Div 2d 843,361 NYS2d 709. to be eligible to apply for
reinstatement after one year on the condition that he submit satisfactory medical evidence
of his rehabilitatioa The suspension had resulted because of misconduct consisting of
neglect of claims, deception of clients, failure to respond to the inquiries of clients, and
failure to co- operate with the investigation of complaints received from clients, but the
attorney testified that his acts were unintentional and had resulted from a drinking
problem for which he had undergone medical treatment, therapy, and counseling. In
granting the attorney leave to apply for reinstatement after a period of suspension, the
court stated that he would be required to submit proof that he had become physically and
mentally capable of once again engaging in the practice of law.
Upon application for reinstatement to Bar after six-month suspension of practice of law,
applicant should demonstrate that he has taken appropriate and effective steps to maintain
his sobriety and to prevent recurrence of kinds of professional misconduct which led to
suspension. Re Conine (1990,3d Deprt 167 App Div 2d 657. 564 NYS2d 202.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel appropriately recommended indefinite suspension from
practice of law on evidence that attorney had effectively abandoned his law practice and
offices, and had failed to take adequate steps to protect his clients or to insure that
pending legal matters would be properly handled by other counsel, as result of his serious
abuse of drugs and alcohol, but was without authority to recommend that suspension be
stayed and attorney be placed on professional probation for 2 years. Although Board's
attempt to design form of probationary discipline might well have merit, if such

probationary discipline is to be adopted, it should be adoptedformallyby way of
amendment to Supreme Court rules for government of bar. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v Hiller (1983) 5 Ohio St 3d 237. 5 Ohio BR 498.450 NE2d 1157.
Attorney who committed numerous acts of misconduct and who admitted he had serious
chemical dependency problem in form of alcohol dependency would be indefinitely
suspended from practice of law and in any application for reinstatement, court will look
for proof that attorney resolved alcohol abuse problems. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v
Gieeel (19901 56 Ohio St 3d 58. 564 NE2d 84.
Attorney's misconduct in failing to act on behalf of clients, neglecting entrusted legal
matters, failing to assist in disciplinary investigations, failing to appear in court on behalf
of client, falsely representing that he had authority to reach settlement on behalf of client,
and manufacturing and giving client "Report of Court Action" which appeared to give
limited driving privileges to client who was appealing driver's license suspension
warranted suspension from practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on
conditions that attorney make restitution, enter arrangement with Ohio Lawyers
Assistance Program (OLAP) relating to treatment for alcoholism, abstain from alcohol
and drugs, be subject to random testing by OLAP, and attend recovery program.
Government of the Bar Rule V, § 4(G); Code of Prof. Resp., DR1- 102(A)(3-6), DR 6101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(l, 2), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(A), DR 9-102(BX4). Office
of Disciplinary Counsel v. MaxwelL 83 Ohio St 3d 7. 697 N.E.2d 597 (1998).
Where the decision was made to suspend an attorney because of his conduct in appearing
in court on several occasions in an intoxicated condition to represent a client, the court in
Re Complaint of Dibble (19701 257 Or 120.478 P2d 384. stated that if the attorney
would make the decision to stop drinking and seek help and be rehabilitated, he might be
readmitted to the practice of law. Two judges had testified that the attorney in question
had appeared before them on several occasions in an intoxicated condition, and the court
considered it significant that the attorney's alcoholism had resulted in misconduct in open
court which it felt tended to bring the legal profession and the administration ofjustice
into disrepute. Although the accused denied the charges and asserted that he was not an
alcoholic and did not use alcohol to excess, he did admit that he was a problem drinker.
The court recognized that in the absence of a course of intensive treatment as an
alcoholic, which the accused had refused to accept, there was no reasonable assurance
that he had permanently ended his drinking problem. Thus, the court ruled that the
attorney could not be reinstated into the practice of law until he could affirmatively show
that he had refrained entirely from the use of alcoholic beverages for a period of at least
one year and that he was in all respects again able and qualified to resume his position as
a member of the bar and that his resumption of the practice of law would not be
detrimental to the bar or to the public interest.
Attorney who was suspended for 63 days would be placed thereafter on three- year
probation requiring that he refrain entirely from using alcohol, continue in alcoholic
rehabilitation program, and permit bar association to monitor such compliance; attorney
would be subject to summary suspension for violating these conditions. Re Conduct of
Paauwe (19841298 Or 215.691 P2d 97.
In Re Greenwood (194118 Wash 2d 722.111 P2d 79L the court disbarred an attorney for
various professional misdeeds, but expressed the hope that he would in the future be able
to demonstrate by abstinence from the use of intoxicating liquor that he was worthy of
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reinstatement to the bar. fFN41
Applicant was properly denied permission to sk for bar examination, where he freely
admitted to three convictions for drunk driving and 32 traffic arrests, but doctor who
evaluated applicant for Colorado bar examiners concluded that applicant was suffering
from alcoholism and denial of his condition, and feet that applicant only began to abstain
from alcohol and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings after receiving Board of Law
Examiner's decision not to let him sit for examination indicated thatfindingof
rehabilitation was not yet warranted. Frasher v West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners
(199L W Va^l 408 SE2d 675,
END OF DOCUMENT

99AX.R.3d288(1980)
American Law Reports ALR3d
NARCOTICS CONVICTION AS CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE JUSTIFYING- • •
Volume 99 (1980)
ARTICLE

Some statutes and rules regulating the conduct of attorneys provide for disciplinary action
if an attorney has engaged in conduct involving moral turpitude or has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude (as distinguished from statutes or rules which do not
contain the "moral turpitude11 qualification, but which provide for disciplinary action if an
attorney has been convicted of a felony). This annotation collects and analyzes the cases
which have determined whether an attorney's conviction of a narcotics offense constitutes
a crime of moral turpitude and thus justifies disbarment or other disciplinary action
against the attorney.
The reader is reminded that the annotation does not purport to state the statutory law or
other applicable rules of any jurisdiction except insofar as they may be reflected in the
reported cases within the scope of the annotation; the reader should therefore consult the
latest relevant enactments in the jurisdiction of interest
Most of the courts which have been confronted with the annotated issue have held that a
narcotics conviction does justify disbarment or other disciplinary action, such as
suspension from die practice of law for a period of time. The courts typically reason that
an attorney is held to a high standard of conduct, particularly with respect to upholding
the law, so that a conviction for such a criminal offense requires disciplinary action in
order to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession Some courts have held
that various mitigating factors lessened the severity of the disciplinary action which
might otherwise have been taken
In Re Application ofShepard(1917) 35 CalApp 492,170 P 442, the court held that an
attorney's federal conviction for conspiring to import opium involved moral turpitude
justifying his disbarment under a statute authorizing the removal or suspension of an
attorney upon a conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The
court said that even if opium were not subject to an import duty so that it could not be
said that the attorney attempted to defraud the government out of revenue, the smuggling
of smoking opium is on at least as low a moral plane as the smuggling of dutiable goods.
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the court said, smoking opium has dysfunctional and degenerating effects upon the
human body and the act of making the drug available for distribution cannot be
reasonably differentiated from maiming a body with the intent to wreak harm upon it
The court also said that the attorney became involved in the crime through his
representation of clients who were charged with a similar crime, and that the public is
entitled to protection from attorneys who are unable to resist the opportunities for
dishonesty which their practice often presents. The court added that it made no difference
that the attorney was convicted in a federal court, reasoning that jurisdictional lines did
not affect the character of the act done.
In Disciplinary Board of Hawaii Supreme Court v Bergan (1979, Hawaii) 592 P2d 814,
the court ordered that the attorney's license to practice law be suspended for 5 years, upon
evidence that the hearing committee of the state supreme court's disciplinary board had
found that the attorney had engaged in conduct involving moral turpitude in that he
knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it, for which
he was convicted in federal court on his guilty plea. The court rejected the disciplinary
board's recommendation of disbarment, however, in view of the mitigating factors that
the attorney (1) had served his time in a penal institution and had suffered the ignominy
of a criminal conviction; (2) was still subject to parole restrictions; (3) had earned the
respect and confidence of his business associates upon being paroled; (4) had
demonstrated his commitment to self- rehabilitation by engaging in an extensive drug
rehabilitation program while imprisoned; (5) had displayed candor, co-operation, and
repentance throughout the disciplinary proceedings and a willingness to accept
punishment for his misconduct; and (6) had voluntarily undergone psychiatric treatment
after his commission of the offense, with a favorable prognosis.
Acknowledging that there may be problems in defining moral turpitude since acts which
are defined as crimes do not always involve an element of moral turpitude, the court m
Re Gorman (1978, Jnd) 379NE2d970, held, however, that an attorney's federal felony
conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and
conspiracy to distribute cocaine did involve moral turpitude. The court said that the issue
did not involve the nature of the drug, and thus the court rejected the attorney's
contention that the use of cocaine is neither addictive nor injurious to health so that his
involvement with it could not be said to involve a lack of moral fitness. The issue for
determination, the court said, was the attorney's moral fitness to continue practicing law.
Accepting the definition of moral turpitude as baseness, viieness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which persons owe to each other and to society, the court said
that the attorney's conduct was an attempt to place himself above the law and superior to
societal judgment and was thus base, vile, and depraved. The court noted that the
attorney's conduct was not the act of an experimenting youth, but involved the
introduction, without apparentregardforthe consequences, of a controlled substance into
a marketplace often occupied by children and adolescents. Accordingly, the court
concluded that disbarment, the strongest sanction available, must be imposed in order to
preserve the integrity of the bar and to demonstrate the court's total and absolute disfavor
with the attorney's actions.
In Butler County Bar Asso. v Schemer (1961) 172 Ohio St 165,15 Ohio Ops 2d 320, 174
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NE2d 103, the court held that a county bar association's findings that an attorney who had
been convicted of state felonies of (1) obtaining a narcotic drug by forging a prescription,
and (2) uttering a false prescription for a narcotic drug had been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and that the bar association's recommendation that the attorney
be suspendedfromthe practice of law indefinitely was not unreasonable. The court
rendered judgment accordingly.
In Munizv State (1978, TexCivApp 13ihDist) 575SW2d408, 99ALR3d277, writrefnr
e, the court held that an attorney's federal felony convictions, on his guilty pleas, of
unlawfully conspiring to import marijuana and conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute marijuana, were felonies involving moral turpitude under a statute mandating
disbarment for the conviction of such crimes, because, the court said, this type of activity:
(1) affects the morals of the community in which an attorney lives; (2) tends to lessen
public confidence in the legal profession; and (3) is morally reprehensible conduct on the
part of a licensed attorney. The court said that moral turpitude had been variously defined
as anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals, or an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which persons owe
to each other or to society in general The court said that the term "moral turpitude"
implies something immoral in itself; regardless of whether it is punishable by law.
Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude, the court said, is to be determined
by a consideration of the nature of the offense as it bears on the attorney's moral fitness to
continue in the practice of law. The court said that in determining this issue,
consideration must be given to the fact that the illegal act was committed by an attorney
as compared to a layperson, for an attorney must be held to a more strict standard because
of the position of public trust which an attorney enjoys. Because a lawyer assumes a
position of responsibility to the law itself the court said, any serious disregard of the law
by him or her is much more grave than that by the layperson who may breach the law
innocently or otherwise. The court also said that it made no difference that the Texas
Penal Code did not contain prohibitions similar to those for which the attorney was
convicted under federal law, since the relevant statute mandated disbarment upon
conviction in any trial court of any felony involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, in Re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal 3d562,99 CalRptr 865, 493
P2d97,^
qpurt held t t o an attorney's conviction for failure to pay a marijuana transfer tax gT^rol
^mfiM^mFMIfcfiun^^l per se and thus did not justify a disbarment or suspension,
because (1) possession priiise^ofithe dru
:mbra^aod(2) although
the use of marijuana for illicit traffic could be considered abase crime, it was not dear
that the attorney became involved in the smuggling operation to traffic marijuana. The
court pointed out that the federal statute under which the attorney was convicted did not
require wrongful intent or intent to defraud the government, and the court said that
without such intent, the failure to pay the tax did not involve moral turpitude. However,
the court said, the attorney's conduct in assisting and counseling a conspiracy to smuggle
marijuana did involve moral turpitude because the attorney disregarded the legitimate
public concern that attorneys not use their legal knowledge to counsel or assist clients to
violate the law. Thus, the court said, these actions by the attorney involved moral
turpitude because they demonstrated his unsuitability to be entrusted with the privileges
and duties of the legal profession. Disbarment was not warranted, however, the court

said, in light of the mitigating fectors that: (1) the attorney's actions were prompted by a
desire to assist a client who was in financial difficulties and did not grow out of a motive
of personal financial gain; (2) the attorney's actions did not cause any particular
individual to suffer physical orfinancialharm; (3) the attorney displayed honesty and cooperation when he was arrested; (4) the attorney indicated a recognition of his wrongful
conduct and a willingness to rehabilitate himself inforgoingpossible meritorious
defenses (such as entrapment) to both the conspiracy and tax evasion charges; (5) the
client whom the attorney was trying to help encouraged the attorney's growing
involvement in the smuggling operation in order to obtain a bounty offered by the United
States Customs Service; and (6) the attorney had no prior disciplinary record and enjoyed
a good reputation among his clientele and the members of his community. Accordingly,
the court ordered that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, the
first year to be actual suspension, followed by a year's probation during which he would
be permitted to practice law.

Court Cases Involving Disciplinary
Action Against Attorney's for Use and/or
Possession of Alcohol/Drugs
In re Cohen (1974)
113 Cal Rptn 485,11 CaUd 416,521 P2d 477
the court held that an attorney's conviction, on his guilty plea, for possession of marijuana
for sale involved moral turpitude, upon evidence that: (1) the attorney was
unquestionably aware of the laws proscribing the possession and sale of marijuana; (2)
the attorney acknowledged that he knew he was in violation of the law; and (3) at the
time of his arrest the attorney was representing a person who was charged with
possession of marijuana and restricted dangerous drugs. The court said that the facts
showed that the attorney had failed to abide by the oath he had taken when admitted to
practice, to support the laws of the state and to maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice. In determining the degree of discipline to be imposed upon the attorney, the court
considered the feet that the attorney had no prior record of discipline, that his wrongful
acts did not grow out of a motive for personal enrichment, and that he displayed honesty
and co-operation when he was arrested. Accordingly, the court ordered that the attorney
be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years, thefirst2 years to be actual
suspension, followed by a year of probation during which he would be permitted to
practice law..
In Re Kreamer (1975)
14 Cal 3d 524,121 Cal Rptr 600,535 P2d 728
the court held that an attorney's convictions on his guilty pleas to the federal offenses of
illegal possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor) and of conspiracy to distribute
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marijuana (a felony) justified afindingthat moral turpitude was involved, on
incontroverted evidence that: (I) the attorney was aware of the laws proscribing the
possession and distribution of marijuana; (2) he was a principal and not merely an advisor
in both enterprises which gave rise to the conviction; and (3) he entered into the
enterprises at least in part forfinancialgain. Considering that the purpose of a
disciplinary proceeding is not punitive but is to inquire into the fitness of an attorney to
continue in that capacity so that the public, the courts, and the legal profession will be
protected, the court said that although thefederaloffenses were serious ones and reflected
on the attorney's character as a member of the legal profession, there were numerous
mitigating factors present, including: (1) the attorney had had no prior disciplinary
proceedings brought against him; (2) his involvement in the marijuana offenses was
largely motivated by a domesticfinancialcrisis; (3) the attorney was young and
committed the offenses during a period of protracted emotional difficulties; (4) the
offenses were not committed in his capacity as an attorney and wore not in any way
related to his practice of law; (5) extensive and uncontroverted testimony was given by
professional colleagues as to the attorney's rehabilitation, his return to a more normal life,
his value to the profession, and his past and present good moral character; (6) a letter was
presentedfromthe attorney'sfederalprobation officer expressing optimism with respect
to the attorney's future success and urging that he not be severely punished; and (7) the
attorney's candid and co- operative behavior was evident throughout the disciplinary
proceedings. Accordingly, the court concluded that adequate discipline would be a 3-year
suspension which would be stayed in favor of placing the attorney on probationforthat
period
In re Gardner
625A.2d293
D.C4993.
Decided May 27,1993.
However, consistent with our prior decisions, w^Ma that simple possessiontof cocaine
po^not constitute
TOnauCTmyo
ana, therefore, there was no
violation of DR 1-1Q2(A)(3)

Board recommended to this court that reciprocal discipline not be imposed pursuant to
D.CBarILXI,§ll(cX5).
In this jurisdiction, a lawyer who commits misconduct which was substantially affected
by alcoholism or addiction to legal drugs, lawfully obtained, would be disciplined unless

the lawyer could show by clear and convincing evidence that he/she was substantially
rehabilitatedfromhis addiction. In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); In re Temple,
596 A.2d 585 (D.C.1991), If he/she could make a showing of rehabilitation, he/she
might be placed on probation for a lengthy period with monitoring to detect relapses. By
contrast, Respondent will be practicing under no such supervision.

Case Law
In re Lock
54S.W-3d305
Tex.,2001.
Decided June 21,2001
44Tex.Sup.CtJ.934
Attorney appealed Board of Disciplinary Appeals' (DODA) determination that she was
subject to compulsory disciplineforbeing placed on probation, without an adjudication
of guilt, for possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court, Hankinson, J., held
that attorney was required to be disciplined in the standard grievance process.
Reversed and remanded
Justice HANKINSON delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
PHTTIIPS, Justice ENOCEL Justice BAKER, Justice QT^ML, and Justice JEFFERSON
joined
The issue in this appealfroma judgment of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA)
concerns the appropriate disciplinary procedure to be followed when a licensed Texas
attorney is convicted of or placed on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt
for possession of a controlled substance. We must decide whether discipline in this
instance is mandatory under the compulsory discipline process, or whether BODA may
consider a range of sanctions based on the facts underlying the alleged misconduct as part
of the standard grievance process.
Paula Ann Lock, a licensed Texas attorney, pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code §
481.115(c). The trial court deferred further proceedings without an adjudication of guilt,
ordered her to pay a $500.00fine,and placed her on community supervision for six years.
Through the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, the State Bar of Texas commenced compulsory
discipline proceedings against Lock pursuant to Part Vm of the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure. See TexJL Disciplinary P. 8.01-.08. reprinted in Tex. Gov't
Code, tit 2, siibtit. G app. A-l. After a hearing, BODA held that Lock, having been
placed on probationforpossession of a controlled substance without an adjudication of
guilt, had been convicted of an intentional crime, as defined by disciplinary rule 1.06(0).
BODA suspended Lock for the term of her criminal probation and held that if her
criminal probation is revoked, she should be disbarred pursuant to Texas Rule of
Disciplinary Procedure 8 . 0 6 ^ ^ ^ J ^ » ^ ^ ^ i r t g s M k ^ ^ f f l ^
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moral turpitude, and therefore, on the facts of her case, she was not convicted of an
inteMSMjcrunff We agree that under Texas1 disciplinary scheme, Lock is not subject to
compulsory discipline, but that her actions may be reviewed and sanctioned following the
standard grievance procedures. We therefore reverse BODA's judgment and remand the
case to BODA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
As the question before us is which of the two available disciplinary procedures is the
appropriate way to review Lodk*s conduct, we begin with an overview of the disciplinary
system. The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provide two procedures by which a
licensed attorney may be disciplined: compulsory discipline, delineated in Part VIII, or
the standard grievance procedures outlined in Parts II and DI See In re Birdwell 20
S.W.3d 685. 687 fTex.2000). Compulsory discipline is reserved for when an attorney has
been convicted of or received deferred adjudication for an "intentional crime," as that
term is defined in the rules; in all other instances of alleged attorney misconduct,
discipline is determined in the standard grievance process. See generally TexJL
Disciplinary P. Part II, Part ID, Part VOL
The salient distinction between the two proceduresforpurposes of this appeal is that the
compulsory discipline process admits no discretion. Compulsory discipline for an
intentional crime turns solely on the record of conviction, the criminal sentence imposed,
and the factual determinations that the attorney is licensed to practice law in Texas and is
the party adjudged guilty. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 8.04. 8,05.8.06. An attorney guilty
of an intentional crime must be either suspended or disbarred—depending *307 solely on
whether the attorney's criminal sentence was probated—without regard for any collateral
matters, and without any consideration or inquiry into the facts of the underlying criminal
case. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 8.05.8.06.
The standard grievance process, unlike the compulsory process, affords some discretion.
In the standard grievance process the attorney has the opportunity to present the facts
underlying the alleged misconduct The reviewing body that hears the evidence and
imposes sanctions—whether an investigatory or evidentiary panel or district court-may
also consider any mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate degree of
discipline. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 2.13T 2,17.3.09.3.10. In the standard grievance
process, the rules permit the reviewing body to disbar the offending attorney, but also
make available a range of lesser sanctions, including various types of suspension and
reprimand. See TexJt Disciplinary P. 1.06m.
Apparently concluding that the elements of Lock1 s crime satisfied the rules1 definition of
an intentional crime, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel invoked the compulsory
discipline process against Lock. Thereafter, BODA suspended Lock for the term of her
probation. Whether compulsory discipline was the appropriate disciplinary procedure
depends on the nature of Lock's offense, specifically, whether possession of a controlled
sub stance is an intentional crime. See Tex.R. DisdpKnaryP. 8.01. To hold that
possession of a controlled substance is an "intentional crime,11 by definition BODA had to
conclude that it is a "[sjerious [cjrime that requires proof of knowledge or intent as an
essential element." Tex.R. Discinlinarv R L06fOV Further, BODA concluded as a matter
of law that Lock's crime qualified as a "serious crime" as that term is defined by rule

1.06(U\ Under the disciplinary rules, "serious crime" means:
barratry, any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft,
embezzlement, orfraudulentor reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or
any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of theforegoingcrimes.
TexiL Disciplinary P. 1.06(01 Possession of a controlled substance is neither barratry
nor a misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or misappropriation of money or other
property; BODA thus implicitly concluded that it is afelonyinvolving moral turpitude.
Therefore, to determine whether the Bar properly invoked the complusory-discipline
procedure against Lock, we must review its core conclusion that her crime was one of
moral turpitude.
The conclusion that a particular crime involves moral turpitude is one of law. See In re
Thacker. 881 S.W.2d 307,309 frex.1994^: State Bar of Tex, v. Heard 603 S.W.2d 829.
835 (Tex.19801 We review BODA's legal conclusions de novo. Birdwell 20 S.W.3d at
687. We have also established that to determine whether a crime is an intentional crime,
thus permitting the Bar to pursue the compulsory discipline process, we look solely to the
elements of the crime, and not to any collateral matters, such as an attorney's record of
service and achievement, orto the underlying facts of the criminal case. Duncan v. Board
of Disciplinary Appeals, 898 S.W.2d 759,762 (Tex. 1995^ (attorney convicted of
misprision of felony not subject to compulsory discipline because BODA could not
determine if the attorney committed an intentional crime without looking to the
underlying facts); In re Humphreys. 880 S.W.2d 402.406-07 (Tex. 1994^ (attorney
convicted of tax evasion subject to compulsory discipline because *308 tax evasion is an
intentional crime involving "deliberate greed and dishonesty and has a specific
connection to a lawyer'sfitnessto practice11).

See Birdwell 20 S.W.3d at 688: Duncan 898 S.W.2d at 761: Humphreys.
880 S.W.2d at 408. Therefore, under the analysis we established in Humphreys and
Duncan we look solely to the elements of Lock's crime to determine if those elements
involve any of the kinds of acts or characteristics encompassed within our definition of
moral turpitude. The elements of the applicable criminal statute are that the defendant
knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance listed in Texas Health &
Safety Code 6 481.102. Seel&L Health & Safety Code S 481.115fa>. i ^ a s l l

As we explained in Humphreys, quoting from the comment to rule 8.4 ("Misconduct") of
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, not all crimes
implicatefitnessto practice law: "Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on
fitness to practice law.... However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication...
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be
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professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics
relevant to law practice." 880 S. W.2d at 407.
The Rules of Professional Conduct define "fitness11 as denotftng] those qualities of
physical, mental and psychological health that enable a person to discharge a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients in conformity with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct. Normally a lack of fitness is indicated most clearly by a persistent inability to
discharge, or unreliability in carrying out, significant obligations.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROPL CONDUCT terminology. This definition of fitness
plainly contemplates that some review of particular facts or a course of conduct may be
necessary before one can conclude that an attorney should be professionally answerable
for a particular offense or pattern of offenses. We simply cannot determine whether an
attorney's conduct reveals "a persistent inability to discharge, or unreliability in carrying
out, significant obligations" without looking to the facts of the case. The Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure clearly limit compulsory discipline to, among other specified
crimes, "any felony involving moral turpitude." By contrast, the Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar dictate that anyone convicted of or who receives deferred
adjudication for "afelony"is "conclusively deemed not to have present good moral
character andfitness,"and must wait five years after the completion of any sentence or
period of probation before filing a declaration of intent to study law or application to take
the bar exam. TEXR. GOVERN. BAR ADMTtf IV(d), While we could change the
disciplinary rules to likewise say that an attorney should be professionally answerable by
compulsory discipline for any crime or any felony, we are not permitted to judidally read
the current express limitation, "involving moral turpitude," out of the disciplinary rules.

Precisely because we are not permitted under our current disciplinary rules to consider
any underlying facts in a compulsory *310 discipline proceeding, and because the Rules
of Disciplinary Procedure limit compulsory discipline to felonies involving moral
turpitude, the assertions in the dissenting opinion are likewise inapposite. In particular,
every case cited in the dissenting opinion may be distinguished in that the attorney's
conduct involved more than simple possession, the jurisdiction does not have a
comparable compulsory procedure that looks only at the elements of the crime in
determining which disciplinary procedure to follow, or the ultimate tribunal looks at the
underlying facts to determine the appropriate sanction. fFNl] In other words, the
jurisprudence of almost every *311 state court with an opinion on the issue is that
possession of a controlled substance may or may not be a crime of moral turpitude,
depending on the circumstances. And our compulsory discipline rules prohibit
consideration of the circumstances. We may change die rules, but until we do so we are
constrained to follow those rules and the analysis we established in Humphreys and

Duncan. [FN2] How other lawyers fared under different disciplinary systems in other
jurisdictions amply does not help us answer the question before us in this case, which is
not whether Lock should be disciplined, but which procedure the Bar should follow in
pursuing that discipline.
Because we would need to examine the drcumstances surrounding Lock's possession of a
controlled substance to determine if she were unfit to practice law, which we are
prohibited from doing under the compulsory discipline rules, !wi c^iot^concliid^tliO
possession of W^^
cnme^pfmoral turpitude petsgf Thus, Lock is
not subject to compulsory discipline. Instead, Lock's misconduct should be reviewed and
sanctioned under the standard grievance procedures. Our holding does not mean that an
attorney who has pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance is immune from
discipline or will necessarily receive the least possible sanction; we rely on the Bar to
impose appropriate discipline, including suspension or disbarment when the facts so
warrant, to protect the public from impaired attorneys, and to improve the reputation and
integrity of the legal professioa However, the venue for that discipline is the standard
grievance process.
Our position is further supported by the existence of the Texas Lawyers1 Assistance
Program. Among other things, TLAP provides peer intervention and rehabilitation to
practicing attorneys whose professional performance is impaired because of chemical
dependency. This service is available not only to lawyers who take part voluntarily, but
also to lawyers who have been referred by family, friends, or other members of the bar.
Impaired attorneys may participate in the program without being subject to disciplinary
action. Infect, TLAP receives referrals from the State Bar's disciplinary system, but
TLAP win not intervene in any disciplinary action, nor will it report an impaired lawyer
to the disciplinary authorities. Therefore; it would be inconsistent for us to hold that
possession of a controlled substance is a crime of moral turpitude, which means by
definition that an attorney is categorically unfit to practice law, when the State Bar, under
our ultimate supervision, sponsors a program to assist attorneys in overcoming addiction
while the attorneys continue to practice law.
In light of these considerations, we hold that an attorney convicted of or receiving
deferred adjudication for possession of a controlled substance must be disciplined in the
standard grievance process, where the underlying facts and any collateral circumstances
can yield the appropriate sanction. We reiterate that our holding does not mean that a
lawyer's possession or use of drugs should go undisciplined. Rather, a licensed Texas
attorney convicted of or receiving deferred adjudication for possession of a controlled
substance should be sanctioned in the standard grievance process. Accordingly, we
reverse BODA's judgment and remand the case to BODAforfiirfherproceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Tex.,2001.
In re Lock
54 S.W.3d 305,44 Tex. Sup- Ct 1 9 3 4
END OF DOCUMENT
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In re Discipline of Ashton
768F.2d74
CJL3(Pa.),1985.
Decided July 16,1985
After testimony was concluded Ashton's counsel advanced the legal argument that it was
not proper to confront him for thefirsttime at this hearing with rumors based on hearsay,
and expect him to meet them in the hearing. A. 155- 56. Throughout the argument the
panel member who expressed strong dissatisfaction with the state Disciplinary Board
proceedings indicated that the rumors (about which no one testified) bore on Ashton's
reputation. Ashton's counsel attempted, with little success, to convince the panel that the
relevant inquiry, under Local Rule 1(d), was Ashton's present "moral and professional
character11 The transcript contains numerous indications that one panel member found
more relevant an anticipated adverse public reaction to Ashton's readmissioiL Two panel
members acknowledged, however, that under the governing legal standard ofIn re
Dreier, 258 R2d 68 (3d Cir.1958), the district court should not deny admission to an
attorney who has been readmitted to the state Bar unless the district courtfindsthat the
attorney is not presently of good moral and professional character. A. 163-65.
The transcript of testimony before the state Disciplinary Board and the transcript of
testimony of the witnesses who testified before the ad hoc panel establishes not merely a
prima facie case, but a rather strong case that Ashton, since joining Alcoholics
Anonymous, has ceased alcohol abuse, and has become a person of good moral and
professional character.
The ad hoc panel filed a report to the fall court on April 19,1983. Asidefroma listing of
witnesses, the entire report states:
Some of the witnesses testified that they had known Mr. Ashtonfora longtime,feltthat
his problems were caused by alcoholism, but that he is now reformed and is capable of
practicing law.
The district court requires applicants to its Bar to offer satisfactory evidence of their good
moral and professional character. Local Rule 1(d). Since that is the standard which the
court adopted by rule, we need not consider whether, had some more stringent standard
been adopted, it would conflict with Matter ofAbrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.1975).
Applying the standard of Local Rule 1(d), on this record, Ashton established a prima
facie case of present good character. The only relevant reason advanced by the district
court for concluding that he is not entitled to admission to the B ar is a reason on which
the ad hoc panel made no finding, and which is in any event not supported by the record
evidence. That being the case, there is no rational basis for the district court's order
denying Ashton's application for admission. This alone is groundforreversal, and it is
not necessary to address Ashton's further contentions that the procedures adopted by the
ad hoc panel are inconsistent with the due process requirements ofIn re Ruffcdo, 390 U.S.
544,88 S.Ct 1222,20 LJEd2d 117 (1968).
The order appealedfromwill be reversed and the district court will be directed to grant
Ashton's motion for admission to its Bar.
C.A.3 (Pa.),1985.

In re Discipline of Ashton
768F.2d74
Opinion on rehearing,
3dCir..769F.2dl68.
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
The petitionforrehearingfiledby appellant in the above entitled case, 768 F.2d 74having been submitted to the judges who participated in the dedsion of this court and to
all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge
who concurred in the decision having askedforrehearing, and a majority of the circuit
judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court
in banc, the petitionforrehearing is denied
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Ray Harding, Jr.

Case No. 03-0417

RESPONDENTS SCREEOTNG PANEL WITNESS LIST
The Respondent, Ray Harding, Jr., hereby submits that the following witnesses will be
called at the Screening Panel Hearing currently scheduled for Thursday, January 22,2004,
commencing at 1:00 p.m. By this document the Respondent has attempted to provide the Panel
with the approximate time each witness will be providing testimony, the name and relationship
of the witness to the Respondent, and what information the testimony is anticipated to provide:
1:30 p.m.
Dr. Lynn Johnson, 261-1412, may appear in person.
Psychologist for Ray Harding.
Meets with Ray regularly
Involved with Ray's aftercare through the Betty Ford Clinic.
6.3(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
6.3(c) personal or emotional problems;
6.3(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
the misconduct involved;
6.3(g) good character or reputation;
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.3(i)(l) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.3(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.3(i)(3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
6.3(i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.
Dr. (HenR. Hanson, 581-3174, may appear in person.
PhD, DDS, Director of Utah Addiction Center.
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.3(5(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.3(iX3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and

6.3(i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.

Francis Mackenzie, 381-4148, will appear in person.
Met Ray through drug rehabilitation about one (1) year ago.
Sees Ray regularly about four (4) times per week.
6.3(g) good character or reputation;
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.30(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.30(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
6.30(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
6.3(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
6.3(m) remorse.
Richard Uday, 579-0404, will appear in person
Head of Utah State Bar's Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program.
Will testify about Ray's involvement with that Program.
6.3(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
the misconduct involved;
6.3(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
6.3(g) good character or reputation;
6.3(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.3(f)(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.3Q(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contribute^ to the
misconduct; and
6 3 0 ( 3 ) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
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6.3 (i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
6.3 (m) remorse.
DordKynaston, (801) 369-3281, (801) 423-3338, will appear tdephonically.
Ex husband of Ann Harding.
Will testify as to her credibility.
Judge Fred Howard, (801) 429-1113, (801) 429-1054, may appear tdq>honically.
Fourth District Court Judge.
Saw Ray regularly during the time he was a sitting Judge.
Never felt that he was under the influence.
Never thought he smoked crack cocaine at the Court
Judge Claudia Laycock, (801) 429-1071, will appear tdephonically.
Fourth District Court Judge.
Saw Ray regularly during the time he was sitting Judge.
Never felt that he was under the influence.
Never thought he smoked crack cocaine at the Court.
3:00 p.m.
Paul Belnap, (801) 560-9758 (cdl), (801) 532-7080 (work), will appear tdephonically.
Attorney at Strong & Hanoi
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court several times.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
John Allen, (801) 375-8800, will appear tdephonically.
Former Deputy Utah County attorney.
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regularly.
Never observed inappropriate behavior or anything which would lead him ta condude
Ray was ever under the influence while on the bench.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
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Thomas W. Sdler, (801) 375-1920, may appear in parson.
Attorney at Robinson, Seiler.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
Rick J. Sutherland, (435) 645-6156, will appear telephonically.
Attorney at Law.
Wrote letter of January 17,2004.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
Ed Brass, 322-5678, will appear telephonically.
Ray's attorney throughout the criminal process.
Was present in Court in July, t, 2002, will testify contraiy to anticipated testimony of
Mariane O'Biyant
6.3(e) full andfreedisclosure to the client or the disdplinaiy authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
6.3(e) foil and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
6.3(m) remorse.
Sheleigh A. Chalkey-Harding, 651-1901,347-0143, may appear in person.
Attorney andfriendof Ray.
63(g) good character or reputation;
63(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
63(f)(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
63(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
63(i)(3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
63®(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
63(m) remorse.
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Mike Petro, (801) 362-1760, will appear tdephonically.
Attorney at Young, Kester & Petro.
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regularly.
Never observed any conduct which would lead him to condude that Ray was under the
influence while on the bench.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
4:00 p.m.
Shauna Young Woodward, (801) 429-1067, will appear tdephonically.
Judge Harding's In-Court Cleric
Will testify that she never observed Ray under the influence or using drugs while on the
bench.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
Dave Sturgill, (801) 370-8026, will appear tdephonically.
Deputy Utah County Attorney.
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regular}/.
Never observed any conduct that would lead him to conclude Ray used drugs while on
the bench.
6.3(g) good character or reputation.
Michelle Monson, (408) 349-6123, will appear tdephonically.
Ray's daughter.
6.3(c) personal or emotional problems;
63(g) good character or reputation;
6.30 mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.3(F)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.30(3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
6.30(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
6.3(m) remorse.
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Nicole Farnsworth, (801) 794-0278, will appear in person.
Ray's daughter.
63(c) personal or emotional problems;
6.3(g) good character or reputation;
6.3(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.30(1) The respondeat is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.3(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.3(i)(3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
6.3^(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
6.3(m) remorse.
5:00 p.m.
James Heiting, (909) 682-6400, will appear by telephone.
Attorney at Heiting & Irwin.
Ray's mentor and sponsor during his current care.
6.3(g) good character or reputation;
6.3 (I) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
6.3(i)(l) The respondent is affected, by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
6.30(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
6.3(L)(3) The respondent's recoveryfromthe substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and
6.3(iX4) The recoveiy arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.
Ray Harding, Jr., Respondeat.

Respectfully submitted this Z7* day of J d u t e

, 2004.
ft
SKORDAS1& CASTON, LLC

Gregory tj. Skordas

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
00O00

In Re:

Ray Harding, Jr.

Case No. 20020535-SC

ORDER OF REFERENCE
Pursuant to Rule 6. Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, this Court has the exclusive authority to review the
licensure status of Ray Harding, Jr., a former Utah District
Judge, in connection with facts arising during his judicial
tenure, summarized in the recommended Order of Removal from
Office of Judicial Conduct Commission, Case No. 200300173-SC, and
the accompanying stipulation and record. The Court therefore
requests the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
to proceed with a disciplinary review under its ordinary rules,
but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr.
Harding's license to practice law to be submitted directly to
this Court for final action.

For The Court:

Date
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Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT
I n Re:

Ray H a r d i n g ,

Jr.

Case No.

20020535-SC

ORDER

Pursuant to this Court's Order of Reference, dated March 25,
2003, zne Court: has received a copy of the decision of Screening
Panel C-l, including its findings, conclusions, and
recommendation for discipline in this matter, along with the
entire evidentiary record before the Panel. Inasmuch as the
court now intends to review the case in order to make a final
determination regarding what sanction is appropriate in this
matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Ray Harding, Jr. is suspended from the practice of law
pending a final disposition by this Court;

2.

This matter will be placed on the Court's oral argument
calendar for May 6, 2004, at 9:00 a.m.

3.

The parties ( Mr. Harding and the Office of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar ) are requested to file briefs
with the Court regarding the appropriate disciplinary
sanction to be imposed. The parties should be aware that the
Court intends to consider the full range of disciplinary
sanctions available.
The schedule for briefing will be as follows:

Simultaneous opening briefs are due to be filed on or before
April 5, 2004. Simultaneous reply briefs ( optional )to be filed
on or before April 22, 2004. The briefs and oral argument shall
conform to the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure.
For The Court:

Date

[/

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 13 th day of February 2004, I mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to
the following addresses:

Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111-3834

Gregory G. Skordas
Attorney At Law
9 Exchange Place #1104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Date CJ^f)

• tf. 20OV

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

Re: Ray Harding Jr.
Case No, 20020535-SC

